Internal security threats to Pakistan by Safdar, Naveed
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-12
Internal security threats to Pakistan
Safdar, Naveed












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









 Thesis Advisor:   Robert Looney





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 i
 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Internal Security Threats to Pakistan 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Naveed Safdar 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES:  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Pakistan Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Ethnicity, sectarianism and economic instability are fundamental variables of internal security threats to 
Pakistan. Religious extremism has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and 
has affected the country adversely. At the same time inter-provincial grievances could potentially cause serious 
damage to the federation. Despite recent economic recovery and sound macro policies, the absence of genuine 
socio-economic development has provided ethno-sectarian elements and regional forces grounds to exploit and 
weaken Pakistan internally. 
This paper argues that ethno-sectarian problems are major security threats to Pakistan and will remain a 
huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. Interdependence of these multifaceted threats and their 
overall impact on internal security is the focus of this analysis. Pakistan needs to address these national security 
threats and find a viable solution in a reasonable timeframe to find its rightful place in the community of modern 
nations. The immediate requirement is to introduce political, economic and education reforms and take bold 
initiatives to obviate present and future threats. This paper recommends three-pronged strategy to counter ethno-
sectarian threats to Pakistan: halt then reverse present trends, enforce rule of law and lastly introduce fresh 
incentives for socio-economic development. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
151 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Ethnicity, provincialism, Sectarianism, Jihadi Culture, Economic 
Instability, Interdependence of Economy and Internal Security, State Institutions, Police, 
Paramilitary 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS TO PAKISTAN 
 
Naveed Safdar  
Lieutenant Colonel., Pakistan Army 
BSc (Honors) War Studies, Balochistan University, 1996 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 











Author:  Naveed Safdar 
 
 








 James J. Wirtz 





























Ethnicity, sectarianism and economic instability are fundamental variables of 
internal security threats to Pakistan. Religious extremism has created an unenviable 
image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country 
adversely. At the same time inter-provincial grievances could potentially cause serious 
damage to the federation. Despite recent economic recovery and sound macro policies, 
the absence of genuine socio-economic development has provided ethno-sectarian 
elements and regional forces grounds to exploit and weaken Pakistan internally.  
This paper argues that ethno-sectarian problems are major security threats to 
Pakistan and will remain a huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. 
Interdependence of these multifaceted threats and their overall impact on internal security 
is the focus of this analysis. Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and 
find a viable solution in a reasonable timeframe to find its rightful place in the 
community of modern nations. The immediate requirement is to introduce political, 
economic and education reforms and take bold initiatives to obviate present and future 
threats. This paper recommends three-pronged strategy to counter ethno-sectarian threats 
to Pakistan: halt then reverse present trends, enforce rule of law, and lastly introduce 
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Impact of globalization, complex economic interdependence and events after 9/11 
have brought a major shift in security perceptions in Pakistan. Internal security concerns 
caused by resurgence of extremism, ethnic polarization, socio-economic problems, and 
political instability, have assumed far greater importance than external security threats to 
Pakistan. Though India continues to pose serious military challenge, which compounds 
Pakistan’s security, however, Pakistan’s immediate threat grows from within, i.e., from 
its internal security problems.  
There is little disagreement on the seriousness of internal security threats in 
Pakistan. However, opinion differs in regards to understanding which type of threat is 
most serious. A large number of security thinkers consider sectarianism and growing 
jihadi culture is the most serious threat to the country. President Pervez Musharraf also 
said the “only threat is sectarian and religious terrorism, which is eating us like termites, 
and it is Islam and the Muslim Ummah (community) which is paying the high cost. We 
all have to fight against it.”1 However, some scholars and political leaders consider 
ethnicity and national integration to be most serious threat to Pakistan, also referred to as 
‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. In the last decade, nationalistic movements such as the 
Balochi, Sindhi and Mohajir, have been increasing restive and posing threats to the 
integrity of the state. Recognizing this threat, President Musharraf regarded inter-
provincial harmony as one key area for focus after taking over in October 1999.2 Another 
school of thought strongly feels that economic collapse can lead to the disintegration of 
Pakistan. Cited examples are: the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, some crumbling African 
states like Congo, Somalia and Ethiopia, and more recently, Afghanistan, are often given 
to illustrate this new threat phenomenon. It is extremely difficult to prioritize which threat 
is the most dangerous. The real challenge however, is how to handle these threats, 
minimize their negative impact, and how to take the country out of these quagmires?  
                                                 
1 President Musharraf told a thousand armed forces’ top brass, provincial officials and foreign 
diplomats at navy dockyards in Arabian Sea port city Karachi, in December 2003. For details see: 
Pakistan: Threat is internal, at web-site http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-
1462_1458842,00.html. March 2004. 
2 Musharraf speech October 17, 1999. See The Dawn newspaper.    
2 
Religious extremism with a sharp rise in jihadi culture, ethnic diversity, economic 
instability are the fundamental variables which have a downward spiral effect on the 
stability and peace within the country and in the region as well. All these variables pose a 
certain degree of serious threat in one form or the other. Each variable needs to be 
analyzed critically to determine their impact on Pakistan’s internal security. I argue that 
ethno-sectarian problems are major security threats to integrity of Pakistan and will 
remain a huge impediment to the goals of economic prosperity. There is a need to 
understand the interdependence of these multifaceted threats to the country and take a 
holistic view in order to formulate viable strategies for the future. Any strategy that does 
not critically address all the security threats may prove to be counter productive in the 
long term. Professor Robert Looney rightly argues that “strategy of macro economic 
stability is the best thing the country can do in the short term”. However, he stresses that 
“the country must address it internal terrorism problems if it is to get high sustainable 
amount of foreign investment.”3 Looney’s statement clearly establishes a relationship 
between internal security threats and economy. Therefore, this thesis will analyze the 
ethno-sectarian threats to Pakistan and examine their influence on economy. Other 
contributing factors to the state of affairs in Pakistan are lack of democratization and bad 
governance. Their combined affect has compounded the ethno-sectarian problems and 
economy. Given the scope of this thesis, later factors are not being analyzed threadbare 
but only referred to in the chapters. However, the negative impact of breakdown of 
fundamental security institutions has been discussed separately in Chapter V as 
intervening variable to critically analyze its role in handling internal security threats.  
Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution, 
in a reasonable timeframe, to find its rightful place in the community of modern nations. 
The rise of the jihadi culture has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of 
the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely. At the same time inter-
provincial grievances could potentially cause serious damage to the federation. The 
ethnic and regional polarization has emerged as major motivation for potential breeding 
ground for terrorism. In the early 1960s, theorists of modernization proposed that “with 
                                                 
3 Looney, Robert, Pakistan: Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism, draft paper received from 
Professor Robert Looney.  
3 
accelerated mobility and economic interdependence ethnic differences would eventually 
disappear.”4 But in the case of Pakistan, the situation remained highly charged from the 
outset. Here ethnic difference became “instrument for competition over scarce 
resources”5 Ethnic diversity, scarce resources and struggle for survival have been the key 
factors that led to the numerous ethnic violence, law and order situation in the country. 
The absence of genuine socio-economic development has provided ground to ethno-
sectarian elements and regional forces to exploit the situation. In the future, pressing 
issues related to over population, absence of basic civic amenities and lack of education 
would pose serious challenges, especially in the province of Sindh and Balochistan. This 
thesis concludes that for a peaceful Pakistan, there is a need to eradicate any sense of 
alienation and obtain egalitarianism in the country as whole by establishing writ of the 
government, by achieving democratization, decentralization, accountability, and wider 
consensus on vital issues of national importance. The immediate requirement is to 
introduce political, economic and education initiatives in line with the challenges of 
future. Finally this paper recommends a three pronged strategy to fight out extremisms 
and militants. The first prong suggests means to halt and then reverse the growing trend 
of religious intolerance. The second prong proposes methods to enforce the rule of law. 
The last prong recommends measures to consolidate the gains by introducing incentives 
and dividends of economic prosperity.  
This thesis has been divided into six chapters. After this chapter of introduction, 
Chapter II discusses the ethnicity challenges posed to Pakistan’s internal security. 
Chapter III analyses the impact of growing Jihadi culture and its negative implication for 
the future viability of Pakistan. Chapter IV focuses on interdependence between economy 
and ethno-sectarian problems. Chapter V will briefly analyze the causes of weakness in 
security institutions, i.e., police, paramilitary, and judiciary, in handling internal security 
threats to the country. The last chapter suggests a strategy and gives recommendations. 
Chapter II summary is mentioned below. 
                                                 
4 Iftikhar H. Malik, State an Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997, pp. 174 and 178. 
5 This term has been used by number of Pakistani scholars and Western scholar as well.  Steve Cohen 
is the person who actually referred to this term many a times.   
4 
Chapter II deals with ‘ethnic challenges in Pakistan. This has been the most 
serious threat to Pakistan since its birth. In Pakistani official terms it is also referred to as 
‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. Pakistan, as yet, is evolving nation. Each province in 
Pakistan has its own culture, language, and history and it drives ethnocentric pride in it. 
The main question is whether the ethic problems in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP could 
lead to disintegration of Pakistan. This assertion is exaggerated. One problem identified 
by the research is the feeling amongst these provinces, of the Punjabis domination in 
Pakistan. In this regard the separation of East Pakistan has been analyzed to draw its 
parallel with recent nationalistic movements. I argue that that separation of East Pakistan 
does not invalidate the “Two-Nation Theory” which was the basis of Pakistan’s creation 
but the event was a product of peculiar set of circumstances such as political failure, 
geographical cleavage, exploitation, and intervention by India. Nevertheless, East 
Pakistan did set precedence for sub-national movements, wherein it validates the use 
violence as instrument of policy to alleviate grievances and deprivations. This chapter 
identifies that basic resentment on important issues: water distribution, royalty on natural 
resources, lack of equal representation at the center, use of force by the army and security 
agencies, uneven socio-economic development of provinces- compounds and cause 
serious problems for the unity of the nation. Lately, inter-provincial water crises and 
scarcity of resources has had serious ramifications for integration and economic future of 
Pakistan. While the present government is trying hard to neutralize these threats, the 
problem of fair distribution of resources, socio-economic development and role of 
provincial government remains unresolved.     
Chapter III shifts focus to growing threats of sectarianism and jihadi culture to the 
internal security of Pakistan. Different sectarian groups and their affiliations with militant 
groups are discussed at length. Pakistan came into existence as a moderate and modern 
nation state under the vision of Jinnah- the father of the nation. But downward trend in 
last 25 years warrants an explanation to the causes. A deliberate effort is made to explain 
the root causes for the rise of jihad syndrome in Pakistan. It also questions the poor 
education system and the role of madrassahs in fueling religious extremism and providing 
recruits to jihadi militant groups. Over a period of time, Pakistan became the hub of 
fundamentalists, which affected the moderate fabric of Pakistani society. Trained and 
5 
motivated militants, having experienced Afghan and Kashmir jihad, are available to 
various groups/sects. These fanatic groups with considerable access to unaccounted 
arms/ammunition are also exploited by opposing political parties. Iranian and Saudi 
Arabia, whose financial/material support to these organizations have been recorded; 
allegedly support some of these groups. Hostile neighboring countries have also exploited 
sectarianism in the last two decades for their own interests. The study proves that 
religious intolerance, sectarian problems and rise of religious extremism and militant 
groups are significant factors responsible for increased unrest and law and order problems 
in Pakistan. Sectarian threats feed on the failed education system in Pakistan and allow 
religious clerics to interpret Islam in the manner that exploits unemployed and raw youth. 
This chapter also discusses specific problems currently in tribal areas where use 
of force in tribal area is a necessity but not a sufficient condition. Excessively relying 
upon military force alone is not answer to all the threats. Being an ideological Muslim 
state, Pakistan must allow sufficient freedom to religio-political parties without allowing 
them to use violent means or indulge in practices contrary to the policy of state. Any 
extremist group that uses violent means must be confronted with a strong application of 
force with clear ends in sight. Leadership must convey resolve and use of all appropriate 
state instruments to eliminate all such threats.           
The focus of Chapter IV is on the economy. It highlights the effects of ethnic 
tensions and sectarian violence on the economy. The impact of fundamental variables, 
like environmental scarcity and lack of human resource development, on economy and 
internal security, will also be discussed. Tensions between security imperatives and 
economic development are not confronted by Pakistan alone. But given Pakistan’s 
peculiar set of problems, this debate is significant. Proponents of security first argue that 
security guarantees economic development. According to them, security is a precondition 
of development and for achieving successful outcomes in the other reconstruction 
pillars.6 Conversely, the supporters of economy first approach rely on economic 
development, which will in turn ensure credible national security. This school of thought 
believes it is erroneous to qualify security purely in terms of physical security or 
                                                 
6 A Secure Europe in a Better World, Security strategy paper presented at Thessaloniki summit.  
6 
attainable through military means. This approach argues that “economic development” is 
the most effective mean to attain security.7 My main argument is that these two variables 
are interdependent. Professor Robert McNab, while explaining the linkage between 
economy and security in Afghanistan, states that “demilitarization of Afghan society 
cannot be achieved unless suitable reintegration opportunities are available to former 
militias. If the economy remains stagnant and no employment is forthcoming the process 
of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration will collapse”.8 Though Pakistan’s 
problems are not akin to Afghanistan, the problem and solution holds true for 
reintegrating jihadi/sectarian militants in Pakistan as well.  
In Pakistan, the provinces have been fighting over the distribution of financial 
resources, over the share of water, and over the claim of natural resources. This alone has 
led to sectarian and ethnic polarization with attendant negative impact on Pakistan’s 
economy. Pakistan has embarked on major projects of national importance. However, 
province agendas and bitter differences have forced these mega projects into non-start 
and have placed our country’s future prosperity into question. In recent years, the country 
has experienced critical water shortages both for irrigation and for drinking purposes. 
This has serious repercussion for Pakistan’s future viability and economy. Man-made 
dams may become inoperative in 10-15 years time because of silting and worst is no new 
dams are being built.9 At present, the storage capacity of our major reservoir has already 
declined to 12.6 million-acre feet (MAF), which is hardy 20 percent of our potential 
storage capacity of 65.4 MAF.10 Inter-provincial disharmony on critical issues of national 
importance can ruin the future. Already deteriorating law and order situation in the 
country has forced foreign investor to shy away from Pakistan. In fiscal year 2003-2004, 
                                                 
7 Mirza,M. Nasrullah, External Security and the Issue of Development in Pakistan, available on 
www.acdis.uiuc.edu/homepage_docs/pubs_docs/S&P_docs/S7P. March 2004. 
8 McNab Robert, Naval Postgraduate School, Economics of Development for Security Building, 
Lecture notes on Economic of Security building, April 17, 2004.  
9 Henning, Job, Pakistan’s Future and US Policy Options, Regional Issues-Energy and Water Crisis, 
Centre of Strategic and International Studies , September 24, 2002, p.5.  Available on 
http://www.csis.org/saprog/020924PKfuture.pdf, 14 Jun 2004.  
10 M. H. Naqvi, S. M Alam, Water Scenario and Pakistan, March 19, 2003, p. 6. Available on internet 
site: www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp. 14 June 2004.  
 
7 
foreign direct investment (FDI) dropped by 12 percent11 ,i.e., $586.8 million during nine 
months (July-March), compared with $664.7 million of the same period last year12. 
Strikes in view of sectarian killing have hurt Pakistan immensely in terms of economic 
losses. According to a study by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a single 
day's strike results in losses amounting to Rs1.18 billion in terms of GDP, besides Rs154 
million indirect tax revenue loss to the national kitty.13 How can we invest more in 
education or improve the capacity of state institutions if economically these plans are 
unsustainable? This chapter discusses wide variety of viewpoints on the subject and 
concludes that economic development and internal security are interdependent on each 
other and should be addressed simultaneously for future stability of Pakistan. 
Chapter V researches into the flaws and weaknesses of the law enforcing agencies 
in Pakistan whose inability to enforce rule of law in the country has compounded the 
above mentioned problems manifolds. With ethnic conflicts, sectarian violence and crime 
rate on the rise, the failing law enforcing institutions, i.e., police and judiciary, have 
aggravated domestic problems. Sectarian killings, ethnic tensions between groups and 
provinces are on rise. The series of events points to the reality that state institutions of 
Pakistan have failed to play its vital role in dissolving these threats and establishing the 
writ of the government. Police is the main law-enforcing agency in the country, which is 
supported by paramilitary troops to maintain the order. However, present law and order 
situation of the country is reflection of its performance and effectiveness. The sectarian 
and jihad militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are equipped 
with modern weapons and too highly trained for the ill-equipped police force to be able 
to counter them. The inefficiency and breakdown of civil institutions have dragged in 
military  in  running  these  institutions. This  direct  intervention  has  a  downward spiral  
                                                 
11 Kiani, Khaleeq, Foreign Investment falls by 12pc, The Dawn, April 20, 2004. 
12 The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the United Kingdom declined by a mammoth 65 per cent 
to $75.7 million against $202.7 million of the same period last year. The FDI from the UAE, which is 
Pakistan's third largest investment partners after the US and the UK, also reduced by 52 per cent to $54.1 
million against $112.7 million of the corresponding period last year. FDI from Saudi Arabia came down by 
more than 90 per cent to $3.2 million compared with $32.6 million of the same period last year. Investment 
from other countries also dropped to $77 million against last year's $114.5 million. FDI from France, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Canada, and Australia reduced during the same period. 
13 Ibid., p. 6. 
8 
effect on already sensitive civil-military relations in Pakistan. The answer to all the 
problem lies in strengthening state institutions which are capable of establishing writ of 
government.  
Chapter VI lays out broad conclusions and recommendations of this study. The 
existing provinces are highly multi-ethnic in nature creating a situation similar to a tug-
of-war for power among different ethnic groups. Besides, increase in population growth 
has increased the struggle for survival and created lots of administrative and social 
problems. Fair income distribution and development in all provinces will help reduce 
tension between provinces. The government should increase the development fund for 
Balochistan, which has remained underdeveloped and deprived for a long time. Socio-
economic packages to upgrade some well deserving areas/communities would reduce 
political exploitation.  
Pakistan must confront jihadi culture squarely, since it has transformed into a 
movement that can cause immense damage to the state of Pakistan. Pakistan’s political, 
institutional, economic and social decay will have to revive and accelerate before the 
radical groups gain enough traction to emerge as an independent political force undoing 
the writ of government within state. There is a need to formulate a strategy to deal with 
the threat. Out rightly confronting jihadi organizations could result in a backlash which 
could get out of control. Preferably, the strategy should be to: keep a strong check on 
their activities, cut their support by engaging masses, bring the frustrated youth in the 




II. ETHNIC CHALLENGES IN PAKISTAN  
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Ethnicity has been the most serious challenge to Pakistan’s integrity since its 
birth. In Pakistani official terms it is also referred to as ‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. 
Pakistan, as yet, is evolving nation. Each province in Pakistan has its own culture, 
language, and history and it drives ethnocentric pride in it. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic 
country, where different ethnic groups are fighting for their identification and rights, 
since its inception. The element of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’ is more dominating over the factor 
‘our’. In past, provincial imbalance, political failure, ethnic rise and insurgency, had cost 
the loss of its eastern wing.  A similar kind of unrest is prevailing in the remaining 
Pakistan even today. The ethnic conflicts within regions and inter-provincial grievances 
have created an alarming situation. Law and order situation in Sindh and insurgencies in 
Balochistan raises various questions like: The main question is whether the ethic 
problems in Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP could lead to disintegration of Pakistan. What 
are the reasons for the ethnic unrest? How the power struggle between different factions 
has become an internal security problem? Is the ethnic uprising a sign of disintegration? 
Is the history, 1971, going to repeat it?  
In this chapter, I argue that that separation of East Pakistan does not invalidate the 
“Two-Nation Theory” which was the basis of Pakistan’s creation but the event was a 
product of peculiar set of circumstances such as political failure, geographical cleavage 
and exploitation and intervention by India. Nevertheless, East Pakistan did set precedence 
for sub-national movements wherein it validates use violence as instrument of policy to 
alleviate grievances and deprivations. 
This chapter will initially define the term ‘Ethnicity’ and discuss the ethnic nature 
of Pakistan. Later; will throw some light on causes of separation of East Pakistan, ethnic 
issues in Sindh and Balochistan and will present issues responsible for inter provincial 
disharmony. Last portion of this chapter will analyze the present situation in Balochistan 




B. WHAT IS ETHNICITY  
The term ‘ethnicity’ is usually used to define a group of persons sharing a 
common cultural heritage. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the resurrection of 
ethnic movements across the globe has forced many political analysts to look at it more 
closely.14 Out of 132 countries in 1992, there were only a dozen which could be 
considered homogeneous; 25 had a single ethnic group accounting for 90 percent of total 
population while another 25 countries had an ethnic majority of 75 percent. Thirty-one 
countries had a single ethnic group accounting for 50 percent to 75 percent of total 
population whereas in 39 countries no single group exceeded half the total population. In 
a few European and Latin American cases, one single ethnic group would count for 75 
percent of total population.15 
Indeed the greatest challenge to the “New World Order” comes from ethnicity 
that has largely replaced ideology as the major threshold of political activism.16 After the 
end of the Cold War, there was a lot of disorientation and many options were open. 
Multi-literalism, international liberalism, democratic peace, a new era of democracy of 
human rights, of political freedom, and participation is some of the terms and ideas that 
came up in the spirit of hope. But in the end, the real driving force became the issue of 
“ethnicity” and “ethnic conflict”. Multi-ethnicity has become a socio-political 
phenomenon in most civil societies.  In the present century, inter-ethnic cleavages, 
competition, and conflict seem to have acquired a higher intensity. As a result, ethnic 
mobilization poses various challenges to many developing as well as developed 
countries.  Ethnicization of politics and politicization of ethnicity eventually diffuses the 
mutual tolerance and sharpens ethnic consciousness among various communities.17 There 
is a deep relation between ethnicity and terrorism, as both of them are swiftly used to 
                                                 
14 A number of scholars had been suggesting that the ethnic within the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe could eventually disintegrate the Communist bloc as such. US Senator Daniel P. Moynihan 
reaffirmed his early statements on ethnic volatility in his Cyril Foster Lecture on the subject at Oxford on 
29th November 1991. Also see Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin’s Press Inc. 
1997, p. 172. 
15 For further details, see Myron Weiner, ‘Peoples and States in the New World Order,’ Third World 
Quarterly, XIII (2), 1992, p. 320.  
16 President Bush, in a speech at the US Naval Academy, Annapolis, emphasized this great shift in 
global politics. See The Boston Globe, 15 April 1991.  
17 P. R. Rajeswari, Ethnicity, Its Causes and Possible Solutions: The Case of Sri Lanka. 
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cover a multitude of events and contexts, rightly or wrongly. Similarly to “terrorism”, 
“ethnicity” is a concept that lives from its proclaimed idea.18  
1. Ethnic Nature of Pakistan 
Demand for a separate homeland by the Muslims of India was based on the ‘two-
nation theory’. But when it emerged, it was a state with the ethnic cocktail of Sindhis, 
Punjabis, Balochistan, Pakhtoons, Bengalis and refugees from India.  Pakistan falls into 
the category of what Clifford Geertz calls “old societies and new states”.19 Language and 
cultural factors are often not supportive of the growth of single nationalism in these new 
states, and great many of which have “illogical’ boundaries cutting across tribes and 
nationality groups or which contain within themselves “sub-national” groups whose 
leaders aspire to lead an independent nation state. The social group cleavages in 
multicultural states are both horizontal (i.e., ethnic, religious, linguistic, tribal) and 
vertical (i.e., class, caste and sectarian). The most immediate loyalties of the vast majority 
of people in these states go to units other than the nation state.20 The most serious threat 
to Pakistan since it’s birth has been from the ethnic front, which in official terms referred 
to as ‘provincialism’ or ‘regionalism’. History is not unifying factor in Pakistan. Each 
province has its own culture, language, and history.  
2. Separatist Movements 
There have been sporadic separatist movements and ethnic riots in different 
regions of the country since its creation. Of Pakistan’s five major ethnic groups, all 
except Punjab have experienced volatile separatist movements. There was Sarieki 
movement in Punjab but it was not so violent. The oldest separatist movements are 
Pushtunistan and Balochi movements. Pushtun separatism picked up in 1950s with 
backing of Afghan government.21 The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
government’s programs to include Pushtoons into the instrument of state- the Army and 
civil services -has weakened the Pushtunistan Movement. It is also to be noted that today 
                                                 
18 Dr. Carsten Wieland, The Paradigm of Ethnicity vs. the Paradigm of terrorism: Are 11/9 and 9/11 
two sides of the Same Coin? Paper presented on Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Lincoln 
University, UK, April 6-8, 2004, p. 2. 
19 Geertz, Old Societies.  Also see: Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, 
Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 5.  
20 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 3. 
21 Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State? Research Institute for the Study of 
Conflict and Terrorism, 1990, p. 16. 
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NWFP economy has become closely integrated with that of Punjab.22 But in present day 
scenario the Balochi, Sindhi and Mohajir movements are quite active and poses serious 
threat to the integrity of the state In past Bangali Separatist Movement that resulted in 
separation of East Pakistan triggered ethnic discrepancies and frustration among different 
groups- leading to ethnic riots in the remaining Pakistan. To further worsen the situation, 
heavy influx of arms due to Afghan war militarized the ethnic politics in 1980s. 
C. BANGLADESH-AN ETHNICITY CASE 
As elsewhere in South Asia, linguistic and geographic factors in Pakistan have 
continued to play a significant role in ethnic identification. Pakistan was and is a multi-
lingual, multi cultural and essentially plural society.  Selection of the official language of 
the state was one of the divisive issues that Pakistan faced in its early days of creation. As 
more than half of the population spoke Bengali, the East Pakistanis felt that Bengali 
(Bangla) should have been given the status of national language. But instead, Urdu, due 
to it’s historic background in sub-continent was designated the national language for the 
linguistically heterogeneous new-born state. West Pakistanis accepted the decision 
without hesitation, but East Pakistanis considered it as an affront and an unfair 
imposition. Their provincial sentiment, which was organized under the banner of religion 
in the pre-Partition struggle, was now marshaled under the banner of language, which 
they insisted was the basis of their cultural identity. The central government 
underestimated the East Pakistanis’ opposition to Urdu, and even when aware of it was 
reluctant to annul the decision on grounds of prestige.  Persuasion as well as force was 
used to suppress East Pakistani’s opposition, but resentment instead of being quelled 
mushroomed.23 On February 21st, 1952, a demonstration was carried out in Dhaka.24 in 
which  students  demanded  equal  status  for  Bangla. The police  reacted by firing on the  
 
                                                 
22 Rodney W. Jones, The Prospects for State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional, and Sectarian 
Fissures, Lawrence Liverore National Laboratory, May 1, 2001, p. 3. 
23 A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 180. 
24 Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan was imposed in 1952, banning public 
meetings and processions. 
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crowd and three students were killed. That day is now celebrated every year as a 
Memorial Day25 and a Shaheed Minar stand there to commemorate the martyrs of the 
language movement.26  
From the very beginning of Pakistan’s development the growing tension between 
the political leaders of the West and East Wings was evident. The first Marshal Law, in 
1958 and numerical domination of Punjabis in Army further aggravated the Bengali 
alienation.  Sentiments of Bengali nationalism, but not yet separatism, became 
widespread. Many Bengalis came to feel their Eastern Wing of Pakistan was being 
unfairly exploited for the benefit of non-Bengali rulers, and that they are victims of a neo-
colonial relationship to the West Wing elite which dominated the country. They felt 
slighted, their language, their culture and their dignity despised. They felt themselves to 
be second-rate citizens in their own land.  Rumors that the income from the jute they 
produce was being siphoned off to the West, to feed the mainly West Pakistan army and 
civil service, gained circulation. There was no love lost between the two provinces by the 
1960’s. 
Table 1.1 Military Elite in Pakistan, July 1955 -Number of Officers 
 










Source: Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan:  Failure In National Integration, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 25. 
 
Table 1.2 Situations of Central Government Services in 1955-56 
 
 From West Pakistan From East Pakistan 
Secretaries 19 0 
Joint secretaries 38 3 
Deputy secretaries 123 10 
Under secretaries 510 38 
Source: A. Tayyeb, Pakistan: A Political Geography, Oxford University Press, 1966, p .181. 
 
                                                 
25 Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 44. 
26 Bangladesh: A Country Study, 1989, p. 22. 
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By 1970, out of twenty secretaries of the government of Pakistan, only three 
acting secretaries were East Pakistanis. The figure for military was even worse: only one 
of the senior thirty-five generals was East-Pakistani.  Yet, in the first decades after 
partition, East Pakistan had a favorable trade balance while West Pakistan ran a deficit.  
Before 1965 East Pakistan earned about 60 percent of Pakistan’s foreign currency 
but received less than 30 percent of imports.27 There was also a mark difference in 
developmental expenditure in two wings. Bengali jute exports supplied most of the 
country’s foreign exchange, yet this was devoted to industrial development in West 
Pakistan.28  
 
Table 1.3  Development Expenditures in East and West Pakistan, 1959-70  
 
 1960-1965 1965-70 
 EAST                  WEST EAST WEST 








Public sector 6,700                    10,800 11,300                  13,700 
Private sector 3,000                    10,700 5,500                  16,000 
Total 9,000                    21,500 16,800                  29,700 
Percentage of 
total 
31 69 36 64 
Source: Pakistan, Planning Commission, An Outline of the Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-75, p. 26 
General elections of 1970 were the final blow on the Bengali nationalists. See Table 1.4 
for result of general elections 1970. Despite the fact that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s 
Awami League won the majority seats, Punjabi-dominated army and bureaucrats of the 
West wing refused to hand over the power.  
This political failure increased grievances and resulted in mass killings and civil 
war.  In March 1971 Pakistani’s used army to crush its Bengali civilian population, 
looting, raping and murdering. That was the turning point. It inflamed the ethnic 
movement for independence.29 Indian army exploited the situation and sought the 
                                                 
27 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, Routledge:  Tylor &Francis Group, 1997 
reprinted in 2000, 2001, p. 237.  
28 Anthony Hyman, Pakistan: Towards a Modern Muslim State?, Research Institute for the Study of 
Conflict and Terrorism, 1990, p. 4. 
29 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity, Routledge:  Tylor &Francis Group, 1997 
reprinted in 2000, 2001, p. 237.  
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opportunity for its intervention, the end product of which was the disintegration of the 
two wings of Pakistan in 1971-72. 
 
Table 1.4 Results of National Assembly Elections of December 1970 
 
 East Pakistan West Pakistan Total 
Awami League 
 




- 81 81 
PML 
 
- 18 18 
Jamaat-I-Islami 
 
- 4 4 
Others 
 
2 35 37 
 Total Seats 
 
162 138 300 
Source: Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: The Continuing Search for Nationhood,  Westview Press, 1991, p. 
58 
 
The creation of Bangladesh had proved that the integrative power of Islam had 
failed to overcome ethnic nationalism. This does not mean that Islam did not possess any 
integrative power, but in the face of contradictory forces (ethnic versus national) it was 
rendered almost powerless.30  
Varied countries like India, the former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, 
Canada, or the United States, embody variations in terms of economic development and 
underdevelopment, yet in Pakistan,with its peculiar geographic location and a national 
consciousness still in the embryonic stage, economic unevenness accented language and 
region-based separatism. Thus, at one level it is simplistic to suggest that the inter-wing 
divide was symptomatic of an internal colonialism or a necessary result of exploitation of 
one province by another.31 
 
                                                 
30 Asaf Hussain,  Ethnicity, National Identity and Praetorianism: The Case of Pakistan, Asian Survey, 
Vol. 16, No. 10 (Oct., 1976), 918-930.  
31 Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p. 15.  
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Table 1.5 Demographic Differences between East and West Pakistan 
 












1951 1961 1951 1961    1951 1961 1951 1961 
East Pakistan  41.9 50.8 701 922 4.3 5.2 21.1 21.5 
West Pakistan  33.7 42.9 1091 138 17.8 22.5 16.4 16.3 
Source: Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan:  Failure In National Integration, Columbia University Press, 1972, p .10. 
 
D. ETHNICITY IN SINDH 
During British Raj, Sindh was under the traditional influence of sardars, pirs and 
syeds. These Feudal elites dominated the Sindhi politics until the creation of Pakistan; 
when millions of migrants fled from India to the newborn state, Pakistan. Karachi was 
made the capital of this new state.  Being a port city and new capital, Karachi had lots of 
avenues for new comers.  Thus, Sindh became a source of attraction for the migrants, 
especially coming from the United Provinces, Rajistan and other Hindu majority areas of 
northern India.  
1. Sindhi’s Resentment against Non-Sindhis  
Karachi was officially made the capital of Pakistan on 22nd May 1948, when 
constituent assembly decided that it would be separated from Sindh to become a federally 
administered area.   
This decision fuelled the anger of Sindhis towards Mohajirs32as separation of 
Karachi from Sindh, by becoming the capital city and influx of non-Sindhis completely 
outnumbered the native Sindhi community in Sindh. By 1951, the year of Pakistan’s first 
census, refugees accounted for 57 percent of Karachi’s population, 65 percent of 
Hyderabad’s and 55 percent of Sukkur’s.33 1961 the census showed a population of 2.048 
million, of whom 838,499 had migrated from India.  
 
                                                 
32 Laurent GAYER (lecturer in international relations theory At Sciences Po, Paris), A Divided City: 
Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan, May 2003.   
33 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood, West view Press, 1999, p. 28. 
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Table 1.6 Population Divided Linguistically 
Urdu speaking         1,101,776                                                       
Punjabi speaking                                              260,747 
Sindhi speaking 174,823                                                           
Gujerati speaking 152,471 
Source: Herbert Feldman, The End and The Beginning, Pakistan 1969-1971, Oxford University Press, 
1975, p. 56. 
In short span of time these Mohajirs34, being better educated and motivated as 
compared to local Sindhis, took hold of bureaucracy and education system in Sindh. 
Sindhis started feeling like “American Indians” in their own province. G.M. Syed 
expressed his sentiments on this decision by these words:  
‘Mr. Jinnah dismembered Sindh by cutting off Karachi, its leading city 
from it and handed it over to the central administration of Liaquat Ali 
Khan as its head, for colonization of the city by Mohajirs.’35  
 
Table 1.7 Ethnic Percentages in Sindh, 1981 
 TOTAL URBAN RURAL 
Mohajir 24.1 54.4 2.2 
Sindhis 55.7 20.0 81.5 
Punjabis 10.6 14.0 8.2 
Pushtoons 3.6 7.9 0.5 
Balochis 6.0 3.7 7.6 
Source: Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1997, p. 202. 
 
Most contentious of all has been allocation of land left by emigrating Hindus to 
Mohajir refugees rather than to the landless Sindhi peasants. After partition a large 
number of Punjabis settled themselves in rural Sindh for agricultural purpose. The 
process of Punjabi-Mohajir settlement was stimulated very suddenly in 1950s and 1960s 
when land commanded by Kotri Barrage and Guddu Barrage allotted to civil servants and 
military personnel.36   
The consolidation of a new power elite and the importance of urban sector to the 
exclusion of the large number of indigenous Sindhis, whipped up strong feelings of 
                                                 
34 Term used for migrants from India. 
35 Bannett Jones, Pakistan, Yale University press, 2002, p. 114. Also see: G. M. Syed, A Case for 
Sindu Desh, Sorath Publication, Bombay, 1985, p. 11. 
36 Herbert Feldman, The End and the Beginning, Pakistan 1969-1971, Oxford University Press, 1975, 
p. 56. 
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Sindhi identity. Tahir Amin considers the founder of ethno-nationalism to be G.M. Syed, 
who gave it a socialist framework in 1953 by establishing Sindhi Awami Mahaz, a 
coalition of four parties. The Sindh Hari Committee, founded by Jatoi, was a communist 
organization within the Mahaz and its founder coined the term Jeeye Sindh (Long live 
Sindh) in opposition to two key institutions of the state: the army and the bureaucracy.37 
On June 1972, Jeeye Sindh Mahaz under the leadership of G.M. Syed demanded 
provincial autonomy, adoption of Sindhi as the national and official language and one-
fourth share in all civil and military services, along with the repatriation of allotted land 
to the Sindhis.  In 1975 G.M. Syed tried to explain away the support he, and other Sindhi 
politicians, had given to the creation of Pakistan: 
Some of us who all the time remained conscious of the national 
distinctness of the people of Sindh and of significant past history, 
participated in the movement for Pakistan solely for the purpose of 
ensuring thereby political independence, economic prosperity and cultural 
advancement of Sindh.  We remained convinced throughout of the validity 
of the teaching of our great political thinkers who considered the Sindhi 
people a separate nation. 
 
The two-nation theory he said had been a ‘trap’ designed to establish: ‘Mohajir-
Punjabi exploitative hegemony over the Muslim majority provinces.’ The Sindhi 
nationalists had joined the Pakistan movement, he maintained, because they believed the 
Lahore Resolution would result in Sindhi independence and not ‘the accident of history 
and freak of nature’ that became Pakistan.38 
Combined with demographic and economic statistics, linguistic controversy 
played an important role in ethnic mobilization. Sindhis took the state decision of making 
Urdu the national language as a threat to their ethnic identity.39 Some of the Mohajirs’ 
policy initiatives were highly provocative. In 1957, the University of Karachi forbade 
students from answering questions in Sindhi.  In the face of such discrimination, it is 
hardly surprising that the Sindhis sense of resentment was acute.40 Sindhis were under-
represented in the army and had a marginal role in Sindh administration compared to 
                                                 
37 Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin’s Press. Inc., 1997, p. 221.  
38 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 115. 
39 Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin’s Press, p. 20, p. 203 and p. 222. 
40 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 115 Also see: Rehman, Language 
and politics, p. 114.  
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Punjabis and Mohajirs. Bhutto, in order to console Sindhis, passed the Sindhi Language 
Bill in the Sindh provincial assembly, making Sindhi the provincial language. The 
teaching promotion and use of Sindhi language bill became a law in July 1972.41  The 
proponents of Urdu reacted violently.  Several people were killed and many wounded in 
Karachi. Many more casualties occurred in Hyderabad, where rival political factions 
fought each other as well as police force. The execution of Zulifqar Ali Bhutto, and the 
use of extensive military power in 1983 during the MRD struggle in Sindh, brought the 
alienation of Sindhis to climax.42    
Ethnic politics took a nasty turn in the mid-1980s. The influx of arms into 
Pakistan as a consequence of the war in Afghanistan provided weapons to militant groups 
on all sides: Sindhis, Mohajirs and Pashtoons.43 It was the time when Pakistan was under 
the longest period of martial law in its history. The new generation of ethnic leaders, 
especially in urban Sindh, became progressively more militant and with easy access to 
arms, the ethnic strife became increasingly explosive in the absence of political platforms 
and bargaining process.  
2. Mohajirs 
It is a case of ethnicity-in-making, whereby people belonging to all parts of India, 
except Punjab, including: south, southwest, north, and northwest India, adopted a new 
identity of Mohajirs.44 The Mohajirs, who accounted for one-fifth of the population of 
Sindh, were the most privileged class of the newly formed state for the first two decades. 
Being better educated, they dominated the bureaucracy and the liberal professions. 
Mohajirs also dominated Pakistan because of the personalities of two topmost leaders, M. 
A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. But after the assassination of Liaquat Ali in 1951, 
Mohajirs lost ground to Punjabis. In 10 years, those who regarded themselves as the 
makers of Pakistan, had began to recede to the background.45 After the ethnic revolt in 
East Pakistan, Mohajirs felt threatened by Sindhi nationalism. The feelings of alienation 
                                                 
41 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan, Nationalism without a Nation, 2002, pp. 22, 23. 
42 Iftikhar H. Malik, State and Civil Society in Pakistan, St. Martin Press, p. 220. 
43 Raju G. C. Thomas, South Asian Security in 1990s, Adelphi paper 278, July 1993, p. 28. Also see 
Armed Conflict Report 2003-Pakistan, p. 7. 
44 Mohammad Waseem, Politics of Identity in Pakistan: Patterns of National and Ethnic Discourse, 
St. Anthony College, Oxford, p. 8. 
45 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan; Nationalism without a Nation, Zed Books Ltd., 2002, pp. 17, 18. 
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and separate identity among Mohajirs occurred as a result of five important events in 
Pakistan’s history: 
• 1964’s presidential elections.  
• Implementation of quota system in favor of native Sindhis, during Z. A. 
Bhutto’s rule. 
• 1972 language riots.  
• Growing Punjabi domination in bureaucracy and military during Zia’s 
regime. 
• Post-1985 ethnic clashes between Mohajir and non-Mohajir communities 
in Karachi.  
These events reflected social, economic, political, and cultural issues, affected the 
Mohajirs of urban Sindh and thus, triggered their demand for identification as a fifth 
ethnic group in Pakistan. To safeguard their rights in Sindh, they organized themselves 
into a political organization called Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM).  
The Mohajir search for identity reached its climax during 1986-1988 when the 
MQM launched a crusade through regular ideological meetings. Most important, 
Mohajirs reacted to the upsurge of nationalist forces in rural Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab 
and the NWFP. They thought that their survival was at stake and decided to follow the 
path of other ethnic forces.46  Since then the major cities of Sindh, like Karachi and 
Hyderabad, have witnessed many incidents of ethnic-based violence. 
3. Violence in Sindh 
Karachi had played a key role in Afghan Jihad during 1980s, as it was the main 
port of entry for arms destined to the mujahideen, half of which never reached their 
destination.47 The influx of arms and accompanied by the demographic and economic 
changes,  that  took  place  in  Pakistan  in  general and Sindh in particular,48 are the main  
                                                 
46 Moonis Ahmar, Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crises, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, 
No. 10 (October 1996), currently published by University of California Press, pp. 1032, 1038. 
47 Laurent Gayer, A Divided City, “Ethnic and Religious Conflicts in Karachi, Pakistan. Paper 
presented at the first Pakistan Seminar organized by IIAS and ISIM, Amsterdam, March 24, 2003. 
48 Arif Hassan, A Generation Comes of Age, The Herald, October 1987, pp. 52-53. 
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causes of ethnic violence in Sindh.  First there were clashes between the Mohajirs and 
Sindhis. Then the Mohajirs and the Pathans fought, and hundreds were killed in those 
riots.49 
The first ethnic riot occurred in Karachi in April 1985 between Mohajir and 
Pathan communities. This was sparked by the uncivilized behavior of Pathan transporters 
against Mohajir commuters in Karachi. Then two important events in Hyderabad 
deepened the Mohajir-Sindhi polarization. The first event occurred in September 1988, 
when 250 people, mainly Mohajirs, were killed by the firing of Jayee Sindh activists on 
unarmed people in Hyderabad. The second incident also occurred in Hyderabad in May 
1990, a demonstration led by Mohajir women and children were brutally crushed by the 
predominantly Sindhi police, killing more than 60 demonstrators. The killings led to a 
backlash in Karachi and killing of 40 Sindhis by MQM members. Increased tension 
between Sindhi- Mohajir factions led to a large scale cross migration of Mohajirs and 
Sindhis to their own predominant ethnic areas. Since then Mohajirs have been advocating 
the division of Sindh province in two separate provinces, urban and rural respectively.50 
In the course of fighting for their rights MQM, not only confronted with other 
ethnic groups, but also clashed with Pakistan’s security forces. The incident of torturing 
two army officers in 1991 by MQM activists, Major Kaleem and his colleague, is an 
example of the growing menace of MQM in urban Sindh. The use of rocket launchers 
against security forces and guerrilla war situation prevailed in Karachi and Hyderabad 
during the peak of MQM agitation.  
The MQM launched an armed uprising in 1993 after the city government was 
dismissed, and brought Karachi to its knees, leaving more than 5,000 people dead and 
crippling the economy of Pakistan’s main commercial center51 In Sindh open gun battles 
between MQM, Sindhi landlord lashkars (private militias) and the army are daily 
occurrences. The MQM has begun to press for the separation of Karachi from the rest of 
the province.  
                                                 
49 Ali Asghar, The Problematique of Nation-Building in South Asia: The Case of Pakistan, Secular 
Perspective, March 16-31, 2000, p. 5.  
50 Moonis Ahmar, Ethnicity and State Power in Pakistan: The Karachi Crises, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, 
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Violence threatens to paralyze the capital, even though the army has had a direct 
responsibility for its administration since June 1992. In 1994, a plan announced to replace 
military presence with police and rangers failed to ease tensions.52 The state failure to 
overcome influx of arms and ethnic tension is what led to social problems. Table 1.8 
shows the drastic increase in crime rate in Karachi during the period 1990-1994. 
 
Table 1.8  Trends in Violent Crimes in Karachi 1990-94 
 
Year  
Nature of Crimes 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Murder  584 466 387 365 1,113 
Attempted Murder 1,035 814 672 646 1,069 
Serious injury 501 372 414 465 502 
Kidnapping 572 352 373 345 276 
Armed Robberies 2,557 2,483 2,211 2,191 1,464 
Vehicles snatching at gun point 676 524 965 1,060 1,177 
Source: Methab Karim, Deaths Due To Violence In Karachi, Pakistan: Patterns, Differentials and their 
Impact on the community, p. 3. 
 
Karachi’s law and order situation further deteriorated in 1995 and more than 
2,000 people, including 242 police officers, died in nightly street battles. In March 1995, 
international attention was drawn to Karachi, when unknown assailants assassinated two 
United States diplomats. The United States declared Karachi a danger zone and number 
of foreign countries advised their nationals to stay away from the city. The fruitless talks 
between the government and MQM began in July but soon reached a stalemate. The head 
of the MQM team negotiating with the government, Ajmal Dehlavi, told a group of 
journalists in July 1995 that ““should the government-MQM talks fail, his party would be 
forced to demand a separate province…. [and this] would ultimately end in the division 
of Sindh…as the new province will be carved out from the present province of Sindh.”53  
The frequent armed clashes and work stoppages in Karachi have caused massive 
damage to the infrastructure of that city and to the economy of Pakistan. A research paper 
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commissioned by Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) revealed that “a 
working day lost by strike in Karachi cost 1.3 billion rupees ($ 38 million) and in 1995 a 
total of 34 working days were lost as a result of strikes called by the MQM.”54  
In the period of six months, from July 1995-January 1996, as many as 70 police 
encounters took place in Karachi, in which over 120 MQM activists got killed. Karachi 
became the bleeding wound of Pakistan. Clashes between rival political groups, the 
MQM, and police, including extra-judicial killings, and a police campaign that jailed 
hundreds of MQM members, extended the conflict in 1996. Benazir government is held 
responsible for these extra-judicial killings. “With firm backing from Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto’s federal government, police and paramilitary forces launched a harsh, 
some say brutal, campaign that has crippled the MQM. The Karachi crackdown set off a 
new wave of police intimidation, extortion and unsanctioned killings by officers-extra-
judicial killings-that could threaten to again sink the city into ethnic bloodshed. 
In 1998 clashes between MQM and a break- away faction increased the level of 
violence in Karachi. Hundreds of people died in the reprisal killings between two militant 
factions of MQM. In November 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif declared a state of 
emergency and once again the army was called in the province of Sindh to crush 
violence. 
Since the coup of October1999, the Pakistani Government is under the control of 
the military, but the volatility of Sindh still persists. “There have been several attacks on 
foreign targets in Sindh including: …suicides attack on a navy bus in Karachi in May 
2003 which killed 14 people. …A car bomb at US consulate in Karachi in June, which 
killed 12 people.” [BBC News, September 24, 2002]   
E. PROBLEMS IN BALOCHISTAN 
Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, equal in size to Italy, having the 
smallest population. Its population comprises of native Balochis and southern Pashtoons. 
Northwestern Balochistan is mainly populated by Pashtoons, who have gained in political  
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influence as their numbers has increased, by Afghan refugees, especially in the capital 
city of Quetta. The Baloch group of tribes is further divided on the basis of language, 
Balochi and Brahui.  
The Balochis are further divided into four sub-groups: Marris, Bugtis, Bizonjos, 
and Mongals. Baloch society has been characterized as “feudal militarism” The struggle 
of power between the chiefs of various tribes has been explosive.  Incidents of tribes 
feuding and fighting each other with heavy weapons prove that the provincial 
government has totally failed to impose its writ in these rebel-infested areas.55 During the 
years 2002-2003, to establish his writ and authority in the area Nawab Akbar Bugti 
launched a savage campaign of victimization against other tribes. Twenty-nine rocket 
attacks took place against the gas fields, installations and pipelines in Balochistan, i.e., 
areas of Dera Bugti, Goth Mazari, Kohlu and Marri. 
There had been occasional separatist movements in Balochistan since 
independence. In August 1947, soon after the creation of Pakistan, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan 
declared Kalat’s independence.56 Pakistani historians portray Mir Ahmad Yar Khan as an 
isolated and recalcitrant individual who ungraciously failed to bow to the inevitable.57 It 
was not before April 1948, 225 days after independence, that Khan of Kalat signed an 
agreement of accession, but his brother responded violently. Having based himself in 
Afghanistan, he launched a guerrilla campaign against Pakistani forces. By June 1948, 
the army prevailed, and both Kalat and the rest of Balochistan were secured as parts of 
Pakistan. 
Ten years later, the Baloch objection to “One Unit” led to another violent 
confrontation, involving hundreds of men on both sides. Ethnic identity maintenance laid 
the ground for tribal insurgencies in which “acts of lawlessness” singularly targeted “non 
Baloch personnel.”58 Sons of the feudal lords and merchants who were aspired towards 
bureaucratic jobs pressurized many non-Baloch administrators to vacate their jobs. 
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But in 1970s, the relations between Balochistan and central government 
deteriorated to a serious extent when Zulifqar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Balochistan 
government by accusing it of separatism. In retaliation, Baloch nationalists mounted 
actions against the Pakistan army. Moved by his own whims and encouraged by an over-
vigilant Shah of Iran, Bhutto engaged the armed forces in a futile exercise, which only 
increased ill-feeling among the Balochis and other concerned Pakistanis. Many of the 
Baloch went into exile or engaged in guerrilla activities.59 In 1973-77 about 5,300 
Balochis and 3,300 soldiers were killed.60  
It was under General Zia ul-Haq that the armed forces were recalled to barracks 
and the province returned to peace. However, with the presence of well-armed Afghan 
refugees and Iranian dissidents, inter-tribal and inter-sectarian tensions have increased in 
Balochistan. Gunrunning and drug trafficking, as well as human traffic in political exiles 
across the three borders created serious divisions within traditional Balochi socio-
economic values.61 Relations with the centre have always been low. The present 
government is making an utmost effort to establish good relations and grant them what is 
possible. However, Balochistan has always made an effort to exploit the centre on one 
account or the other.  
F. INTER-PROVINCIAL DISHARMONY 
As Karl Marx stated, the ruling ideas of any epoch are the ideas of the ruling 
class.62  Since demographically, Punjab is the biggest province of Pakistan, and Punjabis 
occupied strategic positions in country’s bureaucratic and military sub-systems, their 
ruling ideas determined national policy making at the highest levels. They manipulated 
political, economic and social policies in such a way that their power was maximized. 
Such Punjabi “colonialism” was quickly exploited by non-Punjabi ethnic political elites 
and this led to the “us” and “them” syndrome, which became symptomatic of ethnic 
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nationalism.63 The imbalance between the Punjab and other provinces has been a major 
source of ethnic problems. Containing roughly two thirds of the population, providing the 
bulk of Pakistan’s armed forces, and possessing the most productive agricultural land, the 
Punjab has loomed large in the eyes of other provinces. This preponderance has triggered 
resentment that has assumed an ethnic character, since provincial boundaries in the main 
correspond to the country’s major ethnic divisions.64  
The Pakistani army was always, and remains, Punjabi-dominated periods of 
military rule have generally seen a growth of Punjabi influence. Although there are no 
official figures, it is estimated that 65 percent of officers and 70 percent of other ranks are 
Punjabis. That compares with the province’s 56 percent share of the population. 
Pakhtoons from NWFP, with 16 percent of the population, constitute an estimated 22 
percent of officers and 25 percent of other ranks.  Sindhis and Balochis have always been 
severely under-represented.65 To ensure the representation of all provinces in military the 
Constitution of 1973 specifies that “the State shall enable people from all parts of 
Pakistan to participate in armed forces of Pakistan.” Despite the constitutional provision, 
imbalances remained in the representatives of the armed forces.  Stephen Philip Cohen, in 
“Security Decision- Making in Pakistan” written in 1980, states that: 
75 percent of all ex-servicemen came from only three districts in the 
Punjab and two adjacent districts in NWFP, so the army as a whole is still 
unrepresentative. 
The authorities were aware of the dangers of an unrepresentative military force, 
but in Cohen’s words: 
Since the army is volunteer, there is little that can be done to dragoon in 
reluctant or uninterested ethnic groups.66 
Nationalist Sindhis portray Punjab as a “villain”, grabbing the shares of other 
provinces.  In an interview to the Dawn newspaper on June 3, 2003, Sindh National Front  
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Chief Mumtaz Bhutto expressed his grievances against Punjabi hegemony very openly. 
In an answer to a question about Punjab’s demand of resource distribution on the basis of 
population he stated that:  
it is very unjust and a very damaging attitude adopted by Punjab. They did 
not allow a Bengali majority,67 and it is extraordinary that we had 
minority rule.  And that is what destroyed Pakistan. But they have not 
learnt their lessons.  Now they have used their clout and strength in the 
armed forces… and there had always been dictatorship, control and 
hegemony of Punjab in this country. 
On water issues between Sindh and Punjab, he said: 
 …this water issue is very, very serious matter…. Fifty percent of the land 
in Sindh is barren.  So to make Punjab prosperous at the cost of rest of the 
Pakistan is going to have adverse impact.  You can’t get away with this…. 
Historically the Indus water has been the property of Sindh…. 16 or 17 
barrages have been built in Punjab since the creation of Pakistan, and they 
totally control the entire flow of water downstream.... They are not going 
to leave any thing for Sindh.68  
 
Mohajirs despite all their differences with Sindhis are more loyal to Sindh than 
rest of Pakistan. And when it comes to Sindh versus Rest of Pakistan, they stand up 
against federal decisions to favor.  Recently alignment of MQM with Sindhis is a sign of 
new storms in ethnic politics of Pakistan. In a Seminar on Positioning Pakistan in “War 
against Terrorism”, Mr. Anwar of MQM announced:  
Annexation of 17 villages of Sindh to the province of Punjab by the 
colonialists and expansionists Establishment will not be tolerated.  If, 
expansionism of Punjab continues, I swear, Mohajirs and Sindhis will 
have no alternative but to seek the right of self-determination.  Kalabagh 
Dam will never be built….  I call upon the Establishment of Punjab that if 
a single village of Gothki were annexed to Punjab then the people of 
Sindh would not like to live with Pakistan.69  
 
The issue of allocation of water to provinces is also very sensitive. The smaller 
provinces, especially Sindh and NWFP, accuse Punjab to consume the bulk of country’s 
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water.  Construction of the Kalabagh Dam, which according to central government is 
essential for boosting country’s power generation and water storage capacity, has become 
an emotional issue in both NWFP and Sindh.70 Successive governments since General 
Zia’s military regime have tried to resolve the deadlock over the Kalabagh dam.  But any 
such effort by the central government is cited by ethnic parties as an example of 
Pakistan’s central authorities ignoring the interests of non-Punjabis. This issue will be 
discussed at length in the fourth chapter 
Speaking at the ‘Meet the Press’ program of the Peshawar Press Club, Senator 
Asfandyar Wali Khan, President ANP, alleged that the center always treated the smaller 
provinces as subservient to Punjab. He added, “Punjab is Pakistan and Pakistan is Punjab. 
Such a situation will spell disaster for the country. The 1971 dismemberment of the 
country was caused due to differences between the center and the provinces and today the 
situation is the same.” He also demanded the transfer of hydro profit to NWFP from the 
federal consolidated fund.71 
The issue of royalties from natural resources is important to the smaller provinces. 
Balochistan produces natural gas, Sindh is country’s largest producer of oil, and the 
NWFP is the site of major hydroelectric projects. The federal government collects these 
royalties and only a part of these are passed on to the provinces. But the provinces, Sindh, 
NWFP and Balochistan, do not agree with the system of distribution of royalties. 
Challenging the royalty distribution formula Sindh argue that it does not receive royalties 
commensurate with its 62 percent share in country’s oil production.72 The royalty of 
natural gas to Balochistan is only 10 percent of revenue rest goes to the federal 
government.   
Many of the specific grievances of Balochis are related to the exploitation of their 
natural resources. The Sui gas field in Balochistan, which provides 60 percent73 of 
Pakistan’s total needs, was not made available to Quetta until after Punjab and Karachi. A 
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statement74 of main tribal chief, Nawab Akbar Bugti, is an indication of deep-rooted 
ethnic resentment. He stated: “Balochistan belongs to the Baloch people and not to 
outsiders. We own the natural resources, but these are being exploited for the benefit of 
others. We will not allow others to steal our wealth. Your sensitive installations will 
remain insecure, because you have pilfered, what belongs to our people.” Such 
sentiments are also shown by actions of other tribal chiefs. In August 2000, Marri 
tribesmen used rocket-propelled grenades and landmines to prevent transportation of coal 
to other parts of the country.75  
G. CONCLUSION 
Historically, even before partition, there was no unitary India. It was divided into 
regions based on history, language and culture. Each region had its own culture and 
shows natural pride in its own history and accomplishments. The policy of early national 
elites of one state, one government, one economy, one language, and one culture had cost 
us the loss of East Pakistan. There is a dire need to recognize the ethnic and cultural 
diversity. Most importantly of all are the language issues, as they have been the divisive 
force throughout Pakistan’s history. Along with Urdu, the regional languages must be 
encouraged and accepted. Cultural aspects are more dominating and real driving force in 
binding people together. Cultural discrimination will add fuel to existing ethnic tensions. 
The need of the hour is to understand the diverse cultural-ethnic realties.     
Despite a provision in the 1973 Constitution, the imbalance in representation in 
military persists. Punjabi domination in military and civil services has created a sense of 
insecurity amongst other ethnic groups who take it as a form of colonialism and feel it as 
a threat to their cultural traditions. The interplay of territory, language, and cultural 
homogeneity, cemented together through a sense of political alienation, in the state 
structure rooted in specific prerogatives, formulated various communitarian responses in 
Pakistan.76 To worsen the situation, few politicians to further their ambitions for 
leadership exploit these ethnic differences. Today’s picture of Punjabi domination is a 
reflection of hegemony of West Pakistan over its eastern half. The case of separation of 
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East Pakistan should be taken as a lesson. Consequences of the frustrations caused by the 
domination of one ethnic group, and hostility between regions of remaining Pakistan, 
should be taken seriously as a major threat to its security and integrity.  
It is important to clarify here that separation of East Pakistan does not invalidate 
“Two-Nation Theory”, as projected by Indian scholars. It was, in fact, a product of a 
peculiar set of circumstances that included: intervention and exploitation by India, ethnic 
problems, political failure, and geographical cleavage. They needed to be neutralized 
through economic planning and social development.  
In the case of Karachi, when compared to separation of East Pakistan, is quite 
different. In Bangladesh, the Bangalis were in majority, while Karachi is a cosmopolitan 
city. The demographic reality is that there are more Balochis in the city of Karachi alone, 
than in the entire province of Balochistan.  Most of the blue-collar jobs in Karachi are 
occupied by Pashtuns and their number in the city is ever increasing, despite all efforts of 
Sindhis and MQM activists to drive them away.  As far as Punjabis are concerned; 
Karachi has already become sixth largest Punjabi city. Therefore, the demand of Mohajirs 
for a separate Mohajir State, as it was in late 1980s, carries no weight. However, their 
demand for division of Sindh province, since the 1990s, is a danger for the solidarity of 
Pakistan. Materialization of such a plan would further alleviate the law and order 
situation for the reason that, Mohajirs are the most privileged of all ethnic groups in 
urban Sindh. The very idea of being outnumbered, outrun, and dominated by MQM raises 
strong reservations among other ethnic communities. Social, economic and demographic 
factors are also responsible for the violence in Sindh.  
Ethnic diversity, scarce resources and struggle for survival have been the key 
factors for initiating ethnic violence, creating law and order situation in the country. For 
example, in 1947 there were 400,000 residents in the city of Karachi: by the late 1980s 
that number increased to 6 millions.77  Now it is flooded by more than 10 million people. 
It has all the problems a big city of developing country could have.  
Issue of royalties, division of share amongst provinces, controversy over 
developmental plans, language issues, and above all the relation of Balochistan province 
with federal government, is a danger to the prosperity and solidarity of Pakistan. 
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Musharraf’s government is trying to bring to an end to the sense of alienation among 
various factions, but it appears that the ethnic/nationalist leaders have their personal 
vested interests in keeping the ethnic fronts open.  
For a peaceful Pakistan there is a need to eradicate any sense of alienation and 
obtain egalitarianism in the country as a whole, by rendering efforts towards achieving 
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III. SECTARIANISM AND JIHADI CULTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan came into existence as a moderate and modern nation state under the 
vision of Jinnah - the father of the nation. But a downward trend, in the past 25 years, 
warrants an explanation to the causes. President Pervez Musharraf said the “only threat is 
sectarian and religious terrorism which is eating us like termites and it is Islam and the 
Muslim Ummah (community) which is paying the high cost. We all have to fight against 
it.”78 Pakistan has a very important strategic position in South Asia. In past decades, to 
encounter geo-political situations of South Asia, the sectarian differences have been 
exploited and sentiments for jihad were aroused. Once out of the bottle, this genie has 
become a menace and a serious threat to internal security of Pakistan.  
This chapter makes a deliberate effort to explain the root causes for the rise of 
jihad syndrome in Pakistan. It also questions the poor education system and role of 
madrassahs in fueling religious extremism and providing recruits to jihadi militant 
groups. Over a period of time, Pakistan became the hub of fundamentalists, which 
affected the moderate fabric of Pakistani society. This chapter will also analyze reasons 
for mushrooming of various madrassahs all over the country and highlights some of their 
structural and functional features. Here, I will also explain the reasons why a large 
number of young men are interested in recruiting themselves to wage jihad, how with the 
passage of time, these religious educational institutions have transformed into the dens of 
militants and played its role in fueling religious extremism in Pakistan.  How, over time, 
the jihadi culture has become a threat to the internal security of Pakistan. What were 
prominent jihadi organizations operating in the country and how far the present 
government has succeeded in confronting the problem? Finally, the paper will deliberate 
and analyze critically the internal and external dynamics of sectarian problems and jihadi 
culture in Pakistan and what is the overall assessment in view of recent operation in 
Tribal Areas 
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B. SECTARIAN PROBLEMS 
1. Historical Perspective of Pakistan Tilting Towards Extremism  
Islam in Pakistan, is highly diverse in its interpretations and modes of beliefs. 
Pakistan’s population is approximately 77 percent Sunni and 22 percent Shia. Some 3 
percent are non-Muslims. These include small Hindu, Christian, and Parsi minorities. 
This number also includes the Ahmadi community, which consider themselves Muslim, 
but is declared non-Islamic by the state.79  
The two-nation theory is the basis of Pakistan’s foundation. Islam and Islamic 
values are deeply embedded in the two-nation theory. Interpretation of the two-nation 
theory by secular Pakistanis and radical groups is a major point of contention today. 
Many scholars express that the masses had an element of extremism but never had 
Islamic infrastructure to promote their cause. Today they have both.  How Pakistan has 
been transformed over the years is a long debate by itself and cannot be covered in this 
chapter.  Pakistan came into being as an Islamic country, however, Islam never played a 
significant role in governing the country.80  Jinnah’s speech of 11 August 1947, clearly 
rejected Islamic primacy in Pakistan governance, stating, “Religion would have nothing 
to do with the business of state”. He wanted to see Pakistan a moderate, secular, and 
forward-looking country.81  
At the time of creation of Pakistan, Deobandis organized into Jamiat Ulema-I-
Islami (JUI) under the Amir Mufti Mahmud.  The JUI contested the 1964-5 elections 
partially on the grounds that the 2 March 1961 Family Laws was “un-Islamic”.82 During 
the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, the JUI mobilized a campaign for financing the defense of 
Pakistan as well as organize Jihad conference. These two events laid the foundation for 
expanded role of Islamic parties in Pakistan politics and defense. JUI announced its 
manifesto on 20 January 1970. Features of manifesto included: providing the country 
                                                 
79  Mandavi Mehta and Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer, Islam in Pakistan: Unity and 
Contradictions. A Report from the CSIS Project: Pakistan’s Future and US Policy Options, October 7, 
2002, p. 9. Also see CIA World Factbook. 
80 Khan, Feroz, notes taken during class lecture on transformation of Pakistan from Jinnah to 
Musharraf, February 24, 2004. 
81 Pirzada, Sayyid A.S. The politics of the Jamiat Ulema-I- Islam Pakistan 1971-1977, Oxford 
university press, 2000, p. 19. 
82 Ibid., p. 27. 
35 
with an Islamic constitution; enforcement of compulsory congressional prayers; closure 
of anti-Islam missionary institutions; provision of equal housing and job opportunities, 
reforming the financial institutions; abolition of interest; nationalization of major 
industries and improving the working conditions of workers; conferring the property 
rights of tenants, confiscation of large estates and their redistribution among deserving 
cultivators; free dispensation of justice, separation of judiciary from executive; freedom 
of the press and an independent non-aligned foreign policy.83 These agendas clearly 
define a set course of action and taking the country more towards religion. But even at 
this stage, the government, politicians, masses and major institutions were not poised 
towards islamization of the country leaders followed secular policies without 
antagonizing the religious extremist.   
The State first exploited the radical and violent Islamic groups in 1970-1971 in 
East Pakistan. These groups weakened Pakistan’s international position. Zulfiqar Ali 
Bhutto was the first state leader to promote Islamization as a cover for his own 
autocracies. 84  Jihad initiated its ascendancy to primacy in the Islamic schools of 
Pakistan during the period of General Zia ul Haq and was fully actualized during Afghan 
jihad. The religio-political parties were quick to take advantage of the situation when Zia 
took over Pakistan and was looking for legitimization of his rule. Introduction of “Shariat 
Law” is one of the major events in the history of Pakistan tilting towards extremism. 
Shariat faculties were opened in universities and schools. The grand jihadi cause during 
Afghan war and disintegration of Soviet Union tilted the whole balance in the favor of 
jihadi organizations. Victory in Afghan war gave impetus to jihadi cause. United States, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and all Muslim countries were behind these organizations to provide 
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2. Active Sectarian Organizations  
There are total of 35 political and religious groups/Islamists parties with 
considerable potential for destabilizing Pakistan.86 Table 2.1 shows orientation and 
characteristics of Sunni political parties of Pakistan. In succeeding paragraphs, only those 
active organizations that could pose threat to the government or the state will be 
discussed. 
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• Jammat-e-Islami (JI):  This is the oldest and most organized politico-
religious party.87  JI favors a return to a strict parliamentary system.88  JI 
does have Madrassahs but they are not the source of the Taliban. JI is an 
international organization and there is a JI in every major South Asian 
State. It is accused of sponsoring militant groups in Kashmir (Hizb-ul-
Mujahiddin and Al-Badar).89 JI has support of masses and is respected by 
majority of population.  
• Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI): The larger Deobandi sect includes JUI.90 It 
has strong support in the NWFP and Balochistan. Split into two factions, 
the JUI run an extensive network of Madrassahs and has links with the 
remnants of the Taliban.91  
• Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) is a radical 
group from majority Sunni sect of Islam. It was founded in 1984 as a 
reaction to the Iranian revolution and increased Shia militancy in Pakistan. 
Both Saudi Arabia and Iraq supported the SSP.92 It was sponsored by JUI, 
Maulana Fazlur Rahman faction.93 The SSP has militant potential and has 
formed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to counter the activities of Tehrik-e-Jafaria 
Pakistan. The members of this group have received military training 
during the Afghan jihad. Recent incidents of attacks on Shias and 
‘Imambargahs’ indicate a fair degree of professionalism. The 
militant/armed potential of the SSP poses a great security threat. Recently 
the SSP has branched out into many smaller terrorist groups. President 
Musharraf banned the organization in January 2002. 
• Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (MIP): A hard-line offshoot of JUI, the MIP 
(formerly SSP), straddles the divide between politics, sectarian rabble 
rousing and anti-Shia terrorism. The party was banned in November 
2003.94   
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• Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP): Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) came 
into being in 1979, when the late President Zia Ul Haq took radical steps 
to establish an institutional framework for Islamization. The organization 
has matching militant potential and is waging an open war with the SSP. 
The members of this group have received military training at home and 
abroad. It was banned in November 2003.95 
• Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi(TNSM): The TNSM 
(Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) is a tribally based 
Deobandi party active in NWFP.96 It has a large following mostly drawn 
from religious madrassahs in Malakland Division and adjoining areas. 
Their uprising against FATA regulations and in favor of enforcement of 
Shariah in 1994 was quelled in an armed operation. The authorities had, 
however, partially defused the situation through the promulgation of a 
Shariah package. Radical elements including some absconders to 
Afghanistan have still not reconciled to the package and pose a latent 
threat to peace in the area. 
• Markaz Dawa Wal Irshad: The Dawa Wal Irshad works to propagate an 
austere “purified” version of Islam and has set up schools across the 
country for this purpose.97 Since its inception, the Markaz has grown at an 
incredible rate. The founders of the Markaz claim that it was set up for the 
two primary missions of Islam, which is preaching and jihad. Many 
Pakistani businessmen are known to support the Markaz generously.98 
Being an Ahl-e-Hadith militant organization based at Muridke, it is 
operating countrywide with an avowed aim to enforce Islam and prepare 
youth for jihad. It has links with some of the Arab countries, sends youths 
mostly of their Madrassahs to Afghanistan for armed training. Its freedom 
fighter wing is known as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba.  
• Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT): The group’s ideas resemble those of the 
Salafi, a puritanical minority sect in Pakistan that is close to the Saudi 
brand Wahhabi Islam.99 It has managed to attract thousands of committed 
young men by using its organizational network including schools, social 
service groups, and religious publications, to stir up anger against the so 
called injustices meted to Kashmiri Muslims. This created a passion for 
jihad. The Lashkar holds its annual congregation at Muridke every year, 
attracting thousands of new followers, many of whom go to fight in 
Kashmir.100 LeT was also on the United State list of terrorist                                                  
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organizations.101 President Pervez Musharraf banned the organization on 
12 January 2002 during his historic speech.  
• Jaish-e-Mohammad: Maulana Masood Azhar, a former member of the 
Harkatul Mujahideen, announced the formation of this group within days 
of his arrival in Pakistan102, on 4th February 2000.103 This group has 
attracted a large number of supporters and activists from Harkatul 
Mujhahideen, and even took over some of the physical infrastructure of 
the organization.104 The group seems to have the support of a large 
number of Deobandi madrassahs in Pakistan. This organization was also 
banned on 12 January 2002.  
• Harkatul Mujahideen (HuM): It was formed in 1998.105 Harkatul 
Mujahideen is believed to be under the influence of both the factions of 
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Islam of Maulana Samiul Haq and Maulana Fazlur 
Rehman. The organization had such strong links with the Taliban that 
Harkat activists are known as the Pakistani Taliban. The Harkatul 
Muhahideen recruited young men from all the provinces of Pakistan and 
from both sides of the Line of Control of Kashmir. A large number of its 
recruits were students from Madrassahs. The Harkat also ran a number of 
guerilla training facilities inside Pakistan, at least one of which was 
reported to be on a hilltop above Batrasi, a forest village near 
Mansehra.106 It is also amongst the banned organizations in November 
2003.107 
3. Sectarian Violence  
The problem of sectarian violence is not a new phenomenon in Pakistan. It existed 
in the culture of the sub-continent for many centuries in one form or the other, but 
certainly not with this intensity. Relations between religious sects, as between races, 
ethnic groups and religions are potentially divisive. One irresponsible move against any                                                  
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particular group can easily ignite emotions and shatter relative peace and harmony.108 
Pakistan, over a period of time, has become the hub of fundamentalists, which poses a 
major threat, fraught with grave consequences. Trained and motivated militants, having 
experienced Afghan and Kashmir jihad, are available to various groups/sects. These 
fanatic groups are also exploited by opposing political parties to their advantage, which is 
adding to internal security problems. The influx of arms/ammunition and the alleged 
Iranian, and Saudi financial/material support to these organizations have accentuated the 
malaise.  
The growing intolerance in Pakistan society is reflected in the statistics of 
sectarian strife in recent years.109 Between 1989 and July 2003, 1,468 persons have been 
killed and 3,370 others injured in some 1,813 sectarian incidents in Pakistan, according to 
the Institute for Conflict Management database.110 According to another source; in 1997 
alone, more than 3000 people were killed in outbreaks of sectarian violence.111  
The nature of sectarian violence in Pakistan has changed over the time. Until mid 
of 1990s, most of the killings occurred in Punjab. Although by the end of 1990s, there 
were an increased number of incidents in Karachi, NWFP, and Balochistan.112 For the 
statistics see Table 2.2. In 2001, Karachi had highest number of sectarian incidents, 
FATA was second highest, and Dera Ismail Khan ranked third highest in sectarian 
tension.113 In recent years, over a 100 doctors and lawyers were victims of targeted 
sectarian terrorism in Karachi, apart from places of worship and foreign installations.114  
                                                 
108 Professor M. Akbar, Pakistan: Sectarian Challenges, South Asia Citizen Wire, July 30, 2003. 
109 “Thousands of Sunni and Shia Muslims have been killed in Pakistan over the past two decades in 
sectarian violence fuelled by extremist outfits of the two Muslim sects,” [IRIN, July 17, 2003].  Also see: 
Armed Conflicts Report 2003-Pakistan, Updated January 2004, p. 4. 
110 Ibid., p. 23. 
111 Sairah Irshad Khan and Muna Khan, “Among the Believers,” News line, February 1998, p. 24. 
112 Bannet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 23. 
113 “The highest number of terrorist attacks was recorded in Karachi where in 33 incidents, 54 persons 
were killed. The second highest remained FATA; where 61 persons were killed in seven incidents of 
sectarian violence. Dera Ismail Khan remained third [highest] where 10 people were killed and 19 injured 
in 6 terrorist attacks. 14 people were killed and 8 injured in 5 attacks in Lahore, 4 killed and 3 injured in3 
incidents in Multan, 4 killed in 2 at Mailsy.” [Pak News, August 21, 2001]. 
114 Mushahid Hussain, Is There any Way To Contain Pakistan’s Sectarian Monster.  The writer is a 
former Minister of Information and is currently a member of Pakistan’s Upper House, the Senate. He can 
be contacted at mhussain@gulfnews.com. 
41 
Table 2.2 Sectarian Violence, 1989-2001  
 
YEAR PUNJAB PAKISTAN 
1989 10 10 
1990 32 32 
1991 47 47 
1992 44 58 
1993 38 39 
1994 73 73 
1995 58 59 
1996 86 86 
1997 90 193 
1998 75 157 
1999 53 86 
2000 29 149 
2001 65 261 
 
Source: Bannet Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, Yale University Press, 2002, p. 24. 
 
In 2003, sectarian violence claimed at least 100 lives115, with Shia Muslim 
civilians accounting for most of the casualties. The worst such case was the July 2003 
bombing of a Shia mosque in Quetta116, which resulted in 60 deaths. Militants employed 
guerrilla tactics, such as bombing and drive by shooting.  
Since Pakistan joined the US coalition against terrorism, anti-Christian and anti-
Western terrorist acts have increased in Pakistan.117 The massacre of 18 Pakistani 
Christians in a church attack in Bahawalpur in October 2001 was Pakistan’s worst 
incident against a minority group.118 In January 2002, Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel 
Pearl, was kidnapped and later murdered in Karachi. In March 2002, a grenade attack on 
a Protestant church in Islamabad killed five, including a US embassy employee and her 
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daughter. In spring of 2002, a car bomb attack on Western targets, including a U.S. 
consulate in Karachi, killed 29 people, among them - 11 French military technicians.119  
C. MADRASSAHS IN PAKISTAN 
1. Conceptual Aspect of Madrassah 
It is important to understand the difference between the terms Koranic and 
Madrassah education. The Koranic school or Maktab is a place where Muslim children 
go to read and recite the Koran only. Koranic schools can function in the mosque, under a 
tree, in the house of the Koran teacher or under an open sky. The term Madrassah is 
usually used for a bit more organized institutions with classrooms and teachers for 
different levels. In addition, whereas a Koranic school is usually a place for lower level 
of religious education (the recitation and pronunciation of the Koran), Madrassah is 
where more in-depth religious education is provided.120  
The structure and operational procedures of the Madrassahs vary from region to 
region. In West Africa, most of the Islamic learning takes place in Maktab or Koranic 
schools. There are only a few madrassahs in West Africa where students obtain detailed 
Islamic education. In the Arab world, the governments who control the curriculum and 
ensure that some secular subjects are taught in these institutions finance most 
madrassahs. In Indonesia and Malaysia, governments follow more or less the same 
pattern as the Arab world. In the South Asia region, a large number of madrassas, 
although financed by special boards of religious education that operate under the Ministry 
of Religious Affairs, are free to acquire other funds from private donors. Whereby, most 
madrassahs in Pakistan teach only religious subjects. 
Before colonialism, madrassahs have been concentrating on imparting pure 
Islamic education without prejudiced attitude and without exerting any influence in 
politics of sub-continent. These madrassahs went through a radical shift in ideology 
under the British rule. With colonialism came a new modern system of education that 
sought to replace the role of madrassahs in any type of development. In the new schools, 
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only those elites were invited to obtain admission that could be used to run the machinery 
of colonialism. This resulted in a dichotomy of education system – secular education for 
the elite and religious education for the poor. This new educational system was perceived 
as a threat to the Islamic identity of the Muslims. The madrassahs system in India took 
upon itself the task of opposing the cultural and educational hegemony of the British.  
Today there are five major Islamic schools of thought in Pakistan: Deobandi, 
Bareilvi, Ahle-Hadith/Wahhabi, Salafi, and Shia. Each sect has its madrassahs in which 
they teach their own version of Islam. The two main sects of Sunni Islam - Deobandi and 
Bareilvi- dominate the madrassahs system in Pakistan. The religious, doctrinal 
differences of these schools are irreconcilable.121 As the American scholar Vali Nasr 
explains, largely theological differences between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims have been 
transformed into full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications for law and 
order, social cohesion, and government authority.122 The impotent Pakistani government 
has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran to fight a proxy war on 
Pakistani soil, with devastating consequences for the Pakistani people.123 
Like in many other developing countries of the world, education is not mandatory 
in Pakistan. Only 40 percent of Pakistanis are literate and many rural areas lack public 
schools. The madrassah system today provides a vital social service by providing free 
education to the poor children. Nonetheless there are certain madrassahs, which apart 
from providing free education also provide free food, housing and clothing.124 The reality 
is that, these madrassahs took up the vacuum left by Pakistani state failed education 
system, as Pakistan only spends mere 2 percent of its GNP on education.125 Thus, rise of 
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this tendency can be rightly attributed to the extremely poor educational infra structure 
and ever less spending from the budget on this very important aspect of national 
development.     
But the problem of madrassah education has two distinct aspects- the first is the 
quality of education in equipping the students with basic tools to earn a living, and 
second is the relationship between certain madrassahs and radical militant groups them to 
fight internationally, or in sectarian struggles. These are two distinct problems with 
different solutions.126 It is important to note here that nothing in the institution of 
madrassahs is inherently prone to militancy. Though it is hard to get concrete data but 
most estimates indicates that only 10-15 percent of Pakistani madrassahs are affiliated 
with radical militant groups.127  
2. Mushrooming of Madrassahs and Their Functioning System 
From a very modest number madrassahs started mushrooming in 1980s, when 
President Zia agreed to help US with training mujahideen in their fight against the USSR 
in Afghanistan. The United States and Saudi Arabia funneled some $3.5 billion into 
Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghan war.128 Madrassahs rapidly proliferated 
throughout Pakistan, most notably in Afghan refugee camps in NWFP and Balochistan 
where future Taliban leaders were trained.129 
In the last 20 years, Pakistan has witnessed an amazing increase in number of 
these madrassahs. Nearly 20,000 madrassahs, according to Islamabad’s Interior Ministry, 
operate in Pakistan.130 Looney also mentions similar number of madrassas in his 
article.131 However, Jessica Stern in her article says that there are around 40,000 to 
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50,000 madrassahs in Pakistan.132 In a TV interview with CNN in 2001, General 
Musharraf said there were 7000 or 8000 madrassahs in Pakistan, and between 600,000 
and 700,000 students attending them.133 Survey of Deeni Madaris of Punjab and students 
enrolled in them is shown in Appendix A and B.  
• Financing System: Initially many madrassahs were financed by Zakat, 
giving the government at least a modicum of control. But now, more and 
more religious schools are funded privately by wealthy Pakistani 
industrialists at home or abroad, by private and government-funded non-
governmental organizations in the Persian Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, and 
by Iran. Saudi Arabia has been supporting madrassahs associated to Sunni 
factions while Iran had been supporting Shias faction. This financing from 
Saudi Arabia and Iran was also meant to spread their own ideologies. In 
addition, most of the organizations have placed collection fund  boxes at 
numerous shops all around the country. One of the major and significant 
sources of fund raising is through the high donations by most of the 
Pakistanis on Eid-ul-Azha (a holiday festival), once a year. These are 
subsequently auctioned, raising tens of millions of rupees. 
Notwithstanding the above, for most of the jihadi organizations, huge 
generous donations are anonymous, which are sent directly to their bank 
accounts. Top leaders of militant groups are financially stronger than 
many leading industrialists of Pakistan. Poor and unemployed youth is 
attracted to jihadi culture in view of a short cut approach to make more 
money than average Pakistani. Arab jihadis are usually from well-off 
families and thus become a source of funding for their Pakistani hosts.134 
It is important to mention here that the biggest source of financing is 
external.135 
• Curriculum: The syllabi of these schools included the learning of the 
Holy Quran by heart, Tajweed, Tafseer, Fiqah, Shariah, Ahadith, 
Philosophy, Mathematics, Astronomy, and Tabligh.136 However, there are 
many madrassahs that offer only religious instructions, ignoring math, 
science, and other secular subjects important for functioning in modern 
society. The teachers too are bereft of liberal education and they transfer 
their own limited vision and narrow-mindedness to their pupils.137 It is 
pertinent to mention here that in order to cover this deficiency, the 
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government of Pakistan on 18 August 2001, in a quantum leap forward, 
promulgated Pakistan Madrassah Education (Establishment and affiliation 
of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance, 2001. It extends to the whole 
of Pakistan. The board’s constitution consists of heavyweights holding 
elite positions in religious and educational hierarchy of the state 
organizations.138 The main task of the board is to promote specialized 
Islamic education, bridge the existing gulf between general and 
madrassahs education, improve curriculum, and standardize it. In addition, 
to establish model madrassahs and model social Uloom, regulate, and 
approve conditions for affiliation of existing madrassahs.  
• Recruitment: The mode of recruitment is completely voluntarily.  
Recruitment teams go to each and every corner of the city, especially rural 
areas, to preach and spread the message of jihad. Jaish-e-Mohammad 
activists use to visit government schools and asked children to devote one 
month of their summer vacations to military training.139 Different 
publications make the ground for developing an awareness of jihad. In 
addition, if anyone from the town or village has achieved “martyrdom”, 
his funeral would be attended by a large number of people from all 
adjacent places. Parents of these martyrs are well respected and also 
receive financial assistance from these jihadi organizations. The event 
inspires many others to volunteer themselves or their sons for jihad. 
Graffiti on the walls has become a very normal thing especially in NWFP 
and interior Sindh. The graffiti is also an indicator of a mindset in society 
and surely help attracting people to join this noble cause.  
3. Role of Madrassahs in Propagating Religious Extremism 
The major cause of sectarian violence and other associated problems in the 
country is the interpretation of Islam by various scholars. These scholars invest in 
madrassahs to promote and spread their own philosophy of waging jihad against non-
Muslims and against other Muslims sects to whom they consider as Kafir. A recent 
survey of religious educational institutions revealed that only 60 percent of the students 
in Deobandi and 49 percent in Barelevi madrassahs expressed readiness to accept the 
existence of other sects. For the students of these schools, jihad against members of other 
sects is as much a religious duty as jihad against non-Muslims.140 Pakistani madrassah 
students from these militant schools have become the primary soldiers in the internal 
sectarian conflicts that have reached increasing levels of violence. Rather than acting as 
                                                 
138 “Taming the Madaris,” “The Nation,” 2 September 2001. 
139 Azmat Abbas, “Catching Them Young,” The Herald, February 2002, p. 35. 
140 International Crisis Group, Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan Failure to Tackle Extremism, ICG Asia 
Report No. 73, Islamabad/Brussels, January 16, 2004, p. 11. 
47 
religious centers of cooperation, the leaders of various schools have issued verdicts 
against other groups, giving an imprimatur to violence.141 For example, within NWFP, 
Sind, and Balochistan, their statements have played a key role in turning localized shia-
sunni disputes into a real threat to the nation as a whole.  
Some extremist madrassahs propagate a culture of violence and preach jihad with 
the aim to recruit and train the individuals who can later take part in the holy war against 
the enemies of Islam. Those who study these curricula for ten to fifteen years (the most 
formative period of their lives) cannot be expected to behave in any other way.142 These 
new schools so-called madrassahs, tend to teach a more extreme version of Islam than 
what had been propagated before. Madrassahs target a lower class of society, 
unemployed youth, and refugees to brainwash their mind and train them for militant 
activities within and outside the country.  
An added concern is that the student pool in many of these radical madrassahs is 
made up of foreigners. As much as 10-50 percent of the students in certain madrassahs 
are from abroad, coming from regions at war such as Afghanistan, Chechnya, and the 
Philippines. These students return with new influence and a changed outlook, which 
worsen the levels of violence. This second generation of conflict leaders tends to be more 
aggressive in their tactics and less willing to compromise or negotiate.143  
As people become both more reliant upon and even integrated within private 
social service systems provided by these groups, their reasons for loyalty to the state are 
diminished. Such new, parallel institutions also provide a means to mobilize against the 
state and pressure or disrupt its policies. For example, the madrassahs provide a common 
pool of protesters, the thousands of students themselves, who are brought out to oppose 
the Pakistani government on almost any issue, ranging from support for the US to new 
taxes on small businesses.  
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D. JIHADI CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON PAKISTAN 
1. Rise of Jihadi Culture in Pakistan 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 sent shock waves throughout the 
world. It changed the power equation in the region. Washington registered a major 
shakeup in area vital to their interest. China perceived the invasion as another step 
towards its encirclement by the Soviet Union. Russian aircrafts at Shindand, only 480 km 
from the Gulf, had altered those geo-strategic environments in South Central Asia 
overnight. The Saudis were equally alarmed; scared because of the Soviet threat to their 
oil supplies. Pakistan faced a highly dangerous situation, sandwiched between two 
enemies – India on the east and the Soviet troops knocking on the Western border.144 
President Zia and his foreign office were in a real dilemma. The situation was even grave 
for the Americans, who during the ongoing Cold War, wanted to defeat the Russians at 
all fronts. Expansion of Soviets towards this region was viewed with great concern.  The 
American strategists then masterminded enticing Pakistan to help them by fighting a holy 
war (Jihad) along with the Afghan military groups. 
President Zia decided to support jihad as conceived by the United States. In 
addition, what made Zia an even more eager partner of the US for the Afghan jihad was 
the nuclear program as it had worsened his relations with Washington.145 He badly 
needed such an opportunity to legitimate his government and overcome the internal 
problems. The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan thus provided the initial 
impetus for call of jihad by Pakistan. 
Geo-strategic compulsions and economic interests brought Pakistan, USA, Saudi 
Arabia, and China on a common platform to support the Afghan Mujahideen. It was 
United States in particular who extended political, economic, and military assistance to 
Pakistan during this entire war. American interests can well be understood by the fact 
that, George Bush, then Vice President of the United States, joined Mujahideen in the 
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religiously emotional slogan – Allah-o-Akbar on visit to the Pakistan border.146  It is 
against this backdrop that Pakistan had to execute the military strategy for the jihad.   
Pakistan raised the voice for jihad against communist infidels, which was readily 
responded by the Afghan refugees, who were mostly settled in camps along the Pakistan-
Afghan border and brethren from other Muslim countries as well. It is prudent to mention 
here that since this war was portrayed as Islam’s war on the atheistic Soviet Communists, 
the militant aspect of jihad became popular within the Pakistani society.147 During this 
war, enough people were converted to the cause, the jihad developed a momentum of its 
own. The Soviet withdrawal and the defeat of communist forces in Afghanistan in 1989 
failed to signal the end of the jihad. Jihadis from all over the world, who were so 
intelligently guided and directed against Soviet armies, were left without proper 
leadership. Loaded with the intensity of confidence after defeating Soviets, they moved to 
other parts of the world to pursue jihad. It is prudent to highlight here that Qazi Hussain 
Ahmed, Chief of Jamaat-e-Islami, very rightly said that, “The Afghan war was the 
mother of all jihads.”148  If his claim is viewed analytically, he is right as that proved a 
springboard for jihad and the jihadi culture as well which slowly and gradually moved 
into Pakistan and was heartily accepted by large segment of our society.  
Meanwhile the Kashmiris, cornered for more than 50 years decided to fight it out, 
thus opening a new venue for the battle hardened jihadis. Identifying Kashmir as a place 
to be liberated in order to bring end to the atrocities by Indian forces, the jihadis engaged 
themselves to wage jihad against Indians. These two consecutive struggles have acted as 
catalyst for ever-growing number of madrassahs, which have been instrumental in 
producing a mindset in the society, i.e., ready to wage jihad. This resulted into a 
phenomenon, namely jihadi culture, throughout the country. Today, every major 
madrassah and jihadi political party use media publications to spread the message of 
jihad. For details see Appendix C. 
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Before 11 September 2001, Pakistan had a number of militant groups active in 
Kashmir loosely linked under the banner United Jihad Council (UJC), formed in the early 
1990s. Some foreign elements were also involved in strengthening the UJC. It is 
comprised of:149 
• Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),  
• Jesh-e-Muhammadi (JeM), 
• Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT),  
• Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM),  
• Al Badar.  
• Harkat ul-Ansar (HUA) (It had previously acted as umbrella organization, 
but after the formation of JeM an estimated three-quarters of its members 
joined the new group) 
• Allied Groups: Small groups attached to HuM and HUA included 
Convey of Mercy, Al Hadid, Muslim Brotherhood and Al Faran. HuM and 
HUA, due to their close links with Al-Qaeda network, had contacts with 
other radical Islamist organizations including the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA); Egyptian Islamic Jihad; Islamic Movement of Uzbeckistan (IMU); 
Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC); Libyan Islamic Fighting 
Group; Al-Itihad al-Islamiya (AIAI); Islamic Army of Aden/Islamist army 
of Aden and Abyan; Uighur separatist and radical Palestinian groups.150 
Jihadi culture has two distinct ideological myths. These myths operate at different 
levels. At international level, these jihadi organizations promote anti Western sentiments 
and call for jihad against the West. The motivating ideological force is that Muslims in 
Pakistan cannot remain indifferent to the sufferings of their brethren in the occupied land 
or elsewhere. It is in this backdrop, the sacred cause of jihad is booming in Pakistan and 
promoted by these jihadi organizations. These organizations are providing impetus to the 
ongoing struggle in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia or Afghanistan. Many of these 
organizations have links all over the world.   They have their own militant groups to 
wage jihad against the enemies of Islam and against those who belong to different school 
of thoughts. At a domestic level, these groups try to promote their own extremist version 
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of Islam and create a state within state.  The militants groups of these organizations are a 
constant source of trouble for law and order.   
 
 
2. Jihadi Culture Threat  
• Jihadi Formations of Islamist Party:  The co-option of Isalmist parties 
as jihadi arms of Pakistan army in Afghanistan sent out a clear signal that 
waging jihad was a legitimate political activity. All sorts of jihadi 
formations sprouted out of the existing Islamist parties.151 This has 
resulted in transforming jihad into the sectarian differences, thus turning it 
into social and political conflict, which had dangerous implications for 
civil society and governmental authority in Pakistan. Appendix D shows 
the map of Islamic militant groups in Pakistan.  
• Militant Madrassah: The role of madrassahs in providing the manpower 
to sustain the sectarian conflict and as an institution for reproducing the 
ideology in which such conflicts has its moorings, is a serious threat to the 
stability of the state. The spread of militant /jihadi madrassahs have 
increased the rate of sectarian strife and violence in the country. There is a 
close link between some Islamist parties and Jihadi organizations. Jamiat-
ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) runs a large number of madrassahs all over 
Pakistan and is considered to be the parent organization for the sectarian 
outfits like, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.152 Tehrik-e-
Jafria Pakistan also owns a sectarian outfit named Sipah-e-Mohammad.153 
Involvement of Jaish-e-Mohammad in sectarian militancy came to fore 
after the attack on a religious gathering in village Mallohwali, Pindi 
Gheb.154  
• Jihadis Let Loose: After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the jihadis 
now posses a serious threat to the internal security of Pakistan. Firstly, 
because thousand of madrassah–trained students filled the ranks of 
Taliban leadership and military. Now that the Taliban and Afghanistan are 
no longer viable outlets for jihadi militancy, it is unclear in what form 
jihadi ideology will be propagated.  Isalmist/jihadi aggression could 
indeed be internally focused or changing the sociopolitical dynamic of 
Pakistan. These jihadi elements strongly feel that it is their principle 
responsibility to liberate Kashmir and play a dominant role in other 
neighboring regions,i.e., Afghanistan, etc. The jihadis perceive that the 
Pakistan government has caved in due to the pressure of U.S. and India, 
against cross-border terrorism. The Pakistani government is now forced to 
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deal with the internal pressure that have compounded since 9/11.155 
Secondly, these radical groups follow the successful model (used in 
revolutions from China to Cuba) of replacing government institutions with 
ones linked to their own groups. 
• Talibanization of Pakistan: Concern about the possible Talibanization of 
Pakistan is now so deep among certain elite sections of society, that it has 
led to a new genre of religious threat perceptions.156 Talibanization is a 
term that highlights the prospects and chances of taking over the control of 
Pakistan by jihadis. In an observation, the US Assistant Secretary of State, 
Karl Inderfurth, expressed concern over a “possible Talibanization of 
Pakistan”.157 However, appreciation of the masses in response to the latest 
stance of the government to support United States in war against terrorism 
and clamping down of the prominent jihadi organizations, is an indicator 
that this concept was being blown out of proportion. Another aspect, 
which has been very much inter-linked with the emergence of the jihadi 
culture, is that most of militant cadres from various groups have come 
home from Indian held Kashmir or Afghanistan or from other parts of the 
world. Growing trends of jihadi culture coupled with strong anti Western 
sentiments in the society have created a dilemma for internal security 
planners trying to evolve a strategy, which strikes balance between 
Western demands and population aspiration. The remarks of a jihadi 
operative were: “we won’t stop-even if India give us Kashmir, we will 
also bring jihad here in Pakistan. There is already a movement here to 
make Pakistan a pure Islamic state.  Many preach Islam, but most of them 
don’t know what it means. We want to see a Taliban-style regime here in 
Pakistan”.158 This mind set can have devastating affect on Pakistan’s 
internal security problems and its integrity within the comity of nations.  
• Kashmir Issue: The Kashmir cause is the primary motivation of most of 
jihadi organizations. The continued illegal occupation of Kashmir by 
India, its refusal to honor the solemn pledges for a plebiscite, the UN’s 
failure to implement its resolutions, and the indifference of world powers 
to the sufferings of the Kashmiri people, served as an incentive for jihad in 
Kashmir. Another dimension to the same problem is that even a most 
viable solution to Kashmir problem is not acceptable to these jihadi 
organizations. No peaceful solution falls in their grand philosophy of 
jihad. The only plausible way to address the Kashmir, as per jihadi 
perception, is to wage jihad. It is imperative for the United Nations in 
general, and the United States in particular, to play an active role in the 
solution to Kashmir problem 
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• Law and Order: The jihadi groups have also contributed to the rise of 
militarist and chauvinistic tendencies in the country. Regardless of how 
sacred is the cause for which they have been raising funds and procuring 
arms, their emergence on country’s political scene amounts to having all 
manners of private armies coming up to pose a challenge to civil 
society.159 The rise in the power of these jihadi groups can be well 
understood from the fact that they do not feel any hesitation in entering 
into an armed conflict with the government if their interests are threatened. 
Without going into the past, the recent decision of the present government 
to support United States in war against terrorism was vehemently opposed 
by most of the religious political parties which have number of 
madrassahs all across the country and also preaching jihad. In a number of 
demonstrations, spread over weeks, have seriously affected the law and 
order situation, and has resulted in the loss of lives of innocent men as 
well as government and civil property. This, and many other examples, 
spread over the past two decades, gives us an ample insight of the 
deteriorating internal security situation resulted due to the emergence of 
jihadi culture.  
• Tribal Districts: The majority of tribal organizations in the government 
administered Mohammed and Bajor Agencies declared that they would 
not allow any anti-Taliban elements, military or civilian, to enter their 
areas. Some tribes blocked a part of historic Silk Route used by traders 
carrying goods between Pakistan and China in protest against President 
Musharraf’s pro-US policies.160 South Waziristan came to international 
attention in January 2003 following clashes between the U.S. and 
Pakistani armed forces. Although technically under Pakistani’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), it has in practice been controlled by 
the ISI in contradiction to the wishes of successive presidents, including 
Musharaff. No regular government has been able to control the feuding 
Waziris, who believe in the primacy of small arms and receive modern 
American-made weapons from the CIA during operations against the 
Soviet in the 1980s.161 
E. CHALLENGES AND STEPS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT 
An International Crisis Group paper on “Unfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to 
Tackle Extremism” recommends162 that Pakistan government take effective action 
against all extremism groups and parties, in particular: 
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• dismantle the infrastructure of groups banned under the Anti terrorism 
Law and prevent members from regrouping and reorganizing under new 
identities. 
• close all jihadi Madrassahs, including those linked to religious parties. 
• and sign immediately the International Convention for the suppression of 
the financing of terrorism. 
Apparently, all these recommendations are logical, but international community 
does not realize the likely repercussion of such a tough stance. Such a policy will result 
into public disorder and may take shape of civil war. Application of force to that extent 
may prove to be counter productive. This resistance may spillover to Afghanistan and 
other part of region. Such a strategy warrants reconsideration. The carrot and stick 
approach is needed to handle such cases.  The mind-set cannot be changed overnight. The 
evil of religious intolerance and fanaticism is the outcome of two decades of interaction 
between international, regional and internal stimuli and cannot be wished away within 
such limited time, at the disposal of present government of Musharraf. It is sincerely 
believed that a short, medium, and long-term policy package may be the only answer. 
Present Government has taken certain administrative, legal, and consultative measures 
thereby displaying political will to free Pakistani society from sectarianism and religious 
extremism. Enforcement of weaponization ordinance and proposed amendment to anti 
terrorist act is a step in the right direction.  
The recent stance of government to support the United States in war against 
terrorism and banning of jihadi organizations are steps towards arresting and checking the 
growth of jihadi organizations and jihadi culture as well. Unconditional support rendered 
by Pakistani government to the United States despite a strong opposition from jihadi 
organizations and their parent political parties is a clear indicator of government’s pledge 
to curb the jihadi groups.163 The dilemma is that these banned organizations re-emerge 
with different names. For example when Harkat-ul-Ansar was declared a terrorist 
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organization and banned in 1997, but it was recast as the Harkat ul-Mujahiddin in 
1998.164 In 2002, the government banned a few militant organizations but they re-
surfaced with new identification. Previously, Talibanization of Pakistan renamed itself as 
Jamaat-ad Dawa.165 Jash-e-Mohammed and Sipah-e-Sihaba became Khuddam-I-Islam 
and Millat-e-Islamia, respectively.166 But the Pakistani government, consistent in its 
plans, announced a series of moves to tighten the grip on banned political parties and 
militant groups. These plans included ban on six parties: Millat-I-Islamia(formerly SSP), 
Khudam-I-Islam(Jesh-e-Mohammadi), Islami Tehrik-I-Pakistan (Tehrik-I-Jafria), Jamiat-
ul-Ansar (Harkat-ul-Ansar), Hizb-ut-Tehrir (part of the foreign-based Kilafat Movement), 
Jamaat-ul Farqan (a sister organization of the Jesh-I-Mohammadi).167 There is still a 
danger of re-emergence of these militant organizations. Tracking of all the militant 
organization is extremely important to arrest the extremism. This warrants a well placed 
intelligence system and workable strategy to crack down the militants.  
Actions taken by present government in tribal areas, especially in Waziristan, are 
highly criticized by religious parties and masses.168 The military operations in Wana have 
cost many innocent lives and still it is nowhere near its goal.169 The battles between 
Pakistani troops and militants of South Waziristan served to exacerbate already volatile  
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anti-Musharraf and anti-US sentiments held by many Pakistani Pashtuns.170 Therefore, 
along with the use of force, a diplomatic channel has to be introduced to bring like 
minded on the side of government. .  
F. CONCLUSION  
The Jihadi culture is a legacy of the Zia era as the first “international jihad” was 
conceived, promoted and patronized by the Americans to fight the Soviet Union during 
the Afghan War. Trained and motivated militants, having experience of Afghan and 
Kashmir jihad, are available to various groups/sects. These fanatic groups with 
considerable access to unaccounted arms/ammunition are also exploited by opposing 
political parties. Iranian and Saudi Arabia, whose financial/material support to these 
organizations have been recorded, allegedly support some of these groups. Hostile 
neighboring countries have also exploited sectarianism in the last two decades for their 
own interests.  
During theAfghan war, numbers of madrassahs mushroomed into the Pakistan 
with the aim to recruit and prepare the men, to wage the holy war against the infidels. 
The end of the Afghan war did not signal the end to the activities of jihadis, who turned 
to look different postures where they could wage jihad. The jihadi organizations over the 
years have been instrumental in fighting against the infidels’ especially in Afghanistan 
and more recently in Kashmir. However, they do not hesitate to pickup arms against the 
government if they feel their interests are threatened. 
The reasons behind the growing political and religious influence of Islamist and 
jihadi groups in Pakistan are complex mixtures of internal and external pressures. The 
first of these is the eternally insufficient government sponsored education system. This 
has allowed jihadi organizations to educate the poor and dispossessed in an increasingly 
militant and fundamentalist manner out the controlling oversight of the central 
government.  
The proliferation of armed religious fundamentalists, jihadi groups created a 
countervailing military force that challenged and undermined the unique role of armed 
forces and the law enforcement agencies. Its internal dynamics are the rise of 
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sectarianism, deteriorating law and order situation and poor economy. At the external 
front this has painted a picture of Pakistan as a country, which is exporting terrorism all 
around the globe and has resulted into strained relations with the West in general and 
neighboring countries in particular. It is against this backdrop that President Musharaff in 
his historic speech of 12 January 2002 has banned most of the jihadi organizations with 
the sole aim to curb down the activities of these organizations in order to arrest the above 
highlighted spin-off of the jihadi culture.  
Another important matter of serious concern is that if these jihadi organizations 
retain their militant jihadi principles, then the future of Afghanistan, Kashmir and 
Pakistan could be under serious threat. The reaction of religious parties against the 
government’s decision to support the U.S. in war against terrorism, poses a serious threat 
to the future of Pakistan. It needs to be tackled diplomatically without antagonizing 
religious sentiments of any faction. While use of force in tribal areas is a necessity, it is 
not a sufficient condition. Excessively relying upon military force alone is not answer to 
all the threats. Being an ideological Muslim state, Pakistan must allow sufficient freedom 
to religio-political parties without allowing them to use violent means or indulge in 
practices contrary to the policy of state. Any extremist group that uses violent means 
must be confronted with a strong application of force with clear ends in sight. Leadership 
must convey resolve and use of all appropriate state instruments to eliminate all such 
threats.           
The study concludes proves that religious intolerance, sectarian problems and rise 
of religious extremism and militant groups are significant factors responsible for 
increased unrest and law and order problems in Pakistan. Sectarian threats feed on the 
failed education system in Pakistan and allow religious clerics to interpret Islam in the 
manner that exploits unemployed and raw youth. The need of the hour, therefore, is for 
our national security planners, be they politicians, bureaucrats or those in the services, to 
take a holistic approach to the issue and set in motion the processes by which a long term 
and coherent solution to combat the dangers arising from anti-national activities under the 
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IV. IMPACT OF INTERNAL SECURITY ON ECONOMY OF 
PAKISTAN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The deteriorating law and order situation in the country has added to the 
economic malaise bringing Pakistan to the brink of economic collapse, therefore there is 
a need to analyze the impact of ethnicity and jihadi culture on the economy of Pakistan. 
Pakistan needs to address these national security threats and find a viable solution if it is 
to progress and find its rightful place in the community of nations. There is an element of 
interdependence between economy and internal security problems. The question is, can 
we find a solution to our internal security threats, i.e., rising jihadi culture and ethnicity 
problem without addressing our economic problems?  The answer is “No”. My argument 
is that Pakistan’s economy and its future stability is dependent upon efficient handling of 
internal security problems. The internal security and economic stability are dependent 
upon each other. This causal relationship between instability and economic growth is the 
focus of my analysis.  
This paper will critically analyze the impact of “Jihadi Culture and Ethnicity” on 
the economy of Pakistan. Part B of the paper will give an overview of economy through 
the lens of some renowned scholars. In section C, an effort will be made to study the 
concept of interdependence between economy and internal security. Section D will focus 
on Jihadi culture and its negative impact on economy. Section E will critically analyze 
few of national projects from the perspective of ethnicity and how economy is affected in 
this process. Section F will analyze fundamental variables, i.e., environmental scarcity, 
human development and poverty alleviation, which are interconnected to internal security 
and economy.  
B. PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY THROUGH THE LENS OF ECONOMIST 
Prof. Looney tried to analyze the economy of Pakistan on the eve of its golden 
jubilee. His main argument was that there is growing dissatisfaction with the country’s 
economic performance. Among many shortcomings, he considers that inadequate human 
resource development, population explosion and rising unemployment as the important 
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factors for deteriorating economy.171 These factors have greatly neutralized some of the 
positive results achieved in Pakistan's economic management and resultantly the overall 
scenario on the economic front has become bleak and confused. 
Looney’s key question is what are the limitations associated with the country’s 
development model, and he also focuses on whether and to what extent democracy can be 
sustained in the light of massive economic and social difficulties.172 On the positive side, 
agriculture and industrial output marked the increase in GNP.173 On the negative side, the 
country has achieved too little and whatever has been accomplished has been done at a 
very high cost. The gap between import and export, rising external debt, internal debt and 
defense budget are serious impediments in overall growth. Looney proposes that the 
government has to cut down its defense budget.174 Despite economic advancement in 
certain fields, the lives of ordinary people have not changed. Poverty has jumped up to 42 
million.175 After making budget allocation for defense and debt-servicing country is left 
with hardly anything to spend on development of the physical and social infrastructure.  
Zaidi argues that Pakistan's economic performance since its independence has 
been mixed. Initially, a subsistence economy in many respects, it developed a significant 
industrial sector in the 60's and made noticeable progress in agricultural sector. Pakistan 
was considered to be a model capitalist economy in the 1960s.176 Periods of rapid growth 
alternated between stagnation; and macro-economic imbalances grew steadily more 
serious during the 1980s and early 1990’s. The political management of the economy 
often served to limit the opportunity for growth while little has actually been done to 
ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth.  
Ishrat, author of several books on Pakistan’s economy, hypothesizes that failure 
of governance and consistent domination of political power and state apparatus by 
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narrowly based elites seeking to advance their private and family interest to the exclusion 
of majority of population lies at the root of problem.177 In analyzing Pakistan economic 
development, he explains dichotomous roles of state vs. the market. The breakup of the 
Soviet Union was a wakeup, call that completed the ongoing revolution- decisively in 
favor of superiority of markets. Government failure was found to be greater than “market 
Failure”.178 Ishrat argues that failure of successive governments to implement economic 
policies in last 50 years has been the main cause of negative aspect of economy. He 
regards this as a bad governance problem, which he considers the mother of all ills in the 
society.  
The economic and social outcomes, as stated by Ishrat, in Pakistan over the last 
50 years have turned out to be mixture of paradoxes.179 The persistence of poverty, large 
income inequalities, severe rural –urban disparities, gender discrimination, endemic 
ethnic rivalries and political instability suggest that benefits of economic growth have not 
been spread evenly.180 However, one of the findings of author is that it is extremely hard 
to quantify these variables.   
Pakistan is blessed with critical natural resources:  gas, irrigation water, and fertile 
land of Indus valley. 70% of the Pakistan economy is based on agricultural production. 
Ishrat emphasizes that resource utilization of these valuable commodities, i.e., natural 
resources, has however been less than optimal as efficiency considerations have been 
overtaken by claims of equitable and fair distribution of water between provinces.181 
Certain key issues of Pakistan economic development182 are: 
 
• The first issue is the overall state capacity of public institutions to deliver 
the goods and services to its citizens. Investing in health, education, 
nutrition, family planning services, water supply, and sanitation are some 
of the activities which state must perform to get positive social returns.                                                     
177 Hussain, Ishrat, Pakistan The Economy of Elitist State, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 
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• Human capital base of Pakistan is much weaker in relation to its economic 
growth performance. 
• Distribution of infrastructure is uneven in the country. 45, 000 villages183 
have only access to trading centers.  Uneven distribution of resources 
creates frustrations, political instability and results into serious law and 
problem within country apart from its economic loss.    
• Deteriorating law and order situation in the country and the ineffective and 
protracted legal system have impaired the overall environment of 
economic activity for the majority of population. 
• Pakistan economy is heavily dependent upon foreign saving and 
investments. Law and order issues are serious hurdles in meaningful 
foreign investment.  
Ishrat’s main conclusion is that ethnic diversity is an underlying cause of poor 
economic growth and that extraordinarily high levels of ethnic diversity in Africa help 
explains substantial amount of Africa’s growth tragedy. Pakistan economic growth is 
dependent upon its success in handling ethnic problems. While he identifies ‘ethnicity as 
the ultimate variable for macro and micro economic stability, however, he does not 
specifically addresses those fundamental variable, i.e., impact of ethnic issues which 
affect negatively on economy.   
Looney refers to Shahid (2001) who bluntly has attributed the country’s inability 
to sustain high growth to the following factors184: 
• An increase in the role of the state has coincided with a decline in 
governance. 
• Non-competitive regimes politically and economically have resulted in 
rampant corruption and stagnation – the subversion of competitiveness 
was the central feature of Pakistani governments. 
• There has been a continuous redistribution of wealth in favor of privileged 
groups. 
• A hard crust of economic monopoly has stifled new growth and creativity. 
• An erosion in the provision of public services has resulted in a decline of 
the public’s trust in government which is seen a predatory. This, in turn, is 
linked to non-payment of taxes, the corruption in tax administration, and 
the massive increase in borrowing. 
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• The quality of the civil bureaucracy is falling rapidly. A majority of civil 
servants are not even paid a living wage and this is tantamount to an 
incentive to corruption. 
• The irrelevance of the state in the lives of the people is exemplified by the 
total breakdown of law and order. 
Due to a lack of vision in the past, economic policies were not geared towards 
improving productivity of the economy, removing bottlenecks and making the economy 
more efficient in production of goods and services. Despite myriad government bodies, 
few serious analyses of the evolving structural constraints were conducted, and fewer still 
were ever implemented. Most distortions which now appear in the form of structural 
constraints stemmed from a basic thesis of free-ridership in Pakistan, i.e., the government 
is responsible for providing food, health, education, housing and more.185  Agriculture 
sector (which contributes 25% of GDP), was totally neglected. As an example, until 
recently, despite input subsidies to farmers (largely siphoned off by big landlords), 
control on producer prices of major crops (wheat, cotton) remained far below the cost of 
production and what the farmer would have received in the open market or the 
international market. At the same time, large agriculturists refuse to accept the 
agricultural income tax. Similarly in industry, distortions arose over the years due to lack 
of policies to promote labor-intensive industry.186 For instance, agro-industry has a large 
potential in Pakistan but this was never fully exploited. Controls, discretionary powers 
and a complex system of licensing and regulations ensured concentration of all large 
industry in a few hands with monopolistic trends.187 Protection of industry under the garb 
of infant industry argument, afforded mark-ups of more than a 100% to industrialists 
producing inefficiencies in production, distortions and structural impediments in the 
economy. Today the same industrialists argue against liberalization and deregulation for 
fear of competition by losing out to more efficient industries. A by-product of the lack of 
coherent industrial policy in the past has been the lack of a diversified export base in 
Pakistan, which in today’s climate of aggressive export competition is a serious detriment  
                                                 
185 Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2000-2001.   
186 The News, December 14, 2001.  
187 S. Akbar Zaidi. Issues in Pakistan Economy, Oxford University Press, Karachi Pakistan 1990, p. 
51. 
64 
to economic growth. Cumulative effect of stunted growth of agriculture sector and 
narrow industrial base has resulted in an annual trade deficit to the tune of approximately 
$ 3.5 billion. 
C. INTERDEPENDENCE - ECONOMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
1. Human Security   
The concept of “human security” is relatively new on the international scene but it 
gaining more and more attention in view of third world security problems. The 
commission of Human Security was created in 2001. The purpose of this commission 
was to study those internal and external factors, which affect human security in Central 
Asia.188 The Commission on Human Security argues189 that need for human security is 
universal; that people, both individuals and communities are central to its promotion; and, 
that all its components, whether they relate to conflict or development, are 
interdependent. Threats to the security of people in the region include potential or actual 
conflict, population displacement, economic deprivation, unemployment, deterioration of 
basic services, human rights violations, etc.   
2. Linkage between Economic Development and Security  
Today, the multifarious threats to developing world stability, however, have 
proved far more complex in understanding the various dimension of internal security. 
There are two streams of thoughts on linkage between security and economy, i.e., the 
“security first” and the “development first”.190   
• Security First Approach: Proponents of this approach argues that 
“security first” guarantees economic development. According to them, 
security is a precondition of development, and for achieving successful 
outcomes in the other reconstruction pillars. Conflict not only destroys 
infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages 
criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity 
impossible. In the most pressing sense, it concerns securing the lives of 
civilians from immediate and large-scale violence and the restoration of 
territorial integrity.191 
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• Economy First Approach: The idea of relying on economic development 
to ensure credible national security is a relatively recent one. According to 
this school of thought, it is erroneous to look at the security in terms of 
physical security, attainable through military means. Proponents of this 
approach argue that “economic development” is the most effective means 
to attain security.192 Their point of view is that economic collapse is also 
frequently a precursor to and a warning of the potential for state failure 
and the possibility of internecine or conflicts. Some argue, for example, 
that the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement and the halving of 
coffee prices played a critical role in polarizing Rwanda before the 
genocide. Ethnic war, revolution, genocide and coups d’état often go hand 
in hand with economic crisis.193  
Both arguments are important for understanding the interdependence between 
these two factors. These two variables cannot work in isolation and ultimately converge. 
In Eastern Europe, security and economic challenges are far greater and have a 
downward spiral effect on each other’s progress. Kosovo has seen the greatest level of 
destruction within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Army and 
paramilitary forces wreaked havoc in Kosovo on its housing and economic infrastructure, 
creating not only a humanitarian disaster but an immediate economic crisis. Undoubtedly 
the persistence of ethnic violence in Kosovo is adding to the climate of insecurity, and 
making it most difficult to restore a modicum of normality to daily life. Sorting out these 
very serious problems constitute a fundamental precondition for economic revitalization. 
The Marshall Plan was indeed instrumental in fostering the conditions that led to the 
economic revitalization of Europe. It explicitly linked Europe’s long-term security to its 
economic revitalization. The Marshall Plan has remained a kind of archetype and is often 
invoked in discussions exploring the links between importance of security and the need 
for economic revitalization.194  
East Timor struggled for twenty-four years to gain independence. After gaining 
independence, East Timor never faced any serious internal security challenges. However, 
slow economic development had a downward spiral effect in creating serious law and 
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order problems. In Dec 2002, riots all over the East Timor created an alarming security 
challenge due to UN failure to deliver on the economic front. Violence and law problems 
were so severe that ultimately UN had to bring major changes its exit strategy of military 
forces.195 Failure to accord top priority to economic development changed the whole 
security scene in East Timor.     
McNab states that demilitarization of Afghan society cannot be achieved unless 
suitable reintegration opportunities are available to former militias. If the economy 
remains stagnant and no employment is forthcoming the process of disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration will collapse.196 Understanding of this interconnection 
between security and economy is vital for the overall success of handling deep-rooted 
conflict. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies at New York University’s, states that “The 
lack of security has hindered reconstruction and sapped the legitimacy of the Government 
in Afghanistan”. Bernard Frahi, of the Office on Drugs and Crime, said that the 
elimination of opium would only occur when political and social stability was provided 
in a broader economic context.  What was needed was the commitment of international 
community for long-term strategies for poverty reduction.197 
McNab argues that food, water, and shelter are basic human need.198 In the post 
conflict scenario or during the conflicts, one has to address the basic needs of people. He 
recommends that one must concentrate on the basic need of the population to address the 
root causes of conflict. Mayer substantiates McNab argument by explaining his theory on 
“Wheels of Conflict”. He places “ Needs” at the center of all conflicts.199 People engage 
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in conflict either because their needs that are not met by the conflict process itself or 
because they have needs that are inconsistent with those of others.200  
 
 
Figure 1.   Wheels of Conflict 
 
3. Importance of Economic Development 
In Pakistan there has been a useful tool for external focus in the form of an Indian 
threat, which has to a large degree managed to divert attention from internal, social and 
political problems. In future pressing issues related to over population, provision of basic 
civic facilities, education and internal security, would pose a more serious threat than any 
external security threat. Inter provincial grievances could easily identify with this, and 
given the distinct ethnic identity of each could be potentially seriously damaging to the 
federation. The ethnic and regional polarization has emerged as major motivation for 
potential terrorism. The absence of genuine economic development and political 
instability has provided ethnic and regional forces to exploit the situation. This is 
particularly relevant to Sind and Balochistan.  
During the last decade, Pakistan’s domestic environments have become 
increasingly degraded in terms of economic, social and internal security. A vast majority 
of people in Pakistan have no access to quality-oriented education, health facilities, clean 
drinking water, and other basic necessities of life. The nuclear or conventional weapons 
                                                 










do guarantee relative security from external threats, however, the investment in external 
security cannot take care of deep-rooted internal insecurity issues emanating from poor 
investment in human development. General Musharraf recently stated that economic 
development is fundamental element of national security. Internal security is an important 
pillar of national security. Most of the countries in the third world are struggling to 
maintain peace internally. An economically bankrupt, loan ridden and dependent country 
is susceptible to economic and political exploitation and military aggression. Feroz states 
that assured deterrence and defense capability is impossible without economic growth.201 
He further argues that all-important institutions of the state must develop together in 
harmony. And this is possible only if the nation state follows a strategy of sustained 
economic development.202   
Defense against external threat is of vital importance, however, present state of 
affairs warrants a balanced approach to deal with internal and external threats. High level 
of defense expenditure in Pakistan has resulted in an adverse impact on Pakistan’s 
economy. Looney states that Pakistan is not left with enough money after making budget 
allocation for defense and debt servicing so as to spend on the development of the 
physical social infrastructure.203  He further states that Pakistan’s economic growth is a 
puzzle because there is scant evidence that this economic advance has affected the lives 
of ordinary people. The country has failed to develop its human capital.204 From the time 
of the creation of Pakistan, 40-50 percent of the revenue has been spent on defense, 
totaling more than Rs. 10,000 billion until now.205 Pakistan ranks 9th among 117 market 
economies  in  terms of the government's expenditure on defense as a percentage of total  
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expenditure. On the other hand, it ranks 2nd among the 34 poorest economies. It ranks 
17th in education and 34th in health per capita expenditure in these 34 poorest 
economies.206  
D. JIHADI CULTURE AND ITS IMPACT ON ECONOMY 
1. Threat Posed by Jihadi Culture to Economy of Pakistan 
Sectarian threats are looming large on the entire country. Karachi, being the 
economic nerve centre of the country, remained in the grip of various acts of terrorism in 
last two decades. Sectarian killings and subsequent strikes during the month of May 
2004207 had restricted the actual working days of business to only 17-18. Being the port 
city of Pakistan, it handles almost the entire foreign trade. The recent wave of 
assassinations and killings has claimed around 61 lives, leaving 195 wounded.208  
Strikes in view of sectarian killing have hurt Pakistan immensely in terms of 
economic losses. According to a study by the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, a single day's strike results in losses amounting to Rs1.18 billion in terms of 
GDP, besides Rs154 million indirect tax revenue loss to the national kitty.209  
Country's revenue collection in May 2004 declined by 28 per cent to Rs37.4 
billion against the target of Rs51.9 billion. What about the social costs of this 
deteriorating internal security problems? In the mid-eighties, riots started in Karachi as a 
result of lack of civic services, but soon they assumed sectarian color as well. The loss of 
human life including target killing210, damage to transport and property and the loss of 
businesses as a result of long spells of curfews are hard to calculate.211  
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2. Impact on Foreign Investment  
The rise of the jihadi culture has created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the 
eyes of the rest of the world and has affected the country adversely in terms of the 
absence of direct foreign investment.  It is in this backdrop that the investors are losing 
trust in the system and are dropping millions to invest in India “especially in IT sector” 
rather than Pakistan. On international front, it is strongly felt that the atmosphere is not 
conducive for the investors in Pakistan. The crime rate has also gone up in the last couple 
of years. Armed robberies, thefts, kidnappings, assaults, and petty crime have all marked 
a visible increase. In addition, politically inspired violence as well as acts of terrorism has 
also dented the country's image abroad.212 This has served as a big blow to our ever-
shrinking economy and to a great extent has crippled it.  
The net foreign investment to Pakistan has dropped by 12 percent213 to $586.8 
million during nine months (July-March) of the current fiscal year (2003-2004) compared 
with $664.7 million of the same period last year.214  The foreign investment of $77.2 
million flew out of Pakistan in nine months due the deteriorating law and order situation 
in the country. The decline in foreign investment by 12 per cent is a wake-up call for 
Pakistan to heed. Paul Chabrier, advisor to the Managing Director of the World Bank, 
says:215  
foreign investors are not attracted solely by debt relief or the foreign 
exchange reserves. There are certain factors like the regional peace and 
internal security situation, which are beyond the economic sphere but 
influence their decision to invest in any particular country. 
How can foreign investors come when embassies are recalling wives of their 
diplomats, shedding the non-essential staff and closing their visa offices in Karachi and 
Islamabad? How can foreign investors come when the travel advisory of foreign 
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countries to their nationals ask them not to visit Pakistan? This is not the climate for 
foreign investors.216 Pakistan has to view this aspect critically in the larger economic 
interest and prosperity.  
As a result of deteriorating law and order, our productive base is not 
expanding. We are caught in a vicious cycle. Because of increasing 
lawlessness, investment is not coming either from foreign or local sources, 
and when investment is not taking place, unemployment is bound to 
increase, giving rise to further lawlessness.217 
A country that has a foreign debt of more than $36 billion cannot afford such 
events, as these cause the economy to nose drive. The blunt truth must be recognized that 
the country can wage jihad either against poverty and inequity at home or for nebulous, 
controversial causes abroad, not both.218 Looney has offered realistic options and 
suggested role of International Community on “Reforming Pakistan’s Educational 
System the challenge of madrassahs.” These options will serve the basis for planning 
viable strategy to root out jihadi culture from Pakistani society and promote education in 
Pakistan.    
E. IMPACT OF ETHNICITY ON ECONOMY 
Ethnic diversity and its consequences have created an anarchic situation in 
Pakistan. The provinces have been fighting amongst themselves over the distribution of 
financial resources, over the share of water, and over the claim of natural resources. This 
ethnic polarization has serious negative impact on Pakistan’s economy. The key projects 
of national importance are not either materializing or facing innumerable security 
challenges that put country’s future prosperity in question. Some of these threatened 
projects are; 
• Provision of natural gas from Balochistan to rest of the country. 
• Constructions of dams to address the water problems.  
• Construction of alternative port at Gwadar in view of persistent law and 
order problems. 
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• Likely benefits to be accrued from by giving access to Central Asian 
States and Iran to export natural resources and gas to India and East Asian 
countries.  
The differences on these issues if not resolved at priority, Pakistan may find itself 
in  deep trouble like some African countries. Succeeding paragraphs will throw some 
light on these key issues to examine the impact on economy and future threats to 
prosperity.  
1. Natural Gas Reserves and Ethnic Problems of Balochistan 
The terrorists and saboteurs in Balochistan have declared war to cripple Pakistan's 
economy and society. The suspension of gas supply from Sui219 to several areas of 
Punjab and NWFP has affected millions of households, industrial workers, industry, 
trade, restaurants, hotels, bakeries, business, transportation and electric power supply. 
Losses to the industry are running into billions.220 Disruption of gas supplies in the cold 
winter has created serious health problems. Twenty-nine rocket attacks have taken place 
against the gas fields, installations and pipelines in Balochistan, i.e., areas of Dera Bugti, 
Goth Mazari, Kohlu and Marri, during the last two years. Tribes are still feuding and 
fighting each other with heavy weapons, prove that the provincial government has totally 
failed to impose its writ in these rebel-infested areas.221 The tribesmen used rockets, 
automatic weapons, hand grenades and mortar in the latest clash with the security 
personnel. Feroz states that:222  
The well-planned sabotage by hired and trained terrorists sends tremors of 
shock and disbelief across Pakistan and around the entire world. There are 
no security arrangements to stop the terrorists from striking at the pipeline. 
Emboldened by lack of security arrangements the terrorists and bandits 
have been regularly blasting the gas wells, installations and pipelines. 
Targeting gas installations in Balochistan should not merely be seen in 
local perspective of tribal clashes, it should be seen in a broader regional 
perspective of geo-strategic politics of laying trans-national gas pipelines. 
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The recurring rocket attacks223 on main gas pipelines supplying gas from Sui in 
Balochistan to Punjab and the NWFP province betray complete absence of adequate 
security arrangements for the protection of such vital communications lines that serve the 
domestic, commercial, industrial and transport requirements of northern Pakistan. The 
area has become a battleground, and writ of the state and authority of the provincial and 
federal governments does not exist there. The petroleum and gas ministry, stated in May 
2004, that Pakistan's oil and gas sector has the potential to attract investment worth $1.5 
billion over the next 18 months. The government must tackle all these problems on a 
priority basis if it wishes to attract more local and foreign investment to this otherwise 
promising sector.224 It is hard to see how new investors can be persuaded to put their 
money in a project whose security situation remains as volatile. Recent statement225 of 
main tribal chief, Nawab Akbar Bugti, is an indication of deep-rooted ethnic resentment. 
He stated: “Balochistan belongs to the Baloch people and not to outsiders. We own the 
natural resources, but these are being exploited for the benefit of others. We will not 
allow others to steal our wealth. Your sensitive installations will remain insecure, because 
you have pilfered, what belongs to our people.”  
The provincial government is apparently helpless and unable to tackle the 
rebellious situation and hostile actions against state property and people's lives. For the 
last 10 years, Dera Bugti tribal area has been projected as “unsuitable” and “dangerous” 
to run any mega project, thus blocking the way of investment in Balochistan. An armed 
clash between local tribesmen and security personnel belonging to the Frontier 
Constabulary and the Rangers in Sui has resulted in enormous loss to lives and property. 
If the situation persists like this, the future threats to Pakistan’s mega projects can well be 
visualized. 
2. Water Shortage and its Impact on Economy  
The country has regularly experienced critical water shortages both the irrigation 
and drinking water. This has serious repercussion for Pakistan, particularly hampering the 
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confidence among provinces. Criticality of water issues warrants in depth analysis to 
understand the interconnected problems and potential threats emanating from this issue. 
Keeping in mind the scope of this paper only few major variables are being addressed 
here which fuels ethnicity and impacts negatively on economy.  
Nature’s endowment of water blessings upon Pakistan has always been envied by 
the world at large. At the time of independence, 5000 cu/m of water was available for 
each Pakistani, which has now reduced to 1000 cu/m because of uncontrolled population 
growth.226 The situation would be much more worrisome after 15 years when the 
availability of water would go down to 600-cu/m water per person per annum.227 This 
situation is depicted through following graph.228 
 
 





















Figure 2.   Population Growth and Water Availability Per Person 
 
The graph reveals that irrigation requirements for the year 2000 and 2013 would 
be  177  and  255  Bm3, respectively.   Considering  the non-irrigation used, the estimated  
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overall water requirements would be 184 and 266 Bm3 for the year s2000 and 2013 
respectively. Water availability for these two targets years would be 134.2 and 132.5Bm3 
respectively.   
For agriculture, water is major source of development.229 Agriculture sector 
contributes230:  
• 24% of GDP 
• 48% to employment 
• 65% to total export earning 
• 50% to total industrial value added and 
• 70% of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings come from the sale of 
agricultural products.  
Therefore, what happens to agriculture is bound to have a substantial impact on 
the growth of overall GDP. Somehow, despite tall government claims, the sector is being 
neglected so far. For the first time in recent decade, the agriculture sector had registered a 
decline.231 During 2000-2001, Pakistan’s economic growth slowed down from the 
previous gross domestic product (GDP) grew at the rate of 2.7 percent against 4.8 percent 
during 2000. Agriculture contracted by 2.5 percent due to a 40 percent shortfall in for 
irrigation.232 GOP states that around Rs 92 billion losses occurred due to the drought 
situation in year 2000-2001.233 Given the size of Pakistan economy this is a substantial 
loss. Asad, director of the international irrigation Management Institute, states that: 
to keep up the pace of agriculture growth comparable to population, we 
must conserve water by ensuring adequate water storage arrangement. 
Everyone knows we are running out of water, we need to build reservoir  
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which will last us for 30 to 50 years. Only one dam has been built in last 
27 years. Just take the example of Tarbela, If we had not built it, we’d be 
like Ethiopia right now.234 
Man-made dams may become inoperative in 10-15 years time because of silting 
and worst is no new dams are being built.235 At present, the storage capacity of our major 
reservoir has already declined to 12.6 million-acre feet (MAF), which is hardy 20 percent 
of our potential storage capacity of 65.4 MAF.236 Storage capacity and life status of 
various dams is given at Appendix E. The surplus water is available in about 70-100 days 
of summer only, and can be stored by constructing additional reservoirs.237 Future 
requirements of water are mentioned at Appendix F. Due to the reduction in the storage 
capacity of Tarbela, Mangla, and Chashma reservoirs, the shortfall by 133.7 MAF is 
assessed for the year 2013. This figure is certainly alarming. Continuous provision of 
sufficient water is therefore extremely essential for generation of hydroelectric power that 
plays a crucial role in Pakistan’s economy.  
3. Controversial Kalabagh Dam and Provincial Disharmony  
Planning for construction of huge multipurpose dam on Indus River at Kalabagh 
was started in 1953 and government approved this project in 1959.238 During Zia regime, 
due to severe water scarcity problem, World Bank committed some US $ 7.0 billion and 
kept this amount earmarked for three years. Then suddenly an intrigue based on dirty 
politics sealed the fate of Kalabagh dam forever.  Governor NWFP, in retaliation to this 
project, started marking high flood level marks on the houses, graveyard, mosques, and 
other permanent structures, which set a wave of alarm among the public of fear of their 
drowning.239 This disturbance was played so much that strong resistance started 
developing among the inhabitants of NWFP against the dam. This resentment has gone 
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deep into their memory and is a serious issue of confrontation between central 
government and provincial government. Before the government could settle the issue 
with NWFP, the Sindh province came out with entirely opposite objection to the 
Kalabagh dam building, i.e., drought and water scarcity. The controversy has reached to 
an extent that almost everyone in Pakistan has formed opinion either for or against the 
Kalabagh dam.240  
The ongoing water shortage has jolted the very foundations of the national 
economy on the one hand and has eroded faith in the decision-making capacity of our 
institutions on the other hand. Pakistan’s economy being an agricultural area has 
sustained an irremediable damage as ramification of the water shortage.241 This crisis has 
to be resolved on war footing before it becomes unmanageable.   
4. Gwadar Port, Ethnicity and Future Impact on Economy 
Pakistan presently has two commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the 
Indian Ocean, catering largely the domestic needs. About 2,000 ships, 200 oil tankers 
visit Karachi coast every year.242 Pakistan’s sea-borne trade in year 2000 was 42 million 
tones. The future trade forecast is 51 million tones per annum by 2005 and 78 million 
tons per annum by the year 2015.243 Karachi and Qasim ports are reaching their zenith in 
handling of cargo and were perceived to be deficient in meeting future demands. Law and 
order situation in Karachi has always been precarious and requirement of having an 
alternative port was realized in the 70s. Decision of building a deep-sea port at Gwadar 
came after over 25 years of initial proposal to build a port along the Makran Coast.244  
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Deep-sea port at Gwadar is strategically245 located at the mouth of Persian Gulf 
and has potential to act as hub port for natural resources of Central Asia States and for 
trade of the entire area. Another important fact is the US approval of over 1.4 billion US 
$ for the economic recovery of Trans Afghan gas pipeline. This project carrying 30 
billion cubic meters of gas per annum from Turkmenistan’s gas fields to Gwadar will be 
the first step towards the perceived economic benefits. With almost 30 billion US $ 
already invested by US oil companies in Central Asian region, the suggested Afghan 
route would cost only one-half the amount of the other alternative, which would run 
through Georgia to Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. This 1500 Km pipeline project can 
yield significant revenues. It would be interesting to note, that road distance from Kushka 
in Turkmenistan to Gwadar is only twelve hundred KM whereas, the nearest Black Sea 
port of Odessa in Ukraine is approximately three thousand and four hundred KM away 
from Central Asian states. Therefore, Gwadar is the most viable option available with the 
Central Asian Republics.  
The economic prosperity of Pakistan is linked to stability in Afghanistan and law 
and order situation in Balochistan and NWFP.  The dilemma is that despite knowing the 
economic and strategic importance of construction of Gwadar Port, the central 
government has not been able to resolve the difference with Balochistan Province. The 
recent killing of three Chinese engineers at Gwadar port in an explosion indicates the 
attempt to sabotage the project.246   
The government’s decision247 of declaring Gwadar as an industrial zone will 
attract investors, create job opportunities, and open up new vistas of economic and 
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tourism development in the coastal region. The port comes as a much-needed national 
requirement in the wake of the rise in cargo traffic at existing ports and sectarian issues in 
Karachi.  
The economic loss of foreign trade (imports and exports of over Rs1,158 
billion annually, which almost exclusively passes through Karachi) in case 
of violence, strikes, terrorism, etc., is estimated at 10pc of daily exports 
value and 5pc for imports.248  
However, the Gwadar port, which was likely to give some relief to the country, 
has added to the worries of Pakistan. Gwadar port has taken a shape of a serious ethnic 
issue between Balochistan province and Central government. A complete shutter-down 
strike was observed in Gwadar port and other areas of Balochistan in May 2004.249 Dr 
Ishaq, Central Information Secretary of Balochistan National Movement states, “Land in 
and around Gwadar has already been allotted to outsiders, and added that the strike had 
proved that the people of Balochistan would not allow Islamabad and other elements to 
usurp their rights.”250 The Balochistan based political parties251 have rejected the Gwadar 
Master Plan and described it as anti-people plan, saying that with the implementation of 
this plan, the people of Gwadar would become minority.  It appears that Pakistan’s future 
economic prosperity through Gwadar will result into chaos due to ethnic problems.  
5. Gas Pipeline between Iran and India through Pakistan. 
The transfer of gas from Iran to India via Pakistan is considered the most 
economical project, which will accrue $8 billion252 to Pakistan as the transit fee for 
laying a 2672-km trans-Pakistan pipeline to India. This would entail an estimated income 
of $14 billion to Pakistan in 30 years including $8 billion transit fee, $1 billion taxes and 
$5 billion as savings.253 
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This multi-billion dollar gas export project is economically viable for all the three 
states. Despite repeated Iranian assurance, India has expressed reservations over the 
passage of the proposed pipeline through Pakistan. Main concerns are law and order 
problems in Pakistan and assurance of Pakistan’s government for safety of the project. 
India has asked for international assurances as well. In view of serious ethnic problems in 
Balochistan and NWFP, can Pakistan guarantee the envisaged security being asked? 
Apparently, it appears to be an uphill task. 
F. FACTORS AFFECTING ECONOMY AND INTERNAL SECURITY  
Of the faultiness explained in the previous sections, it is concluded that there are 
fundamental variables that are, directly and indirectly, affecting economic prosperity and 
internal security. In view of the scope of this paper, I will analyze only two core 
variables, i.e., environmental degradation and its social impact and human resource 
development. 
1. Environmental Scarcity and Social Conflicts 
Environment and security are becoming interlocked issues. The potential that 
environmental decline has to create social unrest and other impacts on national and 
regional security is being explored in number of areas around the world. Preliminary 
indications are that Pakistan is highly vulnerable at this time if environmental conditions 
continue to decline.254 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in its annual report stated 
that country was estimated to suffer from a loss of U.S. $1.8 billion annually due to 
environmental degradation.  
Natural resources and biodiversity are important consideration in poverty 
reduction, community development and ultimately, in more participatory approaches to 
management of land and water resources. Current curves are moving in the wrong 
directions. Many resources are declining while population and demand for rural 
livelihood are on the increase. This huge challenge is central to the future health of rural 
ecosystems as well as economic opportunities in Pakistan.255  
Vertical pumping systems used for drainage are also proving unsustainable. In 
Punjab alone there are approximately 280,000 tube wells pumping 51 billion cubic                                                  
254 Arthur, Hanson J., Pakistan’s National Conservation Strategy: Renewing Commitment to Action, 
Report of the Mid-Term Review, p 6-7. Available on internet www.nssd.net/pdf/mtrch1.pdf. June 2004.  
255 Ibid., p. 8. 
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meters of water. Salts have been pumped up in the process decreasing crop productivity 
in about 5 percent of agricultural land. Beyond the Indus Basin, sharp drops in the water 
tables are occurring from 15 to over 60 centimeters per year. In Quetta Valley it is falling 
at 200 cm per annum, while in Southern Basin it is 60 cm. In Central Lahore it is falling 
at a rate of 30 cm per year. 256 McNab term this tendency as a myopic approach, which 
can have devastating effects in many areas.257 Using thousands of tube wells salty water 
has been pumped up which has resultantly decreased the crop productivity in about 5 
percent of the total agricultural land in Pakistan. Beyond the Indus Basin, a sharp drop in 
the water tables of underground aquifers is occurring at alarming rates.  
From macro-economic perspective, when human development and natural 
resources depletion are taken into account, the genuine domestic saving of 
the country is in reality much smaller than what is indicated by the 
traditional gross or net saving rates of the National Accounts.258 
McNab states that environmental scarcity causes social effects, which in turn 
become the main source of violent conflicts, i.e., ethnic conflict and insurgency etc.  
Scarcity and social factor in combination produce violent conflict. Conflict further 













Figure 3.   McNab Model on Violent Conflict, Social Effects and Scarcity  
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McNab further stresses that the weakening of institutions takes place due to 
environmental scarcity and in turn it directly increases the chances of conflicts such as 
group identity conflict, i.e., ethnic conflicts/class wars.  
Dixon states that environmental scarcity can generate severe social stresses within 
countries because societies are highly dependent on these resources in developing 
countries.260 Dixon further states that Karachi grows by about 400,000 people per year. 
Many of these new residents are migrants from rural areas, and large proportions are 
escaping environmental scarcity in the countryside.261  As Karachi population rises at 
around 5 percent per annum, the development authorities cannot provide residents with 
basic services. Acute shortage of water and electricity are pervasive.262 Dixon conclusion 
on Karachi situation is that violence stems from a variety of factors that interact to 
magnify the problems. The inability of state institutions to address diverse demands 
accentuates latent ethnic and class tensions, which further erodes the social fabric and 
economy.263 Dixon model264 on casual link between environmental scarcity and violence 
is fully applicable to Pakistan’s current internal security situations.  
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Figure 4.   Dixon Model on Casual Link Between Environmental Scarcity and 
Violence 
 
2. Lack of Human Resource Development  
The most serious neglect in the past 57 years has been the lack of human resource 
development (HRD). Much of the insecurity is caused by extreme socio-economic 
injustice between rich and poor, among different regions and classes, which often leads to 
violence. Pakistan has one of the lowest social indicators on literacy, health, primary 
schooling etc in the world. It has now become abundantly clear that accelerated growth 
per-se is necessary but not sufficient condition for bringing about sustainable poverty 
reduction. There are other complementary factors, which have to accompany higher 
growth. The most important of these is investment in human development:  education, 
training, literacy, health, drinking water, nutrition, and population planning. Countries, 
which have neglected human development, may achieve some spurt in growth and 
poverty reduction for a short period of time but these gains will not last long. Growth 
together with investment in human development offers a much better chance for 
alleviating poverty.265  
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HRD has a direct relationship with the economy in terms of raising the standard 
of living of the general populace through opportunities for higher earnings. Investment in 
human resources lead to a skilled labor force, better health and less man-days lost due to 
illness, lowering of fertility rates which curbs the burgeoning population and reduces 
pressure on resources, all of which contribute to greater economic growth. Pakistan has 
sadly neglected all these areas. The “economic miracle” of the East Asian economies 
today is as much due to correct policies as to large investments in their human resources. 
In the 21st century, with technological advancement being commonly shared, the 
countries, which are expected to grow, are the ones, which have the cutting edges in 
terms of the wealth of their human resources.266 Statement published in ‘economic 
survey of Pakistan” is alarming and warrants serious attention:  
“Pakistan, with a literacy rate of 40% the pool of about 100 million illiterates, coupled 
with the inadequate capacity of the economy to produce adequate number of jobs, is a 
potential time bomb.”267 
The priority given to human resource development is obvious from resource 
allocations. Currently, we are spending 2.5% of GDP on public education, i.e., 
approximately $1.5 Billion.268 This is the lowest amount committed for education in the 
developed world. Pakistan government has announced budget of financial year 2004-
2005 and allocated Rs13 billion for education as compared to previous year allocation of 
Rs 6 billion.269 This is a right step in the direction to invest in human development, 
however, not sufficient to address the growing internal security problems emanating from 
socio-economic diversity. Investment of Rs 194 billion270 on defense for financial year 
2005 as compared to Rs 13 billion on education and Rs 4 billion for water, gas and other 
social projects appears to be irrational given the priority laid on HRD.   
                                                 
266 P. W. Singer, and John M. Olin, Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a system of Education not 
Jihad, Analysis paper #14, p. 40, November 14, 2001.  
267 Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2000-2001. 
268 Budget of Pakistan, 2001-2002. 
269 Aziz, Shaukat, Budget Speech 2004-2005, available on www.dawn.com/events/bud2004-
2005/index.htm. June 2004. 
270 Ibid. 
85 
The educational divide through government English and Urdu medium schools 
and colleges, the mediocre and high grade private educational institutions for the 
privileged class and the madrassahs in Pakistan is fostering a clash between those who 
have studied at very expensive private schools and those who have studied in the free 
board and lodging Madrassahs. The mere budget allocation of 2.06 % of GDP is 
insufficient to meet the future challenges.  Ishrat states that lower the proportion of 
educated and literate people, the lower the probability that the ruling alliance could be 
displaced.271 Among the more traditional tribal societies in Pakistan, i.e., tribal areas of 
NWFP, Balochistan, rural Sindh and Rural southern Punjab, the overall literacy rate and 
female literacy rate, in particular, are among the lowest in the world. The feudal lords 
who dominate these societies feel threatened by the spread of education and 
communication, as within their areas they fear that this will erode their monopoly over 
power.  
The children can either go towards jihadi madrassas or would become part of 
child labor industry due to different system of education for rich and poor. Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan estimates that there are some 11 million children ranging in age 
from 7 to 12 years working in this child labor industry.272 These figures are likely to rise 
if we fail to accord correct priority to this important issue.   
Pakistan witnessed significant poverty reduction from almost 40 percent to 18 
percent in a period when GDP growth rate was averaging 6 percent. But in the 1990s 
when the growth rate slowed down to 3 to 4 percent there has been a resurgence of 
poverty to 34-35 percent.273 Today 50 million Pakistani live below the poverty line, i.e., 
they earn less than a dollar per day. Reportedly, another 30 million people earn between 
one and two dollars a day. Widespread poverty is primarily due to unemployment, 
burgeoning population and iniquitous income distribution. Iniquitous income distribution 
has resulted in a highly polarized society. The poor blame the rich and the government 
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for their problems, and are fast losing faith in the system, and join the files of jihadi 
organizations to take revenge from system, which contributed, to their miseries. With 
statistics like these, who can then blame our society, if it reports a sharp rise in the 
number of crimes committed each year? The poverty reduction strategy warrants strong 
political commitment, real devolution of powers to grass roots level, a vibrant private 
public- community partnerships for delivery of services, change in the bureaucratic 
values and norms and a focus on gender disparities. If these issues are resolved sooner 
than later, we can embark on a path of sustainable poverty reduction.274 
Women in Pakistan are worse off among the poor compared to men. In a country 
where only 17 percent of female population participates in labor force, where female 
enrolment ratios are dismally low and where health indicators, as given in Appendix G, 
are worse for the female population poverty and vulnerability will remain a serious issue. 
Economic literature has amply documented that there is no other investment, which 
fetches higher rate of return than investment in female education. This return does not 
take into account all the externalities associated with female education in form of better 
health, nutrition outcomes, lower fertility rate and better citizenship. Bangladesh 
exemplifies the enormous benefits of female education and labor force participation. The 
results are simply astounding. Until we pay attention to uplift the status of 50 percent of 
our population, I am not convinced that we will be able to make a significant break 
through in moderating our society, in eliminating poverty, and in educating our 
population.  
G. CONCLUSION 
In Pakistan, the provinces have been fighting over the distribution of financial 
resources, over the share of water, and over the claim of natural resources. This itself has 
led to sectarian and ethnic polarization with attendant negative impact on Pakistan’s 
economy. Pakistan has embarked on major projects of national importance. However, 
province agendas and bitter differences have forced these mega projects into non-start 
and put country’s future prosperity into question. Strikes in view of sectarian killing have 
hurt Pakistan immensely in terms of economic losses. How can we invest more in 
                                                 
274 Husain, Ishrat, Concluding remarks at the World Bank Seminar on Pakistan Poverty Assessment, 
p. 9, January 7, 2003. 
87 
education or improve the capacity of state institutions if economically these plans are 
unsustainable? This chapter concludes that economic development and internal security 
are interdependent on each other and should be addressed simultaneously for future 
stability of Pakistan. 
Law and order situation, ethnic and sectarian strives have negative effects on the 
economy of Pakistan. Increasing threat of terrorism by religious militants is enough to 
drive foreign investors away. Without safe environments economic revival is not 
possible. Similarly, by addressing environmental scarcity and HRD will reduce social 
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V. REASONS FOR FAILURE OF STATE INSTITUTIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter researches into the flaws and weaknesses of the law enforcing 
agencies in Pakistan whose inability to enforce rule of law in the country has 
compounded the problems discussed in previous chapters. With ethnic conflicts, sectarian 
violence and crime rate on the rise, the failing law enforcing institutions, i.e., police and 
judiciary, have aggravated domestic problems. Sectarian killings, ethnic tensions between 
groups and provinces are on rise. This series of events points to the reality that state 
institutions of Pakistan have failed to play its vital role in dissolving these threats, and 
establishing the writ of the government. The police are the main law-enforcing agency in 
the country, which is supported by paramilitary troops to maintain the order. However, 
present law and order situation of the country is reflection of its performance and 
effectiveness. The sectarian and jihad militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-
e-Mohammed are equipped with modern weapons and too highly trained for the ill-
equipped police force to be able to counter them. The inefficiency and breakdown of civil 
institutions have dragged in the military in running these institutions. This direct 
intervention has a downward spiral effect on already sensitive civil-military relations in 
Pakistan. The answer to all the problem lies in strengthening state institutions that are 
capable of establishing writ of government.  
Despite all the efforts by the successive governments for bringing peace and 
stability to this country, what are the factors that are contributing to lawlessness? Why 
the state institutions have failed to handle the internal security threats? How the 
inefficiency of law enforcing agencies and judiciary has contributed in aggravating the 
law and order situation?  
These are all relevant and important questions, which warrant detailed analysis. 
However, given the scope of this thesis, only most pertinent flaws in the basic institution 
of state will be discussed that are responsible for deteriorating internal security situations. 
Internal security situation cannot be improved without enhancing the capacities of state 
institutions, i.e., police, paramilitary forces, judiciary, etc. 
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B. POLICE 
The police are the main law-enforcing agency in the country, which is supported 
by paramilitary troops to maintain the order. However, present law and order situation of 
the country is reflection of its performance and effectiveness. 882 murders, 925 cases of 
kidnapping/abduction, 8 explosions, 143 car-hijackings in a single month, May 2004, 
provides an indication of the pathetic state of law and order system.275 The comparison of 
the crime rate between 2003 and 2004 is on Table 3.1. Despite a rise in budget for law 
and order, crime rate and violence, the graph on Table 3.1 is ascending every year. There 
are many incidents where police force fails and army is called out to take over internal 
security duties. For example, in a recent eruption of violence in Sialkot, the 
administration was forced to call the army for restoring peace in the area.276 This reflects 
the poor crisis management and capacity of police force in law and order maintenance. 
Therefore, there is a need to analyze the weaknesses of police force before 
recommending remedies for it.    
1. Institutional and Functional Weaknesses 
• Politicization of Police.  The more ambitious politicians had used their 
power and authority to induct thousands of their supporters and henchmen 
into the police force.277 The number of police officials of the ranks raging 
from constables to deputy superintendent thus recruited in Punjab alone 
over past fifteen years is estimated to be over 20,000.278 This resulted in 
induction of a large number of corrupt people, some with criminal records, 
in police force. This is one of the reason of inefficiency and loss of 
credibility of police force in the eye of public.  
• Police and Civil Relations. Misuse of power by officials, making police a 
tool of successive governments, violation of human rights, and implicating 
innocent into cases of heinous crimes are some of the factors which had 
eroded public confidence in police and led to the failure of the system. 
During 2003, 66 cases were registered against public for resisting against 
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police.279  According to a documented study in 1991, there were 12198 
children/minors waiting to be tried in the jails in Punjab alone. Of these, 
2095 were finally tried and sentenced, 129 of them aged below 14.280 
• Torture against Prisoners: Pakistan’s Police and other law enforcing 
agencies are known to use torture against prisoners. During 2002, the 
Society for Human Rights and Prisoners Aid (SHARP) reported 38 deaths 
due to police torture, and Amnesty International estimates that at least 100 
persons die from police torture each year.281 Many officers of the police 
force, when interviewed held lack of training, man power, funds, time, and 
proper equipment responsible for use of torture as tool to extract 
confessions and making recoveries.282  
• Extra-judicial Killings: Police have been involved in extra-judicial 
killings to circumvent or overcome insufficient evidence, to intimidate 
witnesses, judicial corruption and at times under political pressure. The 
charge that the police are involved in extra-judicial killings of suspected 
criminals is backed up by reports on human rights in Pakistan by both 
Amnesty International and US State Department. During the period of 
1997-1999 the number of suspected criminals killed by police was more 
than 850 in Punjab province alone. Most of them were killed in the 
disguise of so-called police encounters.283 According to the Interior 
Minister 548 persons were killed in police encounters in 2002, with 114 
encounter deaths reported in first six months of the year.284  
• Police Involvement in Terrorizing Religious Minorities: State has 
generally failed to provide protection to the religious minorities in the 
country. Low-level officials often use the Blasphemy Law to threaten or 
prosecute minority religious communities.285 In February, police was 
reported involved in an attack by several hundred Muslims on a Christian 
community in Shantinagar (in Punjab province).286    
• Corruption: Corruption is widespread in police force. Police and prison 
officials often use threat of abuse to extort money from prisoners and their 
families. Police has been reported to accept money for registering false 
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charges or torturing innocent. Police corruption is most serious at the level 
of the Station House Officer (SHO), the official who runs each precinct. 
Some SHOs are widely believed to operate arrest-for-ransom operations 
and to have established unsanctioned police stations to collect illicit 
revenue.287 
• Funds: Over the years provincial budget for law and order has continued 
to rise but with no tangible results to show for it. For example, in 2004 
fiscal year, Rs 10 billion has been earmarked for law and order only in 
Sindh province, which is 12.5 percent increase over the previous year.288 
Out of this 81 percent is spent on distribution of salaries and 12 percent 
goes towards meeting utility expenses. The remaining seven- percent of 
the total budget is allocated for the purchase of new vehicles, weapons and 
other necessary apparatus. There is no allocation for police stations in the 
budget.289 
• Pay scales: The police are highly underpaid and devoid of facilities like 
health and housing. The highest pay that is of Inspector General of Police 
is equivalent of $400 to $450 a month, whereas, a Police Chief of a district 
earns about $300 a month. The pay of a middle level officer, $120, is not 
enough to pay the utility bills. This low pay scale is one reason for the 
culture of corruption in police force. What are the other options for a 
constable, whose monthly wages is $25-$30, to win bread for his family? 
• Ill-equipped police: Besides being ill-equipped in terms of weapons, 
Pakistani police has no automated system for checking finger prints, little 
DNA testing and an antiquated radio system that anyone with a scanner 
can hear.  There are still some police stations without vehicles for 
patrolling duties.290 
                                                 
287 Pakistan, Country Report on Human Rights Practices-2003, Released on February 25, 2004. 
288 “Vehicle theft on the rise,” The Dawn, Pakistan, August 02, 2004. 
289 “Karachi: New Police System Lacks Key Elements for Success,” Arman Sabir, Dawn, Pakistan, 
October 08, 2001. Available at: http://www.dawn.com.  
290 The New York Times, Pakistan‘s Police Force Struggles to Find the Resources It Needs to 




Table 3.1 Comparison Between Crime Rate in May 2003 and May 2004 
 
S/No Type May 2003 May 2004 
1 Murders 835 882 
2. Death by Sectarian Violence -- 39 
3. Kidnapping for Ransom 11 23 
4. Kidnapping/abduction 660 925 
5. Gang rape 24 24 
6. Rape 188 212 
7. Rioting  208 277 
8. Robbery  937 1154 
9. Car Snatching  120 143 
10. Explosions 5 8 
Source: Muhammad Asghar, The Dawn, Pakistan, 18 July 2004 
 
2. Police Ordinance 2002 and Devolution Plan 
Under Musharraf some steps have been taken to reform the police system, 
similarly to Japanese police system that was overhauled under General Macarthur and a 
new Police act (Police Order 2002) has been enforced instead of the 1861 Act.291  
Previously, the DC exercised operational oversight over the police. In a significant new 
police reform initiated under the devolution plan (and later enforced through Police Order 
2002), the district police officer has been responsible for law and order function to the 
nazim. The Police order of 2002 envisages the setting up of Public Safety Commissions 
at the district, provincial and national levels to create a system of external checks on the 
police. This is based on the Japanese model of public accountability of police. In the 
majority of the districts, these commissions are yet to be formed. In the absence of 
effective external oversight, the police are answerable only to their institutional chain of 
command and in many districts are virtually running a parallel administration.292  
                                                 
291 Hussan Abbas, a member of Pakistan Police Service, spoke on the topic:  Law Enforcement and 
Internal Security in Pakistan in Meeting VII, Pakistan’s future and US Policy Options, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 9, 2002. 
292 Bushra Asif, Local Government Reforms in Pakistan, South Asia Program, CSIS, December 1, 
2003, p .30. 
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Until 2004, many of the provisions of the Police Order of 2002, such as separation 
of the investigation branch from the rest of the policing functions and setting up of the 
public safety commissions, have remained unimplemented.293   
3. Police vs. Terrorists 
In 1997, the Punjab Police chief told the Federal Cabinet that there were 160 
hardened terrorists trained for target killings operating in the Punjab, whose lists and 
profiles are with relevant intelligence organizations. In Karachi police had records of 137 
“freelance terrorists”, generally hired criminals who normally do “contract killings’ for 
the right amount at the behest of anonymous clients.294 
The sectarian and jihad militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammed are equipped with modern weapons and too highly trained for the ill-
equipped police force to be able to counter them. The militants have had training by the 
US, Pakistani forces; flooded by excessive foreign funds; and have experience of fighting 
against highly trained armies of the world. In comparison not only the budget of police 
force is low; the instructors in police academies are those that have either failed in a field 
posting or have no contacts to get themselves one- generally, a frustrated lot.295  
Hence enabling the police force, despite its numerical dominance, to control terrorist acts. 
For an idea of strength of police force see Table 3.2. Besides, most militants are armed 
with Kalshnikov assault rifles that fire six rounds a second. Most of the police are armed 
with World War II-era rifles that fire one round a second.296  
                                                 
293 Dawn-Editorial, Rising crime wave, Dawn, Pakistan, August 4, 2004.  
294 Mushahid Hussain, Is There Any Way to Contain Pakistan’s Sectarian Monster, Opinion, July 
2003. See: www.aljazeerah.info/opinion%20editoriols/2003%20Opinion%20 Editorials/July. October 
2004. 
295 Hussan Abbas, a member of Pakistan Police Service, spoke on the topic:  Law Enforcement and 
Internal Security in Pakistan in Meeting VII, Pakistan’s future and US Policy Options, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, Washington, D.C., December 9, 2002. 
296 The New York Times, Pakistan‘s Police Force Struggles to Find the Resources It Needs to 
Combat Terrorism, September 30, 2002. 
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Table 3.2 Strength of Police Force in the Provinces, Islamabad/Railways/AJK and 
Northern Areas  
 




97911 93555 31481 15954 7036 7715 6274 2857 
Source: Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Independence and 
Enforcing Accountability, p.36.  
In 1996, the commissioner of Sargodha, a Shia, was assassinated. In early 1997, a 
secretary to the Punjab provincial government, a Sunni, was killed. The Lashkar’s agents 
killed Ashraf Marath, a senior police officer, even though he was a fellow Sunni, because 
he insisted upon pursuing the killers of 7 people at the Iranian cultural center in 
Multan.297 Sindh police have reportedly sent written directives to many mosques and 
imambargahs in the province asking them to have their own private guards or armed 
volunteers posted on the premises to provide security.298 Newspapers have published 
reports of police officers sending apologies to the militant sectarian captains for having 
dared to investigate them, with promises to leave them alone in the future.299 
C. PARAMILITARY FORCE  
A recent report on the internal use of force in Asia between 1975 and 1996 found 
that  the  ratio  of government forces to the population rose considerably.300 Paramilitary  
 
                                                 
297 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan: Founders’ Aspirations and Today’s Realities, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p. 257. 
298 Terrorism in Full swing, Dawn-Editorial, Pakistan, October 12, 2004.   
299 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan: Founders’ Aspirations and Today’s Realities, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p.257. 
300 It rose 29 percent in Thailand, 42 percent in Burma, 63 percent in China, 64 percent in Pakistan, 71 
percent in India, and 81 percent in Sri Lanka. See: Kit Collier, The Armed Forces and Internal Security in 
South Asia: Preventing the Abuse of Power, East-West Center Occasional Papers, Politics and Security 
series No. 2, Hawaii: East-West Center, December 1999, p. 8-9. Also see:  Sunil Dasgupta, Paramilitary 
Forces and Security Reorganization, GSC Quarterly 12 (Spring 2004) , Program on Global Security and 
Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, http://www.ssrc.org.  15 October 2004. 
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today make up between one-third and one half of the military manpower in major 
countries such as Russia, China, and India. China has the largest paramilitary with the 
strength of 1,100,000.301 
In Pakistan, paramilitary forces are organized on the provincial level but are 
subordinated to the Ministry of Interior and are commanded by seconded army 
Generals.302 The command echelon comes from the army whereas constabularies are 
locally recruited. Thus, the paramilitary is under the influence of the military along with 
Ministry of Interior and Chief Minister of the province. This command structure, with 
different set of priorities, results into complication of implementation and execution of 
orders.  
Paramilitary forces in Pakistan includes: National Guard, Frontier Corps, Pakistan 
Rangers, Mehran Force, Coast Guard, and Maritime Security Agency, are little more than 
military strength - 300,000 compared to 520,000.303 Paramilitary forces have played a 
critical role in maintaining law and order in major urban cities especially in Karachi. 
Although these forces have been more effective than the police, and despite the numerical 
strength, their efficiency was less than expected. Due to organization and structural 
weaknesses, at times paramilitary forces failed to control the situation. Losing faith in 
effectiveness of paramilitary means bringing the army into the scene, which is neither 
desirable nor generally liked by masses at national level.  
In contrast to the military, the paramilitary is poorly trained, lightly equipped, 
highly fragmented, frequently reorganized, politically recruited, and operated. While the 
military protects some objective national interests of the state, the paramilitary serves the 
partisan interests of the regime. As internal security forces, their aim is to secure the 
regime, including in disputes over territorial integrity and national identity.304   
                                                 
301 Sunil Dasgupta, Paramilitary Forces and Security Reorganization, GSC Quarterly 12 (Spring 
2004)  Program on Global Security and Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, 
http://www.ssrc.org. 15 October 2004 
302 Country Study and Guide, Pakistan-Army and Paramilitary Forces. Available: 
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/pakistan/pakistan/pakistan150.html. October 2004. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Sunil Dasgupta, Paramilitary Forces and Security Reorganization, GSC Quarterly 12 (Spring 
2004). 
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The continued involvement of paramilitary in civil set-up has brought some kind 
of police mentality, most critical of which is brutality and corruption. This growing 
police, like the culture, are under serious criticism from public.   
D. MILITARY 
Military intervention in political affairs is not a new phenomenon in Third World 
countries. 305 At various stages during the 58 years of Pakistan’s history, Pakistani 
military has been involved in national politics. The military leadership has taken over 
Pakistan on three occasions: October 1958 (followed by a “coup within coup” in July 
1958), July 1977, and finally October 1999. On each occasion the army chief moved 
against the civilian government at a time when policy-making was drifting, political 
institutions were faltering, and army chief feared or was responding to decisions it 
believed harmed the country’s interests.306 
The inefficiency and breakdown of civil institutions have dragged down the 
military in running these institutions. For example, in November 1998, under the 
democratically elected government of Nawaz Sharif, the entire management of the large 
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) was suspended, and the military 
was inducted to run the utility.307 But, due to the ethnic nature of Pakistan, handing the 
civil authorities to the militaries has important political consequences. Another serious 
effect of handing these lucrative appointments to military leads to resentment, which 
ultimately boils down to internal instability and erosion of institutional development.   
The Pakistan army has been organized, equipped and trained for a conventional 
war. But it has been frequently called in to gain control of internal problems that has gone 
beyond the ability of police to cope. In the past, the military was extensively used on 
internal security duties in Balochistan (1973-77), during the Movement of Restoration of 
                                                 
Program on Global Security and Cooperation, Social Science Research Council, http://www.ssrc.org.   
October 2004. 
305 Hafeez Malik, Pakistan: Founders’ Aspiration and Today’s Realities, Oxford University Press, 
2001, p. 101. 
306 Ambassador Teresita C. Schaffer and Mandavi Mehta, Political Institutions and the Army, A 
Report from the CSIS Project: Pakistan’s Future and U.S. Policy Options, April 17, 2002, p. 7. 
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707.  
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Democracy (1981-84), and during the MQM agitation in Sindh.308 Besides restoring 
peace in the region these operations were the politico-military struggles to achieve 
political, social and psychological objectives. Today the army is again in action in 
Waziristan. While engaged in such operations (low intensity conflicts) the military faces 
following problems:  
• The Pakistan Army is to generate maximum combat power and destruction 
of the opponent, whereas, the victory in such an operation is based on 
maximum intelligence and minimum violence. Lack of intelligence in a 
contested zone is probably emerging as a problem. 
• In all such conflicts involving guerrillas, insurgents or terrorists, the 
enemy is invisible and tries his best to blend with the local population. 
There is no dedicated setup that can maintain area mosaic differentiating 
between a peaceful citizen and a terrorist.  
• Psychological war is carried out to win the support of population and to 
demoralize the troops. Propaganda may be launched to depict the actions 
of military as inhuman and ruthless. Few encounters can be covered which 
can be exposed to constant adverse publicity. Indian television and radio 
are active and effective in this field. Sometimes, this press also helps the 
enemy propaganda innocently or willfully.  
• Currently, troop’s employment on security operations, needs to wrestle 
with lot of legal bottlenecks. Security forces need to be fully aware of 
legal aspects and its implications on their actions, the lapse of which will 
be magnified and exploited by hostile elements. No formal or informal 
training is imparted to troops on this account 
• Weapon systems designed for high intensity war is by no means suitable 
under LIC environment. Present weaponry in the army is not ideally suited 
for LIC operations. Following short-falls need to be addressed.  
• Lack of close quarter battle weapons 
• Lack of non-lethal ammunition 
• Inadequate wireless communication for built up area and areas such as 
closer to Afghanistan, i.e., Waziristan 
• Absence of riot control equipment 
• Lack of protective clothing like bulletproof jackets 
• Lack of light and handy equipment more suitable for operations in built-up 
areas: ladders, grapnels, and ropes etc. 
• Lack of wheeled APCs and lighter vehicles like Hilux etc. 
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• Lack of knowledge of the area 
In East Pakistan, the ethno-lingual factor combined with political follies 
committed by West Pakistan civil-military bureaucracy produced devastating results. 
Although the army had initial successes, however, the lack of intelligence, training of 
officers and men in counter insurgency operations, inadequate logistic infrastructure, 
insufficient knowledge of the area, and failure to execute relief/rest procedures, lead to a 
humiliating end. Due to populace support, Mukti Bahni tried a variety of techniques, 
which our troops failed to read. The dual attacks overtaxed the army’s resources and 
mental energies. Despite of these apparent failures, the fact remains that we had been 
trying to solve a political problem with military instrument, which failed to keep the 
federation intact. Aspects of security buildings (in post conflict or during) requires 
introduction on an urgent basis.  
E. JUDICIARY 
As per the constitution, the judiciary is responsible for:  enforcing the 
constitution, ensure the sustenance of system of “separation of powers” (based on checks 
and balances) and to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedom of individuals.309 
There are some problems in the system which needs to be addressed in order to have a 
strong, effective, and fair judicial system in Pakistan. These include:   
• Politicized appointment of the mutilation of country’s judicial system has 
caused serious erosion of civil liberties, giving police and other agencies a 
freer hand to violate basic rights with impunity. The tempering with 
national judicial institutions by manipulation of rules, appointments,310 
retirement and forcible transfer of judges has further resulted in taming of 
judiciary.311  
• The independence of judiciary is a basic principle of constitution of 
Pakistan.312 However, Pakistan’s judiciary is far from independent. The 
lower judiciary starting from a Magistrate of the third class and to the 
court of the District and Sessions Judge is administratively under the 
                                                 
309 Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Maintaining 
Independence and Enforcing Accountability, p. 12. 
310 For example, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto during her second tenure appointed a number of 
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direct control of the executive branch of the government formed by the 
major political party.313 Judges are appointed by the executive on 
recommendations from the ministry of law, without any checks and 
balances. The ministry also drafts new laws and decrees, sometimes with 
retroactive effect. The superior judiciary, including the Supreme Court and 
Provincial High Courts has sometimes been reshuffled arbitrarily so that 
the courts do not rule against the existing executive in constitutional 
matters, especially under military rule.314  
As it has been said, “justice delayed is justice denied.”  This has had a negative 
impact on accountability of judicial system. The number of pending cases is increasing 
every year. For details see Table 3.3 to 3.6.  The number of pending cases, which was 
19,000 in 2003, exceeded over 25,000 until September 2004. According to Justice Nazim 
Hussain Siddiqui, the Chief Justice of Pakistan, after 2-3 years the number of pending 
cases will touch 45,000-50,000.315 Delayed justice and pending cases only adds to 
frustrations and increases disorder in the society. There is a chronic shortage of judicial 
officers and administrative staff and this is one reason for the increasing number of 
pending cases.  In some areas the strength has to be doubled or even tripled, so as to keep 
pace with the pending cases.316   
The strength of the judges is shown in Table 3.3. Judges are legally trained before 
assuming the bench; the federal government also maintains a judicial training academy.  
Courts, especially at the lower levels, are poorly equipped, with limited access to 
resources such as books and computer databases.317 The Court system and provision of 
criminal law do not extend into the tribal areas along the Afghan border. Political agents 
                                                 
313 “Article 115 of the constitution: Appointments of persons in the judicial service or as magistrates 
exercising judicial functions shall be made by the President in accordance with rules made by him in that 
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who work with tribal leaders to maintain law and order according to tribal standards 
administer these tribal areas.318 
Table 3.3 Pendency, Institution and Disposal of Cases in the Supreme Court of 




Pendency as on 








Balance as on 
31.12. 2000 
 Petitions Appeals Petitions Appeals Petitions Appeals Petitions Appeals Petitions Appeals 
4746 4088 8647 3055 13393 7143 7732 1806 5661 5337 
17 
8834 11702 20536 9538 10998 
 
Source: Justice Irshad Hassan Khan, The Judicial System of Pakistan: Measures for Independence and 
Enforcing Accountability. For details also see: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000. 
                                                 
318 Courts and Criminal Procedures, Country Study and Guide-Pakistan, p. 3. Available at: 
http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/pakistan/pakistan164.html. 10. November 2004. 
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Table 3.4 Pendency Institution and Disposal of Cases by High Courts During 2000  
Name of the 
Court No of Judges 
Pendency as on 
31.12.1999 
Institutions from 
1.1 2000 to 31. 12. 
2000 
Disposal from 1.1 
2000 to 31. 12. 
2000 
Balance as on 31. 
12. 2000 
Lahore High 
Court 50 74077 91514 89990 75756 
High Court of 




15 12995 8980 8374 13601 
High Court of 
Balochistan 6 626 5600 4533 1693 
Total 99 159696 165210 155613 169448 
Source: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000 
 
Table 3.5 Pendency, Institution and Disposal of Cases by Subordinate Courts in 
Provinces During 2000 
Name of the 
Court No of Judges 
Pendency as on 
31.12.1999 
Institutions from 
1.1 2000 to 31. 12. 
2000 
Disposal from 1.1 
2000 to 31. 12. 2000 
Balance as on 31. 
12. 2000 
Sub Courts- 
Punjab 649 930707 558974 503263 986418 
Sub Courts- 
Sindh 390 112971 87712 86291 114392 
Sub Court  
(NWFP) 123 118460 184900 183539 119821 
Sub Court- 
Balochistan 177 5827 21754 21942 5639 
Total 1339 1167965 853340 795035 1226270 
Source: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000 
 
Table 3.6 Pendency, Institution and Disposal of Cases by all Courts During 2000 
Name of 
Court No of judges 
Pendency as 
on 31.12. 1999 
Institutions 
from 1.1.2000 







Court 17 8,834 11,702 9,538 10,998 +1164 
All High 
Courts 99 159696 165210 155613 169448 +9597 
All Sub 
Courts 1,339 1167965 853340 795035 1226270 +58305 
Total 1,455 1,336,495 1,030,252 960,186 1,406,561 +70066 
Source: Publication of Supreme Court of Pakistan 2000 
 
F. CORRUPTION AND NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU 
Corruption is the biggest evil, common in almost all state institutions. In simple 
words it could be described as misuse of entrusted state powers for personal gains. 
Transparency international (TI) declared Pakistan as the second most corrupt nation out 
of 58 surveyed in 1996. For details see Table 3.7. Although there has been some 
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improvement, still as per a general estimate, in past years almost 20% of GDP have been 
lost through corruption and corrupt practices annually.319 According to “Transparency 
international” (TI) survey the main causes of corruption is:320  
• Lack of Accountability (31.68%) 
• Low salaries (16.54%) 
• Monopoly of power (16.43%) 
• Discretionary powers (12.61%) 
• Lack of transparency (9.97%) 
• Power of influential people (4.59%) 
• Red Tapism (4.28%) 
• Others (4.9%) 
 
Table 3.7 Pakistan’s Ranking in TI’s Corruption Perception Index 
 
 Total number of Countries Pakistan’s Rank 
Pakistan’s Score  
(Out of 10) 
CPI 1995 41 39 2.25 
CPI 1996 54 53 1.0 
CPI 1997 52 48 2.53 
CPI 1998 85 71 2.7 
CPI 1999 99 88 2.2 
CPI 2000  NOT INCLUDED  
CPI 2001 91 79 2.3 
Source: Transparency international, Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption Program: Observations and 
Recommendations, May 2002, p. 2.  
 
In 1999, the military government formed the National Accountability Bureau and 
special accountability courts to try corruption cases. NAB performs two major functions 
of investigation and prosecuting cases of corruption, misuse of authority and white- collar 
crimes, under National Accountability Ordinance. According to news report published in 
an English daily, until June 2004, NAB was able to recover Rs. 115.276 billion from the 
                                                 
319 Transparency international, Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption Program: Observations and 
Recommendations, May 2002, p. 2. Also stated in an address by the Chairman NAB on the occasion of 
Plenary session of the International workshop organized on the national Anti-corruption Strategy. 
320 Pakistan’s Efforts Against Corruption, a presentation by Mohammed Mohsin Khan, Deputy 
Auditor-general of Pakistan, ICGFM conference, 2004, Miami. 
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loan defaulters while NAB has affected indirect recoveries of 10.224 billion. The 
Director General NAB Sindh Maj. Gen. Sikandar in his remarks said public sector banks 
experienced serious deterioration in their loan portfolios due to political interference in 
lending and loan recovery decisions.321  
Despite efforts rendered by NAB to unearth cases of corruption, misuse of power, 
political favoritism, and graft the bulk of the malpractice committed by various 
individuals in successive governments, remain untracked because of complications 
involved in baring them and tracing them to their perpetrators.322 In general, the NAB is 
appreciated for its efficiency but there are some factors that have negative effect on the 
accountability of the NAB. Some of these are: 
• It has been accused of victimizing selected targets and to malign the 
politicians.323 A recent report appearing in online daily “Dawn” speaks of 
a US recovery company objecting to NAB’s “selective approach” and 
“political expediency”.324 
• A petition has been filed in Lahore Court detailing “massive kickbacks 
and corruption” and accusing NAB of striking “various under the table 
deals with various individuals accused of high profile economic crimes in 
addition to arm twisting NAB defaulters, into joining the present 
government. These include at least one forth of all elected legislators.325  
• There has been criticism over the powers given to NAB to detain 
individuals for 90 days without formally charging them. Whereas, under 
the existing Criminal law and direction of the Superior Pakistani Courts 
from time to time, police or investigative custody is not permitted beyond 
a normal 7 days, extendable under very special circumstances to 14 
days.326 
                                                 
321 “NAB recovers Rs 110 Bln on State Bank of Pakistan’s request,” Pakistan Times. ‘Pakistan Times’ 
is Pakistan’s first independent Daily Newspaper. See: info@pakistantimes.net. Also see: “An Exclusive 
Interview with Chairman National Accountability Bureau,” Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Available at: 
http://infopak.gov.pk/interview/NAB.htm.  15 November 2004. 
322 “Time to Break the Ice,” Dawn, Pakistan, February 2, 2000.  
323 “Taking Stings Out,” Editorial, Dawn, Pakistan, April 26, 2001. Also see: M. Ziauddin, 
“Economics of Corruption,” Dawn, Pakistan, April 07, 2003.  
324 Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel and Melvin J Dubnick, Prosecuting Corruption: the Case 
of Pakistan, 2004 Ethics Forum, American Society for Public Administration, March 26-27, 2004, 
Portland, OR, p. 11. Also see:  http://www.dawn.com/2003/11/03/. October 2004. 
325 Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel and Melvin J Dubnick, Prosecuting Corruption: the Case 
of Pakistan, 2004 Ethics Forum, American Society for Public Administration, March 26-27, 2004, 
Portland, OR, p. 11.  Also: www.hvk.org. Sep 2004.  
326 “Time to Break the Ice,” The Dawn, Pakistan, February 2, 2000.  
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• A serious flaw negating Human Rights is the creation of new offences that 
were not so defined, when those acts occurred in the past. In this 
connection Section 9(vii) of the NAB Ordinance can be cited.327 
• Cases of maltreatment of detainees have raised continued concerns about 
conditions in NAB custody.328  
G. POLITICAL FAILURE 
The absence of a strong parliamentary democracy and ever-changing political 
scenario has adversely affected the state institutions of Pakistan. Political instability has 
paved the way for successive military rules. Pakistan has had four martial laws, three 
imposed by the military dictators and fourth by a civilian dictator.329 Of Pakistan’s 
eleven heads of state, six were either soldiers or bureaucrats. For details see Appendix H. 
Their cumulative tenure of three dozen years are marked by dismissal of eight out of 
fifteen prime ministers; dissolution of seven out of ten national assemblies; and banning 
of five out of seven political parties.330 Every government devised its own independent 
agenda shaking the very roots of the political system and ultimate mutilation of state 
institutions.  
Four successive governments were dismissed mainly on the grounds of corruption 
before completing constitutional five-year term. The first government of Ms Benazir 
Bhutto was dismissed on 16 August 1990 and the Supreme Court upheld its dissolution. 
Then in 1993, the government of Mr. Mian Nawaz Sharif was dismissed. Ms. Benazir 
Bhutto then came into power; however, her second government was dismissed in October 
1996 on the grounds of corruption of others.  The Supreme Court upheld the dissolution 
order. Mian Nawaz Sharif came into power for the second time but was sacked in 
                                                 
327 Military Rule in Pakistan, World Sindhi Congress. Available at URL: http://www.sindhlink.net. 
For details contact: world_sindhi_congress@yahoo.com. October 2004. 
328 According to Sindh daily Kawish, Malik Allah Yar Khan, a former member of National Assembly 
died at Al Shifa trust hospital in Islamabad on June 27, fifteen days after having been brought there by 
“non-civilian” NAB officials. He had been reportedly been in NAB custody for several months. Kawish, 
June 28, 2000. Also see:  Abuses in Accountability Cases, Human Right Watch available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/pakistan. October 2004. 
329 Three military dictators were: General M. Ayub Khan, M. Yahya Khan and M. Zia-ul- Haq. The 
civilian dictator was Z. A. Bhutto. 
330 Hafeez Malik,Pakistan: Founders’ Aspiration and Today’s Realities, Oxford University Press, 
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October 1999. A strain of governmental incompetence and corruption remained a factor 
in all dismissal sagas of governments and legal battles.331  
The politics of mutual hatred and vengeance have nurtured intolerance and enmity 
between political parties. These antagonisms in political parties have led them to create 
party militias to destabilize each other. Increasingly there is a tendency to resort to 
violence and armed confrontations to resolve political disputes and rivalries.332  
H. CONCLUSION 
Political instability shadowing the politicization of institutions, lack of 
transparency leading to corruption and mismanagement of funds are common causes for 
the decay of all state institutions. A decaying political system, intermittent martial laws, 
unscrupulous politicians, culture of conspiracies, selfishness, corruption and greed, have 
all contributed towards a decaying political system. Over the years, people appear to have 
lost faith in our political system.  This has led to the growth of feelings of regionalism 
and provincialism. Under the prevailing situation, there is a grave danger of a rise in 
demand for greater autonomy by smaller provinces and exploitation of general 
discontentment by our adversary by instigating and supporting the dissidents.  
Lack of court management, deficient case processing, shortcomings in the judicial 
system, parallel judiciary, and inflexible procedures have contributed to deterioration in 
the law and order situation. Flaws in the judicial system, inefficiency of police force, lack 
of public trust in the state institutions and presence of evils in the society, have further 
aggravated the situation.  
The general public when unprotected and insecure, with basic rights of protection 
and justice denied, feel highly discontented thus providing a fertile ground for subverts/ 
saboteurs. Resultantly, when other law enforcing institutions fail to meet internal security 
threats army intervenes. A Low literacy rate, weak democratic institutions, state- 
                                                 
331 Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel and Melvin J Dubnick, Prosecuting Corruption: the Case 
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sponsored repression, corruption, sustained political unrest, lack of accountability, and 
internal security problems are responsible for bringing the army out of the barracks into 






















 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
109 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
For too long Pakistan has sacrificed its internal security in pursuit of meeting 
external threats. The intensity of internal security threats to Pakistan was further 
aggravated by vested interests of some foreign elements. These elements continue to 
exploit ethno-sectarian differences between factions. Pakistan’s internal security 
problems, compounded by external security threats, have made security management 
highly complex, which is affecting larger goals of economic prosperity. Engagement in 
Afghanistan and unending conflicts with India has had a high cost on Pakistan internally. 
There is a dire need for reorientation of our strategic thinking on security issues. The 
labels of fundamentalism, religious extremism, and state sponsoring terrorism have 
created an unenviable image of Pakistan in the eyes of the rest of the world and have 
affected the country adversely in all regards. A deliberate effort has to be made to 
improve the image of Pakistan as a moderate, forward looking and internally stable 
country in the international community.  
Pakistan security dynamics have changed drastically since 11 September 2001. 
Under the leadership of President Musharraf, Pakistan has made dramatic shift in its 
policies. Government decision to intervene in Federally Administered Tribal Areas to 
flush out Talibans and remnants of Al Qaeda has been viewed with great concern by 
majority of masses. These concerns have given a new impetus and motivation to militant 
organization to fulfill their unfinished agendas, creating a dangerous situation for future 
stability and integration of Pakistan. There are opportunities also and greater risks 
involved as well. Establishing writ of government in tribal areas, building long-term 
friendship with the U.S., Afghanistan, and the rest of the world, and cutting the roots of 
militants are few of the opportunities. However, there are some risks such as public 
disorder, political unrest, and inextricable engagement of the army in internal security 
duties. Pakistan should pursue a more balanced approach in handling the religious affairs. 
The military operation, in its effort to haunt terrorists, requires delicate management 
without overly agitating the tribes and the general public to the point of unified revolt. 
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These operations must be done surgically without any collateral damage. Pakistan 
security planners have to take a holistic view of all the present and future security threats. 
Religious intolerance and ethnic disharmony are the outcome of at least two 
decades of interaction between regional and internal stimuli. Any notion that it could be 
wished away within a short span of time is myopic and flawed. Pakistan has to carefully 
balance between the demand of international community and local sentiments of 
Pakistani population. Pakistani leaders have to deal with ground realties and resist such 
pressures of the international community.  This could lead to internal unrest and thus, 
become counter productive to a larger interest of Pakistan as an Islamic state.  
The issue of Kashmir is highly sensitive and politically charged. There is an acute 
sense of gross injustice and unfair treatment to Muslims in Kashmir. This unrest serves as 
a primary motivation for insurgency also. Unless a positive outcome of Kashmir is 
sought, Pakistan will find many associated ills difficult to treat. Though the issue of 
Kashmir is unlikely to be resolved early, Pakistan has to manage its internal situation as it 
resonates deeply into domestic politics. The United States must play an important role to 
settle all the disputes between India and Pakistan. U.S. support in this direction would 
address a major cause taken up by radical Islamist and many moderate Pakistanis.333 
Mere lip service will not serve the purpose.  
Inter-provincial and tribal feuds need to be resolved first. The government should 
try to keep inter-provincial and tribal harmony, playing a neutral and impartial role in this 
regard. The government and tribal forces stand-off in Balochistan provinces would 
plague the economic development process.  The government should consider each aspect 
of the recent acts of sabotage in Sui and Gwadar and beef up security in the sensitive 
areas providing protection to vital installations in Pakistan. Pakistan must evolve a long-
term political strategy to deal with ethnic issues.  
For a peaceful Pakistan there is a need to eradicate any sense of alienation and 
obtain egalitarianism in the country as a whole, by rendering efforts towards achieving 
democratization, decentralization, accountability and a wider consensus at all levels. 
                                                 
333 Cohen, Philip Stephen, The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2003, 
p. 24. 
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Pakistan did not care much about the sensitivity of diverse language and cultures, which 
eventually led to loss of East Pakistan. However, the case of separation of former East 
Pakistan is not the exact parallel to existing ethnic tension in Sindh and Balochistan. The 
later is not a secessionist movement but what Cohen calls, “instrument for competition 
over scarce resources”. The presence of such sentiments is divisive and a cause of 
provisional disharmony, which in turn affects the internal security and economic 
prosperity of the state. One glaring example is the case of Balochistan, having all the gas 
reserves in Pakistan.  It’s people were the last to benefit from gas and yet there are many 
areas where gas has not been provided. Distribution of resources must ensure equal 
benefits to all rather than a few and the privileged class. Though equitable economic 
growth in all provinces is hard to achieve due to structural asymmetries in the respective 
provinces, government allocation of resources must redress the imbalances when 
allocating federal resources. The government should increase the development fund for 
Balochistan. Socio-economic packages to uplift deserving areas/communities would 
reduce political exploitation. Projects of national importance warrants open discussion 
and every effort should be made to achieve consensus on projects of national importance.  
No matter how many reforms are passed and laws are made, peace cannot be 
attained in the state unless the hands of the government are strengthened by strong and 
effective law enforcing agencies. Political instability and failure of law enforcing 
agencies to maintain the writ of government have weakened the vital state institutions. 
This factor is responsible for internal unrest in Pakistan.  
After analyzing all the factors responsible for ethno-sectarian threat to Pakistan’s 
internal security, I conclude that that economic prosperity and resolution of internal 
security are interdependent. The economic and social outcomes, as stated by Ishrat, in 
Pakistan have turned out to be mixture of paradoxes.334 The persistence of poverty, large 
income inequalities, severe rural –urban disparities, gender discrimination, endemic 
ethnic rivalries and political instability suggest that benefits of economic growth have not 
been spread evenly.335 Pakistan must address its internal problems since its future 
                                                 
334 Hussain, Ishrat, Pakistan The Economy of Elitist State, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 
339. 
335 Ibid., pp. 339 –341. 
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viability depends on economic progress. All recommendations suggested in this paper 
point towards economic prosperity as an end point. At present, the state of economy does 
not allow enough spending on socio-economic development, the education and 
strengthening domestic law enforcing agencies. The international community and the 
U.S. in particular, can help Pakistan invest in these areas. A stable and prosperous 
Pakistan can be a role model for the regional stability and for the entire Islamic world.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommended Strategy to Confront Sectarian Threats  
Jihadi culture has transformed into a movement that can cause immense damage 
to the state of Pakistan. Pakistan’s political, economic and social institutions must revive 
and accelerate before the radical groups gain enough traction to emerge as an 
independent political force undoing the writ of government within state. There is a need 
to formulate a strategy to deal with the threat. Out-rightly confronting jihadi 
organizations could result in a backlash which could get out of control. A more referable 
strategy would be to keep a strong check on all illegitimate activities and distinguish 
between religious freedom and religious abuse. By bringing the frustrated youth into the 
main stream, providing an outlet through economic prosperity, Pakistan can turn the 
potentials towards positive goals. Pakistan’s government cannot remain insensitive to the 
feeling of the majority of its population, which are Muslims.  
A three-pronged strategy should be adopted to leash the sectarian/jihadi monster. 
The first prong must halt and then reverse the growing trend of religious intolerance. The 
second prong should enforce the rule of law, and the third prong should consolidate the 
gains by introducing incentives and by showing outlets through economic prosperity. The 
three prongs of this strategy should be activated simultaneously by formulating short-
term and long-term goals. The success of the following proposed strategy depends on 
how it is implemented, subject directly related to “state capacity and economic 
development.” 
• Engagement Strategy: This involves three tasks. The first is mobilization 
of public opinion on fundamental issues including correct interpretation of 
Islam and public awareness of the repercussions of religious extremism. 
Campaigns through electronic media, print media, along with public 
participation in discussions through debates and nationwide seminars 
would help build consensus on the current issues.  Secondly, Pakistan has 
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to give top priority to education and unemployment. This would help 
engage the frustrated youth of madrassahs and would direct their talents 
towards constructive activities rather than militant activities. This could be 
done by implementation of madrassah reforms, and bringing madrassahs 
into the folds of national education programs. The third is the formation of 
an anti-terrorist cell to collect data on militant organizations and foreign 
terrorists present in the country. 
• Enforcement Strategy: This involves direct and indirect application of 
force. Any weakness in this strategy could turn around the whole effort 
made so far to eradicate jihadi element from our society. Guarding porous 
borders and operations launched to isolate and neutralize major jihadi 
organizations needs application of force. This strategy also involves 
monitoring of bank accounts and funding of jihadi madrassahs; keeping a 
check on activists with criminal records and taking necessary actions 
where necessary; and prevention of re-surfacing of banned sectarian/jihadi 
organizations. Strengthening law-enforcing agencies would enforce the 
writ of government.  
• Consolidation Strategy: This part of the strategy proposes to bring the 
frustrated youth into the main stream by giving them incentives and by 
showing them outlets through economic prosperity. Consistent policies to 
bring a bring a balanced approach in social structure, respecting the beliefs 
of different sectarian groups and giving equal opportunities to all sects 
will banish the social elements, responsible for religious intolerance.   
2. Recommendations to Reduce Ethnic Tension 
Despite political re-engineering and the devolution scheme by Musharraf’s 
government, Pakistan maintains a highly centralized bureaucratic system. Center should 
transfer maximum powers to provinces and provinces should dissolve these powers to 
district and local governments. Provincial autonomy should cover two major areas: 
political and economic. Provincial and local government institutions should be given a 
chance to work and regulate the allocated funds subject to audit and accountability and 
through the normal judicial system. Devolution of powers at the lowest level will create a 
sense of involvement and sense of responsibility among the have-nots. A regular election 
would be the best source of accountability. 
The existing provinces are highly multiethnic in nature, creating a tug-of-war 
situation among different ethnic groups within the regions. Besides, an increase in 
population growth has increased the struggle for survival, which has created 
administrative and social problems. Increasing the number of provinces by considering 
new provincial boundaries will remove dominance of any one federating unit. India has a 
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more diverse society than Pakistan and their increasing their number of provinces has 
been a successful experience. However, this topic is another vast study that could require 
it’s own thesis. 
Large number of provinces recognizes ethnic diversity and respects it as 
existential plurality within societies. A greater space for expression of ethnic identities 
should be allowed under the principle of “Unity in Diversity”.336 A national policy of 
“one country, one language and one culture” works for national unity and coherence, but 
it must balance outlets, so that people take pride in their country and ethnic identity 
equally. Power sharing with minority groups by giving them legible representation in 
cabinet, civil service, military, and high party position will provide psychological security 
to these groups. 
Misunderstandings between provinces and ethnic groups within regions, are 
dangerous to the solidarity of the state. The government should build bridges between 
confronting groups and should create grounds for negotiation and explore shared 
concerns. The issues of Kalabagh dam and Gwadar should addressed through mutual 
consensus. The ethnic leaders should not be allowed to exploit the issues for their 
political gains.  
More than 50 percent share should be given to provinces through a divisible pool. 
Horizontal distribution among the provinces should be done through consensus. A state 
can obtain national integration by a consensus-based policy without allowing majorities 
to overrun the minority or the later vetoing the former. While allocating developmental 
funds, the state should consider the area, population density, needs of people, and 
position of developmental plans of every province. 
3. Recommendations to Improve Economy 
Given the state of present economic base, foreign investment and domestic 
investment is key to achieve a higher growth rate. Sectarian wave and ethnic rivalries 
have eluded the confidence of investors. Improving law and order should be the primary 
objective to build confidence amongst investors.  
                                                 
336 Jamil Jalibi, Pakistan: Identity of Culture, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1984, p. 55. 
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The Pakistani community faces enormous challenges brought about by the 
pressures of increasing population and environmental degradation. To meet these needs, 
it is critical that agricultural methods and practices become more sustainable and 
environmentally sound. The urbanization, erosion, and environmental degradation of 
arable agricultural land must be controlled better and, where possible, reversed. In 
addition water resources must be protected and enhanced. 
Ineffective water management is not only creating provincial disharmony but also 
crippling the economy and posing formidable challenges to our future economic 
development. The rapidly burgeoning population postulates a 100% increase in the 
existing irrigated area and hence imply enhanced demand of water. If the grave problem 
of water mismanagement is not redressed and resolved now, it would spell unmitigated 
disaster for the national economy.  This would render the attainment of the long-
cherished national goal of self-sufficiency in food and energy sectors, an elusive dream. 
There is a need to construct small dams on the river Indus, Jhelum, and Chanab. The 
potential sites of these small reservoir/dams need to be surveyed. However, some of the 
sites are located at Sewan-Manchar lake, Hamal lake, Skardu, Bunji, Kohala, Rohtas, 
Neelam valley, and Thal reservoir etc.337 The level of Mangla and Tarbela dams needs to 
be raised to increase the storage capacity.  
The present government is following a comprehensive social sector development 
program.  Nonetheless, some immediate poverty alleviation measures are essential:  
• Relief to the common man through adequate health education and 
population control. This obviously requires funding.  Zakat fund may be 
utilized in health sector. 
• The government can contribute in reducing some miseries of the poor by 
minimizing impact of energy cost also.  
• Universal women’s education should be used as a catalyst for managing 
the population. 
• Involve religious leaders and institutions for removing inhibitions against 
family planning controversies.  
• Effective dissemination of the family planning program through utilization 
of educational syllabi and media with focus on rural areas.  
                                                 
337 M. H. Naqvi, S. M. Alam, Water Scenario and Pakistan, March 19, 2003, p. 8. Available on 
internet site: www.pakistaneconomist.com/database1/cover/c2003-25.asp. November 2004. 
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• Decentralize the program to the local government for effective 
implementation. 6.4% growth rate338 may be an achievement for the 
government, however, it becomes meaningless unless its effects are felt by 
population living below the poverty line.  
4. Recommendations on Education 
The Pakistan educational system must be reconstructed on war footing. Education 
has been a low priority of successive governments. Education seeks to satisfy a 
population’s basic needs and, if educational standard are inadequate, then it can lead to 
irreparable consequences. A literacy rate of 40% is necessary but not sufficient for a 
sustained level of economic growth and thwarts all internal security threats discussed in 
this thesis. My recommendations are based on  a Robert Looney paper “ Reforming 
Pakistan’s Education System, The Challenges of Madrassahs” There is a need to focus on 
all the issues raised by him. I want to stress on following in addition to what he 
recommends: 
• Eradicate illiteracy on war footing through compulsory and universal 
primary education. Emphasis on vocational training to produce skilled 
manpower.  
• Enhance education budget progressively to 4% of GDP. 
• Decentralize education to local government involving local communities 
and creating public-private sector partnership.  
• Improve the public sector educational institutions to narrow the gap 
between these and private sector schools and colleges. 
• Standardize educational syllabi of various educational boards within the 
country.  
• Bring madrassahs education into mainstream through integrated syllabi 
and linkages with Islamic universities with a view to inculcate moderation.  
• It is an established fact that government alone cannot manage to provide 
quality education to all. Private sector has to have a role in this field. But 
at the same time it has to be ensured that education does not become an 
enterprise only and quality is not sacrificed for the sake of profit. 
Government should provide subsidy to those who want to invest in this 
field in rural areas because the role of private sector in education is 
restricted to urban mainland. Thus students of rural areas are left with no 
option other than either going to madrassahs or cities. 
 
                                                 
338 Aziz Shaukat, Budget Speech 2004-2005, available on www.dawn.com/events/bud2004-
2005/index.htm. November 2004. 
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5. Recommendations to Improve Capacity of State Institution  
Governance of multi ethnic and economically unstable country like Pakistan is 
not an easy task, and it is not possible without strengthening state institutions. Unless or 
until the state institutions of police, judiciary, and paramilitary forces to overcome the 
existing shortcomings, the internal security threats will continue to persist.  
Politicization of the government machinery/institutions for vested interests by the 
successive governments is the basic cause of their degeneration and wide spread 
corruption. De-politicization of police, judiciary, and other administrative machinery is 
also an important requirement. A wholesome package must be conceived and 
implemented in this regard. Law and order situation of the country will automatically get 
addressed.  
A judiciary must be independent of the executive. There is a requirement of an 
independent judiciary for the society. There is a need for the government to refrain from 
stepping into judiciary domain. The system has to be purged of corrupt officials 
irrespective of political affiliation, in a transparent manner and the postings and 
promotions should be on merit. All pending cases must be settled at priority.  
A sincere effort should be made to bridge the gap between the police and the 
community by implementing police reforms already in place. Following may be done to 
improve the police performance:    
• To improve the police-civil relations a separate subject on “behavior 
improvement” should be included in police training institutional manual. 
Institutionalize intelligence agencies’ input to police and formation of 
Civil Police Liaison Committee (CPLC) at District level. This is being 
practiced in few districts of Karachi. Institutionalizing CPLC concept in 
all the provinces will improve the efficiency of police and will help 
bridging the gap between police and local population of the areas.  
• Police should be equipped with better weapons, communication system 
and mobility. Police need to be equipped with computers, database, 
detection gear, and testing equipment.  
• A massive purge of corrupt police officials is necessary, particularly 
SHOs. 
• Pakistani police needs better training to meet the internal security threats. 
Their training in detection/investigation needs to be improved on scientific 
lines. Quality of already in-service police officers could improve by 
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regular refresher courses within the country and by acquiring foreign 
courses for police officers.   
• Institutional stability and protection from politicization is required to be 
given to the police to free them from external influences of feudal and 
politicians. Fix tenure appointments need to be introduced ensuring that 
police officials stay long enough to do their job. 
• All provisions of “Police Order 2002” need to be enforced in letter and 
spirit. 
• Modify the pay structure of police along the lines of the armed forces of 
the country.  
A regional paramilitary force should be organized, equipped, and trained in 
consonance with the threat perceived in the area and placed closer to the potential trouble 
spots. This shall save the army from taking the main brunt as army’s involvement in 
internal security adds fuel to an already fragile civil military relations with the country. 
The need of the hour is to enhance the capacity of paramilitary forces. The police will 
take time to evolve its capability to meet terrorism threats, however, with little 
investment on paramilitary forces, there can be substantial improvement in their 
organizational ability to fight terrorism. The following equipment should be provided 
immediately to enhance the capability:  
• Wheeled APCs or bullet proof panels for vehicles carrying troops  
• Radars for surveillance of infiltration routes specially along Afghanistan 
and Kashmir border 
• Lightweight communication wireless apparatus suitable for built up areas 
• Sniper rifles with laser designators 
• Introduction of rubber bullets 
• More number of close quarters battle weapons 
• Bulletproof jackets and fiber glass helmets for at least 20% of troops 
• Sufficient supply of riot controls gear including tear gas, smoke grenades 
and water shells, etc. 
• Hand held metal detectors for speedy frisking of persons 
• Portable baggage-ray machines for search of baggage of bus passengers 
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 APPENDIX A. DEENI MADARIS OF PUNJAB 
A Sect and District-wise Survey of Deeni Madaris of Punjab  
 




Lahore   143 136 41 3 323 
Gujranwala 36 87 36 13 140 
Rawalpindi 83 64 6 16 169 
Faisalabad 47 39 18 8 112 
Sargodha 68 64 9 8 149 
Multan  127 159 27 12 325 
D G Khan 133 174 24 30 411 
Bahawalpur 335 493 36 19 883 
Total  972 1216 174 100 2512 
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APPENDIX B. STUDENTS IN DEENI MADARIS OF PUNJAB 
A Sect and District-wise survey of students enrolled in the Deeni Madaris of Punjab  
 
District Deobandi Barelvi Ahle Hadith Ahle Tashi Total 
 
Lahore   1792 18336 5524 350 42102 
Gujranwala 3632 7400 1712 373 13117 
Rawalpindi 8367 8307 417 442 17533 
Faisalabad 11631 5027 3141 700 20499 
Sargodha 6158 6427 1318 341 14244 
Multan  11888 10798 2620 138 25966 
D G Khan 8816 9593 1829 669 20907 
Bahawalpur 3220 29302 2319 746 64571 
Total  100588 95190 18880 4281 218939 
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APPENDIX C.  JIHADI LITERATURE 
In order to reach out to the masses and spread their message of jihad, some of the 
Pakistani based jihadi organizations produce at least a dozen main publications. Four 
Jihadi outfits with media publications are: 
Lashkar-e-Tayaba: 
• Monthly “Voice of Islam” in English language 
• Monthly “Majla  Al-Dawa” in Urdu language  
• Monthly “Majla  Al-Dawa” in Urdu language (for women) 
• Weekly “Jihad Times” in Urdu and Sindhi language 
• Fortnightly “Zarb-e- Taiba” in Urdu language 




• Monthly “Sada-e-Mujahid” in Urdu language 
• Weekly “Al-Hilal” in Urdu language 
 
Jaish-e-Muhammad: 
• Monthly “Binnat-e-Ayesha” in Urdu language (for women) 
• Fortnightly “Jaish Mohammad” in Urdu language 
Jaish also offers electronic newsletter at its web-site http://www.jaish-e-
muhammad.org 
 
Al-Rasheed Trust (a charity organization): 
• Weekly “Zarb-e-Momin” in Urdu language 
• Daily “Islam” in Urdu language 
 
These magazines and periodicals include the latest news of all fronts around the 
globe where the Mujahideen are waging jihad against infidels.  Day to day activities of 
the jihadis is listed highlighting their successes and amount of damage they have inflicted 
on the enemy. These also highlight the names of all the martyrs who have achieved their 
ultimate goal by embracing ‘Shahadat’ while doing jihad.  Messages from the families of 
these martyrs, who are proud and happy over the ‘Shahadat’ of their beloved ones and 
offering rest of their sons and relatives for this noble cause of jihad, are also taken to 
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print. It would not be irrelevant to add that these magazines have produced innumerable 
mujahideens and many  ‘martyrs’ over the years.  
In addition the importance of jihad for all Muslims and different issues in the light 
of teachings of Islam, are discussed to educate the people on how to learn the essence of 
Islam, and to volunteer themselves for this noble cause. 
The Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad,339 claims that its monthly publications, the Majla 
Al-Dawa that initially started with a circulation of about 5000 in 1989340 has now a 
circulation of 400,000, and weekly print order of its Jihad Times is 200,000 exceeds a 
circulation of over 70,000. Zarb-I-Momin of Al-Rasheed Trust reportedly sells 250,000 
copies a week.341  
Source: International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madraashs, Extremism and the Military, ICG Asia Report 
no. 36, Islamabad/Brussels, 29th July 2002, p.14. Also see: Shahzeb Jillani , “ Taking Jehad to Print”, The 
Herald, March 2001,  P.57. Also see: Zafarullah Khan, Medieval Mindset, Modern Media” a research paper 
read at a media workshop organized by the Freidrich Naumann Stiftung, Islamabad, 28 November 2001. 
                                                 
339 It is an Ahle Hadith organization, established by three university teachers in 1987.  
340 Zaigham Khan, “Information Revolution,” The Herald Annual, January 1998, p. 128. 
341 International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madraashs, Extremism and the Military, ICG Asia Report 
no. 36, Islamabad/Brussels, July 29, 2002, p. 14. 
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APPENDIX D. MAP OF PAKISTANI ISLAMIST MILITANT 
GROUPS 
 
I.  Islamist 
JKLF – Kashmiri 







Jama’at-e-Islami (JI), Pakistan 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 






Lashkar-e-Taiba (Tayyaba) (Army of the Pure) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
III. Sunni Orthodox (Deoband) 
 
Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam 
Deobandi A       Deobandi B 
Maulvi Fazlur Rahman     Maulana Sami-ul-Haq 





Sipah-e-Sahaba    Harkat-ul-(Ansar) Mujahiddin 
Harkat-ul-Jihad 
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi    Jaesh-e-Mohammad 




IV.  Sunni Barelvi 
 




V.  Shia mainstream (not Ismailis) 
 











Source: Rodney W Jones, The Prospects of State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic, Regional and Sectarian 
Fissure summary, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Policy Architect International, May 1, 2001 
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APPENDIX E. STORAGE CAPACITY AND LIFE STATUS OF 
DAMS 
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APPENDIX F. FUTURE WATER REQUIREMENTS AND 
AVAILABILITY 
Year 2000 2013 2025 
Population in millions 148 207 267 
Water (Bm3) requirements 
(irrigational) 
177MAF 255MAF - 
Water requirements non 
irrigational 
7.3MAF 10.7MAF - 
    
Total requirements 184MAF 266MAF 324MAF 
Availability as surface and  
ground water (water course head) 
134.2MAF 132.5MAF 156MAF 
Shortfall 49.7MAF 133.7MAF 186.2MAF 
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APPENDIX G. DATA ON BASIC HEALTH FACILITIES  
 
Details of health Unit 
• Hospitals    - 876 
• Dispensaries   - 4635 
• Basic Health Unit   - 5171 
• Maternity and Child Care Unit - 856  
In terms of population there is  
• One doctor for     - 1529 persons 
• One dentist for     - 33,629 persons 
• One nurse for      - 3732 persons. 
• One hospital bed for   - 1495 persons 
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APPENDIX H. HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, 1947-99 
 
Leader Position1 Term of Office2 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah Governor General August 1947-September 1948
Liaquat Ali Khan Prime Minister August 1947-October 1951
Khwaja Nazimuddin Governor General September 1948-October 1951
Ghulam Mohammad Governor General October 1951-August 1955
Khwaja Nazimuddin Prime Minister October 1951-April 1953
Mohammad Ali Bogra Prime Minister April 1953-August 1955
Iskander Mirza Governor General/President August 1955-October 1958
Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali Prime Minister August 1955-September 1956
H.S. Suhrawardy Prime Minister September 1956-October 1957
I.I. Chundrigar Prime Minister October-December 1957
Firoz Khan Noon Prime Minister December 1957-October 1958
Mohammad Ayub Khan CMLA/President October 1958-March 1969
Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan CMLA/President March 1969-December 1971
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto CMLA/President/Prime Minister December 1971-July 1977
Fazal Elahi Chaudhry President August 1973-September 1978
Mohammad Zia ul-Haq CMLA/President July 1977-August 1988
Mohammad Khan Junejo Prime Minister March 1985-May 1988
Ghulam Ishaq Khan President August 1988-July 1993
Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister December 1988-August 1990
Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi Prime Minister (caretaker) August-November 1990
Mian Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister November 1990-April 1993
Balakh Sher Mazari Prime Minister (caretaker) April-May 1993
Mian Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister May-July 1993
Wassim Sajjad President (caretaker) July-November 1993
Moeen Qureshi  Prime Minister (caretaker) July-October 1993
Benazir Bhutto Prime Minister October 1993-
Farooq Leghari President November 1993-
Nawaz Sharif Prime Minister 1997
Musharraf Military  coup                                         October1999 
1 CMLA stands for “Chief Martial Law Administrator”.  
2 When a head of state or government held more than one position, not all offices were for exactly the same 
term. Dates shown are for the longest period a leader was in power. The name of the head of State was 
changed from governor general to president under the 1956 constitution.  
 
 

























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
135 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Robert E. Looney 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
4. Feroz Hassan Khan 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
5. Karen Guttieri 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
6. Peter Lavoy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
7. Rasmussen, Maria  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
8. The Defense and Military Attaché  
Embassy of Pakistan 
Washington DC  
